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First J ial District Court - Boundary County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000266 Current Judge: Jeff M. Brudie 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Melvin Peterson Deceased 
User: 
DARM STRONG 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Melvin Peterson Deceased 
Date Code User Judge 
712612007 NCIE STACY Application For Informal Probate and Justin W. Julian 
Appointment Of A Personal Rep 
STACY Filing: L 4 - Probate Matters Asking For Justin W. Julian 
Appointment Of Personal Rep. Paid by: John 
Finney Receipt number: 0002453 Dated: 
712612007 Amount $88.00 (Check) For: 
Peterson, Cathie (other party) 
APER STACY Other party: Peterson, Cathie Appearance John Justin W. Julian 
A Finney 
STACY Renoucement of And Consent to Appointment As Justin W. Julian 
Personal Rep 
ORDR TACIE Statement Of Informal Probate And Appointment Justin W. Julian 
Of A Personal Representative 
ORDR TACIE Letters Of Personal Representative Justin W. Julian 
CDIS TACIE Civil Disposition entered for: Peterson, Cathie, Justin W. Julian 
Other Party; Peterson, Melvin, Subject. 
order date: 712612007 
STAT TACIE ST A TUS CHANGED: Closed Justin W. Julian 
713012007 TACIE Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And Justin W. Julian 
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid 
by: Finney Receipt number: 0002493 Dated: 
713012007 Amount $.50 (Check) 
TACIE Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Justin W. Julian 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Finney Receipt number: 0002493 Dated: 
713012007 Amount $1.00 (Check) 
9/6/2007 AFFD TACIE Affidavit Of Publication Justin W. Julian 
11/19/2007 DENO DARMSTRONG Demand For Notice Justin W. Julian 
CLAI DARMSTRONG Claim Against Estate Justin W. Julian 
11/30/2007 MISC DARMSTRONG Disallowance of Creditor's Claim and Request for Justin W. Julian 
Itemization 
12/10/2007 CLAI ROSE Amended Claim Against Estate Justin W. Julian 
PETN ROSE Petition for Allowance of Claim Justin W. Julian 
12/13/2007 NOTC DARMSTRONG Notice of Disallowance of Amended Claim Justin W. Julian 
Against Estate 
12/19/2007 PETN ROSE Petition to Require Payment of Claim Justin W. Julian 
12/28/2007 PETN ROSE Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim Justin W. Julian 
1/4/2008 MISC TACIE Objections Justin W. Julian 
2/26/2008 HRSC JAMIE Hearing Scheduled (Petition 03/25/2008 10:30 Justin W. Julian 
AM) for Allownace of Amended Claim 
NOTH JAMIE Notice Of Hearing Justin W. Julian 
APER JAMIE Other party: State of Idaho, Dept of Health and Justin W. Julian 
Welfare Appearance Larry L. Goins 
\ 
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ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000266 Current Judge: Jeff M. Brudie 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Melvin Peterson Deceased 
User: 
DARM STRONG 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Melvin Peterson Deceased 
Date Code User Judge 
312512008 HRHD JAMIE Hearing result for Petition held on 0312512008 Justin W. Julian 
10:30 AM: Hearing Held for Allowance of 
Amended Claim 
*LOG JAMIE #8-2-4 Justin W. Julian 
41412008 ORDR JAMIE Order Granting Petition for Allowance of Justin W. Julian 
Amended Claim 
CDIS JAMIE Civil Disposition entered for: Peterson, Cathie, Justin W. Julian 
Other Party; State of Idaho, Dept. of Health and 
Welfare, Other Party. 
order date: 4/4/2008 
STAT JAMIE STATUS CHANGED: Closed Justin W. Julian 
51512008 REOP DARMSTRONG Reopen (case Previously Closed) Justin W. Julian 
PETN DARMSTRONG Petition to Require Payment of Claim Justin W. Julian 
BREF DARMSTRONG Brief in Support of Petition to Require Payment of Justin W. Julian 
Claim 
NOTC DARMSTRONG Notice of hearing Justin W. Julian 
HRSC DARMSTRONG Hearing Scheduled (Petition 06/03/2008 02:00 Justin W. Julian 
pm) to Require Payment of Claim 
512812008 MISC JAMIE Personal Representative's Inventory Justin W. Julian 
OBJC JAMIE Objection to Petition to Require Payment of Claim Justin W. Julian 
6/3/2008 CMIN ROSE Court Minutes Hearing type: Petition Hearing Justin W. Julian 
date: 61312008 Time: 9:24 am Audio tape number: 
8-2-7 
INHD ROSE Hearing result for Petition held on 0610312008 Justin W. Julian 
02:00 PM: Interim Hearing Held to Require 
Payment of Claim 
3/12/2008 ORDR ROSE Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim Justin W. Julian 
3/6/2008 MOTN JAMIE Motion to Hire Appraiser and Notice of Hearing Justin W. Julian 
HRSC JAMIE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0812612008 11 :00 Justin W. Julian 
AM) To Hire Appraiser 
3/11/2008 OBJC DARMSTRONG Objection to Motion to Hire Appraiser Justin W. Julian 
NOTC DARMSTRONG Notice of Hearing Justin W. Julian 
MOTN DARMSTRONG Motion for Hearing by Telephonic Conference Justin W. Julian 
HRSC DARMSTRONG Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0812612008 11 :00 Justin W. Julian 
AM) Objection to Appraiser 
3/12/2008 ORDR JAMIE Order for Hearing by Telephonic Conference Justin W. Julian 
3/19/2008 CONT ROSE Hearing result for Motion held on 0812612008 Justin W. Julian 
11:00AM: Continued Objection to Appraiser 
CONT ROSE Hearing result for Motion held on 0812612008 Justin W. Julian 
11:00AM: Continued To Hire Appraiser 
3/20/2008 NOTH JAMIE Amended Notice of Hearing Justin W. Julian 
HRSC JAMIE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/15/2008 09:00 Justin W. Julian 
AM) To Hire Appraiser 
~ 
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DARMSTRONG 








































JAMIE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/15/2008 09:00 Justin W. Julian 
AM) Ojection to Hire Appraiser 
DARMSTRONG Hearing result for Motion held on 09/15/2008 Justin W. Julian 
09:00 AM: Interim Hearing Held To Hire 
Appraiser 
DARMSTRONG Court Log 8-1-37 Justin W. Julian 
DARMSTRONG Order Approving Hiring of Appraiser Justin W. Julian 












Notice Of Hearing Justin W. Julian 
Motion For Hearing By Telephonic Conference Justin W. Julian 
Order For Hearing By Telephonic Conference Justin W. Julian 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Justin W. Julian 
0610912009 11 :00 AM) Short Form Appraisal 
Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on Justin W. Julian 
0610912009 11 :00 AM: Hearing Vacated Short 
Form Appraisal 
Goins appearing telephonically 
Email fr Goins Office taking down hearing of 
6-9-09 
Justin W. Julian 
Notice of Filing Apprasial Report and Addendum Justin W. Julian 
Petition to Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Justin W. Julian 
Department 
Brief in Support of Petition Justin W. Julian 
Notice Of Hearing Justin W. Julian 
Hearing Scheduled (Petition 07/28/2009 10:30 Justin W. Julian 
AM) to Compel Sale 
DARMSTRONG Hearing result for Petition held on 0712812009 Justin W. Julian 
10:30 AM: Disposition With Hearing to Compel 
Sale 
DARMSTRONG Court Log 9-1-31A Justin W. Julian 
DARMSTRONG Order Granting Petition to Compel Justin W. Julian 
DARMSTRONG STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Justin W. Julian 
JAMIE Filing: L2 -Appeal, Magistrate Division to District Justin W. Julian 
Court Paid by: Finney, John A (attorney for 
Peterson, Cathie) Receipt number: 0007023 
Dated: 812012009 Amount: $53.00 (Check) For: 
Peterson, Cathie (other party) 
DARMSTRONG Appeal Filed In District Court Justin W. Julian 
DARMSTRONG Change Assigned Judge 
DARMSTRONG STATUS CHANGED: Reopened 
DARMSTRONG Estimate Of Transcript Cost 
DARMSTRONG Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 7085 Dated 
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ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000266 Current Judge: Jeff M. Brudie 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Melvin Peterson Deceased 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Melvin Peterson Deceased 
Date Code User 
9/14/2009 TRAN DARMSTRONG Transcript Filed (7/28/09) 
TRAN DARMSTRONG Transcript Filed (6/3/08) 
NOTC DARMSTRONG Notice of Balance Due 
NOTC DARMSTRONG Notice of Lodging 
9/21/2009 BNDV DARMSTRONG Bond Converted (Transaction number 642 dated 
9/21/2009 amount 126.75) 
BONT DARMSTRONG Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 7424 Dated 
9/21/2009 for 9.75) 
BNDV DARMSTRONG Bond Converted (Transaction number 643 dated 
9/21/2009 amount 9.75) 
912312009 MISC JAMIE Receipt of Transcript-Finney 
MISC JAMIE Receipt of Transcript-Finney 
10/1/2009 MISC DARMSTRONG Receipt of Transcipt - Cartwright 
MISC DARMSTRONG Receipt of Transcript - Cartwright 
CTSV DARMSTRONG Certificate Of Service 
APER DARMSTRONG Other party: State of Idaho, Dept. of Health and 
Welfare Appearance W. Cory Cartwright 
10/9/2009 NOTC DARMSTRONG Notice of Settling Transcript on Appeal 
11/13/2009 BREF DARMSTRONG Appellant's Brief 
12/14/2009 BREF DARMSTRONG Respondent's Brief 
12/23/2009 BREF DARMSTRONG Appellant's Reply Brief 
12/31/2009 HRSC DARMSTRONG Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal 
03/02/2010 02:00 PM) 
DARMSTRONG Notice Of Hearing 
3/2/2010 ADVS DARMSTRONG Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held 
on 03/02/2010 02:00 PM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement 
CMIN DARMSTRONG Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Oral Argument on Appeal 
Hearing date: 3/2/2010 
Time: 2: 18 pm 
Court reporter: Val Larsen 
Minutes Clerk: Della Armstrong 
Tape Number: 10-1-9 
Party: Cathie Peterson, Attorney: John Finney 
Party: State of Idaho, Dept. of Health and 
Welfare, Attorney: W. Cory Cartwright 
i/26/2010 DEOP DARMSTRONG Decision On Appeal 
)/3/2010 MEMO KWESTBROOK Memorandum Of Costs 
i/23/2010 INVE DARMSTRONG Amended Personal Representative's Inventory 
PETN DARMSTRONG Petition for Approval of And Partial Payment of 
Attorney Fees and Costs and Notice of Hearing 




























Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Date: 2/6/2013 
Time: 12:08 PM 
Page 5 of 11 
First Ju al District Court - Boundary County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000266 Current Judge: Jeff M. Brudie 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Melvin Peterson Deceased 
User: 
DARM STRONG 








































DARMSTRONG Hearing Scheduled (Petition 07/19/2010 09:00 Justin W. Julian 
AM) Approval of and Partial Payment of Attorney 
Fees and Costs I Authority to Sell 
KWESTBROOK Petition For Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Justin W. Julian 
Law 
DARMSTRONG Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for 
Payment of Attorney Fees 
DARMSTRONG Hearing Scheduled (Petition 08/10/2010 02:00 
PM) fo Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
DARMSTRONG Notice of Hearing Justin W. Julian 
JAMIE Amended Notice Of Hearing Steve Verby 
JAMIE Continued (Petition 08/10/2010 02:00 PM) Justin W. Julian 
Approval of and Partial Payment of Attorney Fees 
and Costs I Authority to Sell 
DARMSTRONG Order Awarding Costs 
DARMSTRONG Clerk's Remittitur 
DARMSTRONG Remanded 
DARMSTRONG Change Assigned Judge 
ROSE Hearing Scheduled (Status 07/27/2010 09:30 
AM) re trial 
ROSE Notice Of Hearing 
DARMSTRONG Motion to Appear Telephonically 
JAMIE Order for Hearing by Telephonic Conference 
KWESTBROOK Hearing result for Status held on 07/27/2010 
09:30 AM: Hearing Held re trial 
Cartwright telephonic 
KWESTBROOK Court Minutes 
ROSE 
ROSE 
Hearing type: Status 
Hearing date: 7/27/2010 
Time: 9:32 am 
Minutes Clerk: K. Westbrook 
Tape Number: 10-1-31 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
10/05/2010 10:00 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 10/21/2010 
09:30 AM) 




Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 





Notice of Discovery Justin W. Julian 
Motion to Appear Telephonically Justin W. Julian 
Order for Hearing by Telephonic Conference Justin W. Julian 
Hearing result for Petition held on 08/10/2010 Justin W. Julian 
02:00 PM: Interim Hearing Held for Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law 
5 
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Hearing result for Petition held on 08/10/2010 Justin W. Julian 
02:00 PM: Interim Hearing Held Approval of and 
Partial Payment of Attorney Fees and Costs I 
Authority to Sell 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Petitions 
Hearing date: 8/10/2010 
Time: 2:06 pm 
Minutes Clerk: Jamie Wilson 
Tape Number: 10-1-33 
Party: Cathie Peterson, Attorney: John Finney 
Party: State of Idaho, Dept. of Health and 
Welfare, Attorney: W. Cory Cartwright 
Justin W. Julian 
Order Approving Sale Justin W. Julian 
Order for Partial Payment of Attorney Fees and Justin W. Julian 
Payment of Costs 
Stipulation Regarding Partial Payment of Attorney Justin W. Julian 
Fees 
Notice of Serving Responses to First Requests Justin W. Julian 
for Admission 
Notice of Deposition 
JAMIE Amended Notice of Deposition 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian KWESTBROOK Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For 
Automatic Disqualification 
KWESTBROOK Motion To Strike 
KWESTBROOK Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Strike 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
KWESTBROOK Petition For Removal Of Personal Representative Justin W. Julian 
For Cause 
KWESTBROOK Memorandum In Support Of Petition For Removal Justin W. Julian 
KWESTBROOK Demand For Notice And Special Appearance (1.C. Justin W. Julian 
15-3-204) (l.R.C.P. Rule 4(i)(2)) 
KWESTBROOK Other party: Peterson, Cathie Appearance Brent Justin W. Julian 
C. Featherston 
KWESTBROOK Filing: J1b- Probate, Demand for notice Paid by: Justin W. Julian 
Featherston, Brent C. (attorney for Peterson, 
Cathie) Receipt number: 0003739 Dated: 
9/23/2010 Amount: $9.00 (Check) For: Peterson, 
Cathie (other party) 
KWESTBROOK Motion For Automatic Disqualification Of Judge Justin W. Julian 
1.R.C.P. 40(d)(1) 
KWESTBROOK Amended Motion For Automatic Disqualification Justin W. Julian 
Of Judge l.R.C.P. 40(d)(1) 
JAMIE Filing: J 1 a - Probate, petition for distribution of Justin W. Julian 
estate Paid by: Finney, John A (attorney for 
Peterson, Cathie) Receipt number: 0003753 
Dated: 9/24/2010 Amount: $25.00 (Check) For: 
Peterson, Cathie (other party) 
lo 
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First J ·a1 District Court - Boundary County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000266 Current Judge: Jeff M. Brudie 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Melvin Peterson Deceased 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Melvin Peterson Deceased 
Date Code User 
9/23/2010 JAMIE Filing: J1d - Probate, intermediate or final 
accounting of personal rep Paid by: Finney, 
John A. (attorney for Peterson, Cathie) Receipt 
number: 0003753 Dated: 9/24/2010 Amount: 
$9.00 (Check) For: Peterson, Cathie (other party) 
MISC JAMIE Personal Representative's Final Accounting and 
Petition for Decree of Distribution; and Notice of 
Hearing 
9/27/2010 ORDR ROSE Order Denying Amended Motion for Automatic 
Disqualification - I RCP 40( d)( 1) 
NOTH JAMIE Notice Of Hearing 
HRSC JAMIE Hearing Scheduled (Motions 10/07 /2010 11 :00 
AM) to Strike and for Removal of PR for Cause 
NOTC JAMIE Notice to Vacate Deposition 
9/29/2010 MISC JAMIE Objections 
10/5/2010 INHD JAMIE Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 
10/05/2010 10:00 AM: Interim Hearing Held 
Carwright telephonic 
CMIN JAMIE Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference 
Hearing date: 10/5/2010 
Time: 10:07 am 
Courtroom: 002 
Minutes Clerk: Jamie Wilson 
Tape Number: FD2 
Party: Cathie Peterson, Attorney: John Finney 
Party: State of Idaho, Dept. of Health and 
Welfare, Attorney: W. Cory Cartwright 
10/7/2010 INHD DARMSTRONG Hearing result for Motions held on 10/07/2010 
11:00 AM: Interim Hearing Held to Strike and 
for Removal of PR for Cause 
CMIN DARMSTRONG Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motion I Petition 
Hearing date: 10/7/2010 
Time: 11 :02 am 
Courtroom: 1 
Minutes Clerk: Della Armtrong 
Tape Number: FD 1 
Party: Cathie Peterson, Attorney: John Finney 
Party: Cathie Peterson, Attorney: Brent 
Featherston 
Party: State of Idaho, Dept. of Health and 
Welfare, Attorney: W. Cory Cartwright 
ORDR DARMSTRONG Order Removing Personal Representative 
PETN DARMSTRONG Petition for Formal Apointment of Successor 
Personal Representative 
ACAP DARMSTRONG Acceptance Of Appointment 
HRVC DARMSTRONG Hearing result for Court Trial held on 10/21/2010 





Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
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ROA Report 
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In The Matter Of The Estate Of Melvin Peterson Deceased 
Date Code User 
10/13/2010 DARMSTRONG Filing: L2 - Appeal, Magistrate Division to District 
Court Paid by: Finney, John A (attorney for 
Peterson, Cathie) Receipt number: 0004055 
Dated: 10/14/2010 Amount: $53.00 (Check) For: 
Peterson, Cathie (other party) 
APDC DARMSTRONG Notice of Appeal 
CHJG DARMSTRONG Change Assigned Judge 
10/14/2010 ESTM DARMSTRONG Estimate Of Transcript Cost 
10/19/2010 ORDR DARMSTRONG Order For Appointment of Successor Personal 
Representative 
11/3/2010 BONT DARMSTRONG Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 4334 Dated 
11/3/2010 for 225.00) 
11/22/2010 NOTC DARMSTRONG Notice of Lodging 
TRAN DARMSTRONG Transcript Filed (10/7/10 Petition & Motion) 
11/23/2010 BNDV DARMSTRONG Bond Converted (Transaction number 326 dated 
11/23/2010amount139.75) 
11/29/2010 MISC JAMIE Receipt of Transcript - Featherston 
12/1/2010 MISC JAMIE Receipt of Transcript - Finney 
12/3/2010 MISC DARMSTRONG Receipt of Transcript - Cartwright 
12/20/2010 NOTC DARMSTRONG Notice of Scheduling Transcript on Appeal and 
Briefing Schedule 
1 /20/2011 BNDE DARMSTRONG Transcript Bond Exonerated (Amount 85.25) 
1/24/2011 BREF KWESTBROOK Appellant's Brief 
2/25/2011 BREF DARMSTRONG Respondent's Brief 
i/4/2011 NOTC DARMSTRONG Notice of Oral Argument 
HRSC DARMSTRONG Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 05/03/2011 
11:30 AM) 
)/2/2011 CONT DARMSTRONG Continued (Oral Argument 05/03/2011 02:30 
PM) 
DARMSTRONG Amended Notice Of Hearing 
5/3/2011 DPHR DARMSTRONG Hearing result for Oral Argument held on 
05/03/2011 02:30 PM: Disposition With Hearing 
Bonner County Courthouse 
*LOG DARMSTRONG Bonner Co. Minutes (No CD provided) 
)/11/2011 ORDR DARMSTRONG Order 
)/27/2011 CLAM JAMIE Claim for Unpaid Attorney Fees and Costs 
i/27/2011 REMT DARMSTRONG Remittitur 
RMAN DARMSTRONG Remanded 
CHJG DARMSTRONG Change Assigned Judge 
i/29/2011 HRSC ROSE Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling and Planning 
07/26/2011 09:30 AM) 





Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 






















Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Date: 2/6/2013 
Time: 12:08 PM 
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Case: CV-2007-0000266 Current Judge: Jeff M. Brudie 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Melvin Peterson Deceased 
User: 
DARM STRONG 



































KWESTBROOK Motion To Appear Telephonically 
KWESTBROOK Order For Hearing By Telephonic Conference 
JAMIE Hearing result for Scheduling and Planning 
scheduled on 07/26/2011 09:30 AM: Interim 





Hearing type: Scheduling and Planning 
Hearing date: 7/26/2011 
Time: 9:36 am 
Courtroom: 001 
Minutes Clerk: Jamie Wilson 
Party: Cathie Peterson, Attorney: John Finney 
Party: State of Idaho, Dept. of Health and 
Welfare, Attorney: W. Cory Cartwright 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 09/29/2011 
09:30 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Judge 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
ROSE Letter fr Carl Peterson re notices of hearings Justin W. Julian 
KWESTBROOK Affidavit Of Service Justin W. Julian 
ROSE Motion to Quash Subpoena and Notice of Hearing Justin W. Julian 
ROSE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/29/2011 09:30 Justin W. Julian 






Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Justin W. Julian 
09/29/2011 09:30 AM: Hearing Held to Quash 
Subpoena 
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 
09/29/2011 09:30 AM: Court Trial Started 
Justin W. Julian 
Personal Representative's Requested Findings of Justin W. Julian 
Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Court Trial 
Hearing date: 9/29/2011 
Time: 9:28 am 
Minutes Clerk: Rose Sprungl 
Closing Brief (Cartwright) 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
DARMSTRONG Cathy Peterson's Responsive Brief (Featherston) Justin W. Julian 




Memorandum Opinion Justin W. Julian 
Civil Disposition entered for: Peterson, Cathie, Justin W. Julian 
Other Party; State of Idaho, Dept. of Health and 
Welfare, Other Party. Case Close date: 
1/10/2012 
Order re Value of Estate Interest Justin W. Julian 
Date: 2/6/2013 
Time: 12:08 PM 
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First J · ial District Court - Boundary County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000266 Current Judge: Jeff M. Brudie 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Melvin Peterson Deceased 
User: 
DARMSTRONG 






















































KWESTBROOK Filing: L2 - Appeal, Magistrate Division to District Justin W. Julian 





for Peterson, Cathie) Receipt number: 0000429 
Dated: 2/7/2012 Amount: $53.00 (Check) For: 
Peterson, Cathie (other party) 
Notice of Appeal 
Appeal Filed In District Court 
STATUS CHANGED: Reopened 
Change Assigned Judge 
JAMIE Estimate of Transcript Cost 
DARMSTRONG Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 520 Dated 
2/15/2012 for 225.00) 
JAMIE Transcript Filed 
JAMIE Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal 
KWESTBROOK Receipt Of Transcript (J. Finney) 
JAMIE Receipt of Transcript (B Featherston) 




Bond Converted (Transaction number 60 dated 
4/4/2012 amount 172.25) 
Transcript Bond Exonerated (Amount 52.75) 
Notice of Settling Transcript on Appeal and 
Briefing Schedule 
JAMIE Stipulation to Extend Briefing Deadlines 
KWESTBROOK Order Extending Briefing Deadlines 
JAMIE Appellant's Brief 
JAMIE Respondent's Brief 
DARMSTRONG Appellant's Reply Brief 
DARMSTRONG Order of Reassignment 
DARMSTRONG Order Assigning Judge 
DARMSTRONG Change Assigned Judge 
DARMSTRONG Motion for Automatic Disqualification of Judge 
(Featherston) 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 



















Jeff M. Brudie 
Jeff M. Brudie 
DARMSTRONG Order Denying Motion for Automatic Jeff M. Brudie 
Disqualification 
DARMSTRONG Order Scheduling Oral Argument Jeff M. Brudie 
DARMSTRONG Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 10/12/2012 Jeff M. Brudie 
10:00 AM) 
KWESTBROOK Notice Of Not Attending Jeff M. Brudie 
DARMSTRONG Hearing result for Oral Argument scheduled on Jeff M. Brudie 
10/12/2012 10:00 AM: Interim Hearing Held 
DARMSTRONG Case Taken Under Advisement Jeff M. Brudie 
\0 
Date: 3/1/2013 
Time: 10:07 AM 
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First J ial District Court - Boundary County 
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Case: CV-2007-0000266 Current Judge: Jeff M. Brudie 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Melvin Peterson Deceased 
User: 
DARM STRONG 





























DARMSTRONG Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Oral Argument 
Hearing date: 10/15/2012 
Time: 9:54 am 
Courtroom: 001 
Minutes Clerk: Della Armstrong 
Party: Cathie Peterson, Attorney: Brent 
Featherston 
Party: State of Idaho, Dept. of Health and 
Welfare, Attorney: W. Cory Cartwright 
Judge 
Jeff M. Brudie 
DARMSTRONG Memorandum Opinion Jeff M. Brudie 
JAMIE Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Jeff M. Brudie 
Supreme Court Paid by: Featherston Law Firm 
Receipt number: 0004017 Dated: 12/27/2012 
Amount: $109.00 (Check) For: Peterson, Cathie 
(other party) 
DARMSTRONG Appealed To The Supreme Court 
DARMSTRONG STATUS CHANGED: Inactive 
DARMSTRONG Notice Of Appeal 
DARMSTRONG Estimate of Clerk's Record ($250.00) 
DARMSTRONG Request for Additional Record 
Jeff M. Brudie 
Jeff M. Brudie 
Jeff M. Brudie 
Jeff M. Brudie 
Jeff M. Brudie 
DARMSTRONG Order Re Reporter's Trancript Fee Jeff M. Brudie 
DARMSTRONG Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 37 4 Dated 2/4/2013 Jeff M. Brudie 
for 250.00) 
DARMSTRONG Revised Estimate of Clerk's Record ($487.50 now Jeff M. Brudie 
due) 
DARMSTRONG Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 488 Dated Jeff M. Brudie 
2/13/2013 for 200.00) 
DARMSTRONG Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 508 Dated Jeff M. Brudie 
2/15/2013 for 437.50) 
DARMSTRONG Bond Converted (Transaction number 45 dated Jeff M. Brudie 
2/28/2013 amount 169.00) 
DARMSTRONG Notice of Transcript Lodged Jeff M. Brudie 
\ t 
' JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East Lake Street, Ste 317 
Sandpoint ID 83864 
Phone: 208/263-7712 
Fax: 208/263-8211 
ISB. No. 5413 
FILED 
ZU01 JUL 2b A II: I LI 
IN THE DISTRICT COOR'l' OF '.rHE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 















Case No. CV-07- :<.{z0 
APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL 
PROBATE AND APPOINTMENT 
OF A PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE 
Fee Category: L(4) 
Fee: $88.00 
Your Applicant, CATHIE L. PETERSON, respectfully shows as 
follows: 
1. CATHIE L. PETERSON is the daughter of the Decedent. 
The Decedent, MELVIN PETERSON, died intestate. CATHIE L. PETERSON 
and CARL PETERSON are the sole surviving issue and heirs at law of 
the Decedent. CARL PETERSON has executed a Renouncement Of And 
Consent To Appointment as Personal Representative in favor of the 
Applicant to be Personal Representative. 
2. MELVIN PETERSON died on March 3, 2007. At the time of 
his death, the Decedent was domiciled of Boundary County, Idaho. 
3. Venue for this proceeding is in Boundary County, Idaho, 
because the Decedent was domiciled in Boundary County, Idaho. 
APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL PROBATE AND 
APPOINTMENT OF A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE -1 
4. The names and addresses of the heirs of the Decedent 
are, 
Nam.es 
Cathie L. Peterson 
P.O. Box 442 
Moyie Springs, ID 83845 
Carl. Peterson 
2302 6th Avenue, Apt 121 




5. No personal representative has been appointed in this 
State or elsewhere. 
6. Your Applicant has not received a demand for notice and 
is not aware of a demand for notice of any probate or appointment 
proceeding concerning the Decedent that may have been filed in 
this State or elsewhere. 
7. The time limit for informal. probate and appointment of 
a personal represen ta ti ve has not expired because not more than 
three (3) years have passed since the Decedent's death. 
8. Your Applicant, CATHIE L. PETERSON, hereby accepts 
appointment as Personal Representative of the estate. 
WHEREFORE, your AppJ.icant prays that she be appointed 
Personal Representative of the Decedent's Estate and that Letters 
of Personal Representative be issued to her, based upon the 
renouncement of CARL PETERSON. 
DATED this ~:) ~y of July, 2007. 
APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL PROBATE AND 
APPOINTMENT OF A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE -2 
\~ 
BN A. FINNEY, Attorney f 
THIE L. PETERSON, Applic 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
SS. 
County of Boundary ) 
I, CATHIE L. PETERSON, being first duly sworn on oath, 
depose and say: That I am the Applicant in the foregoing 
Application For Info:anal Probate of Will and Appointment of 
Personal Representative. That I have read the foregoing and know 
the contents therein to be true to the best of my knowledge, 
information, and belief. 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S ACCEPTANCE AND OATH 
I, CATHIE L. PETERSON, hereby accept the duties of Personal 
Representative of the above-named estate, and I do solemnly swear 
that I will perfo:an, according to law, the duties of Personal 
Representative of the Estate of MELVIN PETERSON. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this :J:?~y of July, 
2007. 
APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL PROBATE AND 
APPOINTMENT OF A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE -3 
1U. 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: 208-263-7712 
Fax: 208-263-8211 
ISB No. 5413 
FILED 
2001 JUL 2b A II: 15 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 













Case No. CV-07-tf.14(,a 
RENOUNCEMENT OF AND 
CONSENT TO APPOINTMENT AS 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
COMES NOW, CARL PETERSON, and states as follows: 
1. I am an issue (son) and heir at law of the Decedent. 
2. I hereby renounce my right to appointment as Personal 
Representative of the above-named estate, pursuant to I.e. § 15-
3-203. 
3. I hereby consent to the appointment of my sister, 
CATHIE L. PETERSON, as personal representative of the above 
referenced estate. 
CARL PETE 
RENOUNCEMENT OF AND CONSENT TO APPOINTMENT AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 1 
\5 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: 208-263-7712 
Fax: 208-263-8211 
ISB NO. 5413 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 












Case No. CV-2007-j{/J/t:; 
STATEMENT OF INFORMAL 
PROBATE AND APPOINTMENT 
OF A PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE 
The Application of CATHIE L. PETERSON for the informal 
probate of the Estate of MELVIN PETERSON, and the appointment of 
a personal representative having come before the Court, and it 
appearing that the Application is complete and contains the 
Applicant's oath or affirmation that the statements contained 
therein are true to the best of her knowledge and belief, the 
Court makes the following findings based upon said Application: 
1. The Decedent, MELVIN PETERSON, died on March 3, 2007, 
without a Will, and at least five (5) days have elapsed since 
the Decedent's death. 
STATEMENT OF rNFO:RMAL PROBATE AND 
APPOrNTMENT OF A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 1 
\ \.o 
2. The Applicant, CATHIE L. PETERSON, is an interested 
person as defined by the laws of this State by reason of the 
fact that she is an issue of the Decedent. The Decedent's only 
other issue is CARL PETERSON and he nominated, renounced and 
consented to the Applicant's appointment as Personal 
Representative. 
3. Venue is proper because the Decedent was domiciled in 
Boundary County, Idaho. 
4. No notice is necessary, and the .Application is not 
within Idaho Code § 15-3-204. 
5. The time for original probate has not expired. 
6. A personal representative has not been appointed in 
this or any other county of this State. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 
1. The .Application for Informal Probate is hereby granted 
and is hereby admitted to informal probate. 
2. The .Application for Informal Appointment of a Personal 
Representative is hereby granted and CATHIE L. PETERSON is 
hereby appointed as Personal Representative of the Estate of 
MELVIN PETERSON. 
3. Letters of Personal Representative shall be issued to 
CATHIE L. PETERSON. 
DATED this Q) 6 day of Jul , 2007. 
STATEMENT OF INFOBMAL PROBATE AND 
APPOINTMENT OF A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 2 
\t 
MAG 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: 208-263-7712 
Fax: 208-263-8211 
ISB NO. 5413 
STATE Of: IDAHO 
cou~~~OUN~AB FILED AT ' 
BY GLEND&efR 
D PUTYCLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 












Case No. CV-2007-cfl/p(t; 
LETTERS OF PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE 
The Estate of MELVIN PETERSON, having been admitted to 
informal probate, CATHIE L. PETERSON is hereby appointed 
Personal Representative of the Estate. 
WITNESS: 
of the District Court, County 
the seal of the Court 
\<t 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
FILED 
ZD01 AUG -8 A II: 51.t Phone: 208-263-7712 
Fax: 208-263-8211 
I.S.B. 5413 
STATE Of !OAHO 
COUNTY Of BOUNDARY 
~LEN~A~~ 
" q£PUTY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 












Case No. CV-07-266 
NOTICE TO HEIRS 
COMES NOW, CATHIE L. PETERSON, and pursuant to Idaho Code 
§15-3-705, gives notice that she has been appointed Personal 
Representative of the Estate of MELVIN PETERSON, deceased, who 
died intestate, without a Will, and a copy of this Notice and a 
copy of the Application for Informal Probate and Appointment of 
a Personal Representative are being mailed to: 
Cathie L. Peterson 
P.O. Box 442 
Moyie Springs, ID 83845 
DATED this 
NOTICE TO HEIRS - 1 
Carl Peterson 
2302 6th Avenue, Apt 121 
Tacoma, WA 98403 
of August, 2007. 
~--7-~ ~ OHNA:FiNNEY, Attorney for 
PETERSON, Personal Representative of 
the Estate of MELVIN PETERSON 
\~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
for~ng NOTICE TO HEIRS was mailed, postage prepaid, 
(f day of August, 2007, and was addressed to: 
Cathie L. Peterson 
P.O. Bc>x 442 
Moyie Springs, ID 83845 
Carl Peterson 
2302 6th Avenue, Apt 121 
Tacoma, WA 98403 
this 
By:~·3=~ 
NOTICE TO HEIRS - 2 QO 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: 208-263-7712 
Fax: 208-263-8211 
ISB No. 5413 
FILED 
ZOOl AUG -8 A fl: Sll 
STAIE Of IOAHO 
COUHTY Of BOUNDARY 
GLENO~~,CL~ 
8"26EPUTYE{~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 














Case No. CV-07-266 
NOTICE TO KNOWN CREDITOR 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that CATHIE L. PETERSON has been 
appointed Personal Representative for the Estate of MELVIN 
PETERSON. You must present your claim against the deceased or 
his estate within four (4) months after the date of the first 
publication of the Notice To Creditors or within 60 days after 
the mailing of this notice, whichever is later notice or said 
claims will be forever barred. Claims must either be presented 
to the undersigned at the address indicated, or filed with the 
NOTICE TO KNOWN REDITORS - 1 
Clerk of the Court and a copy furnished to the Personal 
Representative's attorney. 
DATED this ~ay of August, 2007. 
~· q- . 
%BH A. FINNEY ~<" 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
120 E. Lake Street, Ste 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Attorney for CATHIE L. 
PETERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of MELVIN PETERSON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. fl f-" I hereby certify that on the~ day of August, 2007, I 
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by 
the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
State of Idaho 
Dept of Health & Welfare 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
[XX] U.S. MAIL 
[ ] HAND DELIVERED 
[ ] OVERNIGHT MAIL 
[ ] FACSIMILE TO Fax No. 
NOTICE TO KNOWN REDITORS - 2 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Division of Human Services 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov] 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 











Case No. CV-2007-266 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE 
(I.C. § 15-3-204) 
EXEMPT: LC.§ 31-3212 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, (hereinafter the 
"Department") pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-3-204, and hereby files its Demand for Notice of orders 
or other filings pertaining to the estate of the above-named Decedent. The Department asserts that 
it has a financial or property interest in said estate based upon the amount of medical assistance 
benefits which it was required to pay on behalf of the above-named Decedent and/or Decedent's 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE - Page 1 
Y:\MRCases\ESTATE RECOVERY\ER CASES\PetersonM\C&D.wpd ~ 3 
spouse, and based upon its right to recover the amount of medical assistance benefits paid on behalf 
of the Decedent and/or Decedent's spouse as set forth at Idaho Code§ 56-218. 
The Department further requests a copy of the Inventory and Appraisement, upon its 
preparation within three months of the personal representative's appointment, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 15-3-706. 
Notice should be given to the Department through its attorney, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy 
Attorney General, Division of Human Services, 3276 Elder, Suite B, P .0. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
83720-0036. 
DATED this ~y of November, 2007. 
~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that a true and corr~ct copy of the foregoing 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE was mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the IS- day ofNovember, 
2007, to: 
CATHIE PETERSON 
C/O JOHN A. FINNEY 
120 E LAKE ST STE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE - Page 2 "'\\I 
Y:IMRCases\ESTATE RECOVERY\ER CASES\PetersonM\C&D.wpd CJ I 
BOUNDARY COUNTY CLERK 
BOUNDARY COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
POBOX419 
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805 
Barbara E. Prinzing, Legal Assistant 
Division of Human Services 
LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Division of Human Services 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov J 
FILED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 












Case No. CV-2007-266 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE 
(LC. § 15-3-804) 
EXEMPT: LC.§ 31-3212 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, by and through its 
counsel, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy Attorney General, and hereby makes claim against the above-
captioned estate. This claim is based upon the Claimant's statutory right to recover the amount of 
medical assistance paid on the Decedent's behalf, as set forth at Idaho Code§ 56-218. The Claimant 
has paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of the Decedent in the amount of $171,134.28 as of 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 1 
Y :IMRCases\EST A TE RECOVERY\ER CASES\PetersonM\C&D.wpd 
November 15, 2007. To the extent that the Claimant is obligated to make further medical assistance 
payments on the Decedent's behalf, it reserves the right to supplement its claim in this proceeding. 
DA TED this ~day of November, 2007. 
Deputy Attorney General 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Ada ) 
JULIE RAICHART, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: That I am the Claimant's 
Paralegal; that I have read the above and foregoing claim against the decedent's estate and know the 
contents thereof; and that, to my knowledge and belief, the facts stated therein are true and correct. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this f sf-4 day of November, 2007. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Commission Expires: g / / ~ / &o' -3 
I 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 2 
Y:\MRCases\ESTATE RECOVERY\ER CASES\PetersonM\C&D.wpd 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that duplicate originals of the foregoing 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE were mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the \S day of 
November, 2007, to: 
CATHIE PETERSON 
C/O JOHN A. FINNEY 
120 E LAKE ST STE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
BOUNDARY COUNTY CLERK 
BOUNDARY COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
POBOX419 
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 3 
Y :\MRCases\ESTA TE RECOVERY\ER CASES\PetersonM\C&D.wpd 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of, ) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2007-266 
DISALLOWANCE OF 
CREDITOR'S CLAIM AND 
REQUEST FOR ITEMIZATION 




TO: State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare: 
Your claim against the Estate, dated November 15, 2007, is 
disallowed and denied. This disallowance further gives you 
notice of the impending bar of Idaho Code §15-3-806 unless, as 
claimant, you take the action set forth in said Idaho Code §15-
3-806(a). 
Further, you are requested to itemize and document your 
claim that you have paid ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE THOUSAND ONE 
HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR AND 28/100 DOLLARS ($171,134.28) as medical 
assistance benefits on behalf of the Decedent. 
DATED this Z,,16~y of November, 2007. 
CJ~J~ 
Attorney for CATHIE L. PETERSON, 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of MELVIN PETERSON 
DISALLOWANCE OF CREDITOR'S CLAIM AND REQUEST FOR ITEMIZATION - l 
C)<f> 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, this 61~y of November, 
2007, and was addressed to: 
Larry L. Goins 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
Cathie L. Peterson 
P.O. Box 442 
Moyie Springs, ID 83845 
By: 
DISALLOWANCE OF CREDITOR'S CLAIM AND REQUEST FOR ITEMIZATION - 2 
~a 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Division of Human Services 
LARRYL. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov] 
FILED 
ZH01 D£C f O A q: OLJ 
ST.t,TE OF IOAHO 
~qu~rY OF BOUNDARY 
GL~NDAPOSTON.CLERK 
BL~ Dt.~tLrnl(~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 










Case No. CV-2007-266 
AMENDED CLAIM 
AGAINST ESTATE 
(Idaho Code§ 15-3-804) 
Fee: Exempt(Idaho Code§ 31-3212) 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter 
"Department"), by and through undersigned counsel, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy Attorney 
General, hereby amends its claim against the estate in the above entitled matter filed herein on 
November 19, 2007. 
This Amended Claim Against Estate is based upon the Department receiving an updated 
Client History and Profile on November 30, 2007, indicating that the Department paid medical 
3b 
assistance benefits on behalf of the Decedent in the amount of $171,386.94, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and is incorporated by reference herein. 
This claim is based upon the Claimant's statutory right to recover the amount of medical 
assistance paid on the Decedent's behalf, as set forth at Idaho Code§ 56-218. To the extent that 
the Claimant is obligated to make further medical assistance payments on the Decedent's behalf, 
it reserves the right to supplement its claim in this proceeding. 
DATEDthis~dayof DECEMBER,~ . 
~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
VERIFICATION 
ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Ada ) 
JULIE RAICHART, after being first duly sworn, deposes and states: That I am the 
Claimant's Paralegal; and I have read the above and foregoing claim against the decedent's 
estate and know the contents thereof; and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the facts 
stated therein are true and correct. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this L day of DECEMBER, 2007. 
6) 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that duplicate originals of the 
foregoing AMENDED CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE were mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the..fli: dayofDECEMBER, 2007, to: 
CATHIE PETERSON 
CIO JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE ST STE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
BOUNDARY COUNTY CLERK 
BOUNDARY COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
POBOX419 
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805 
Marchelle Premo, Legal Assistant 
Department of Health & Welfare 
\ 
.... 
1199099 MELVIN PETERSON 
Provider 
2003 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BO_LJNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
------BGUNMR¥-GOM~OSl2l+A 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNl_TY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
-BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY qoMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
. BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOStAI 
( 
State of Idaho 
epartment of Health and Welfare 
Client History & Profile 
Claims for From Date of Service 
5/21/1988 - 11/30/2007 
Run Date: 11130/2007 
Report Number: HWMF_1755A_Client History &Profile 
FOOS TDOS Billed Am Paid Amt 
!;;.,,.,"' 
3/1/2003 3/1/2003 $16.20 $5.02 
3/1/2003 3/1/2003 $221,03 $85.07 
3/1/2003 3/31/2003 $4,743.00 $3,337.12 
4/1/2003 4/1/2003 $15.00 $6.13 
4/1/2003 4/1/2003 $30.00 $13.94 
4/1/2003 4/1/2003 $74.40 $26.13 
4/1/2003 4/1/2003 $213.90 $79.25 
4/1/2003 4/1/2003 $258.16 $58.48 
411/2003 4/30/2003 $4,650.00 $3,244.12 
5/1/2003 5/1/2003 $7.36 $7.36 
5/1/2003 5/1/2003 $14.28 $8.57 
5/1/2003 5/1/2003 $31.00 $14.24 
5/1/2003 5/1/2003 $59.00 $9.60 
5/1/2003 5/1/2003 $8q.56 - $34.66 
5/1/2003 5/1/2003 $117.99 $54.05 ' 
5/1/2003 5/1/2003 $428.73 $93.85 
5/1/2003 5/31/2003 $4,805.00 $3,341.12 
6/1/2003 6/1/2003 $12.60 $8.15 
6/1/2003 611/2003 $30.00 $13.94 
6/1/2003 6/1/2003 $67.20 $26.13 
6/1/2003 6/1/2003 $104.22 $29.32 
6/1/2003 6/1/2003 $186.30 $82.49 
6/1/2003 611/2003 $414.90 $90.98 
6/1/2003 6/30/2003 $4,650.00 $3,186.12 
7/1/2003 7/1/2003 $25.20 $11.35 
7/1/2003 71112003 $30.00 $7.31 
71112003 7/112003 $31.00 $14.24 
711/2003 7/1/2003 $69.44 $26.84 
7/1/2003 7/1/2003 $104.22 $29.32 
7/1/2003 7/1/2003 $192.51 $85.07 
7/1/2003 7/1/2003 $428.73 $93.85 
7/1/2003 7/31/2003 $4,805.00 $3,341.12 
8/1/2003 8/1/2003 $3.56 $3.56 
------Bl..'.IJ2003----.Stt./2003-- $2520 $1135 
8/1/2003 8/1/2003 $30.00 $7.31 
8/1/2003 8/1/2003 $31.00 $14.24 
8/1/2003 8/1/2003 ·$69.44 $26.84 
8/1/2003 8/1/2003 $192.51 $85.07 
8/1/2003 8/31/2003 $4,805.00 $3,150.03 
9/1/2003 9/1/2003 $3.56 $3.56 
9/1/2003 9/1/2003 $15.40 $12.82 
9/1/2003 9/1/2003 $29.50 $13.79 
9/1/2003 9/1/2003 $30.00 $11.35 
9/1/2003 9/1/2003 $31.54 $19.03 
9/1/2003 9/1/2003 $60.00 $6.13 
003 9/1/2003 $122.96 $79.90 
EXHIBIT 
3~ Page 1 of9 
A 
1199099 MELVIN PETERSd .. 
Provider FOOS 
TDOS Billed Am Paid Amt 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2003 9/1/2003 
$244.80 $8.76 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2003 913012003 
$4,650.00 $2,995.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2003 10/1/2003 
$30.00 $11.35 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2003 10/1/2003 
$43.40 $27.15 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2003 10/1/2003 
$60.00 $7.31 
BOUNDARY COMMUNfTY HOSPITAL 10/1/2003 10/1/2003 
$114.24 $45.09 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2003 10/1/2003 
$127.20 $82.49 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2003 10/31/2003 
$4,805.00 $3,150.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/9/2003 10/9/2003 
$72.50 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/15/2003 10/15/2003 
$50.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/16/2003 10/16/2003 
$25.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/20/2003 10/20/2003 
$8.14 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/20/2003 10/20/2003 
$34.09 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/20/2003 10/20/2003 
$63.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/2212003 10/2212003 
$100.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2003 11/1/2003 
$3.56 $3.56 
BOUNDARY COMMUNiTY HOSPITAL 11/1/2003 11/1/2003 
$6.92 $6.92 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2003 11/1/2003 
$13.88 $13.88 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2003 11/1/2003 
$15.00 ' $11.35 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2003 11/1/2003 
$29.00 $13.64 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2003 11/1/2003 
$30.00 $7.31 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2003 11/1/2003 
$42.00 $26.43 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2003 11/1/2003 
$118.72 $77.32 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2003 11/30/2003 
$4,650.00 $2,995.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1211/2003 12/1/2003 
$1.50 $1.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2003 1211/2003 
$2.50 $2.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1211/2003 1211/2003 
$2.50 $2.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1211/2003 12/1/2003 
$12.72 $12.69 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1211/2003 1211/2003 
$13.50 $8.99 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2003 12/1/2003 
$30.00 $6.13 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1211/2003 12/1/2003 
$31.00 $14.24 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1211/2003 1211/2003 
$50.60 $21.42 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1211/2003 1211/2003 
$160.89 $93.85 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1211/2003 1211/2003 
$190.00 $71.86 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/5/2003 1215/2003 
$7.50 $7.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1215/2003 12/5/2003 
$15.00 $6.70 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1215/2003 12/5/2003 
$150,00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1215/2003 12/31/2003 
$4,239.00 $4,186.35 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1218/2003 1218/2003 
$1.50 $1.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1218/2003 12/8/2003 
$142.83 $64.39 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/26/2003 12/26/2003 
$3.56 $3.56 
CURTIS, JAMES 1214/2003 12/4/2003 
$934.00 $66.43 
KAVANAUGH, KEVIN 71912003 71912003 
$68.00 $0.00 
______ KOOTENAl .Q.OUNT'(J~M~RGENC'( MEDICAL SERVIC 12/5/2003 12/5/2003 
$325.00 $0.00 
KOOTENAI COUNTY EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVIC 1215/2003 1215/2003 
$624.00 $15.78 
KOOTENAI MEDICAL CENTER 1213/2003 12/3/2003 
$28.20 $1.63 
KOOTENAI MEDICAL CENTER 12/3/2003 12/5/2003 
$840.00 $840.00 
PATAKY, JAMES 12/3/2003 1213/2003 
$38.00 $4.42 
PATAKY, JAMES 12/3/2003 1213/2003 
$216.00 $27.25 
PATAKY, JAMES 1214/2003 12/4/2003 
$50.00 $5.91 




BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2004 1/1/2004 
$3.56 $3.56 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 111/2004 1/1/2004 
$3.56 $3.56 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2004 1/1/2004 
$15.00 $6.70 
~u -- --- ..,, -~"' 
1199099 MELVIN PETERSd. _ 
Provider FOOS 
TDOS Billed Am Paid Amt 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2004 . 1/1/2004 
$15.00 $6.70 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2004 111/2004 
$31.00 $1424 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2004 1/1/2004 
$31.00 $14.24 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2004 1/1/2004 
$68.20 $27.14 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2004 1/1/2004 
$68.20 $27.15 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2004 1/1/2004 
$192.51 $85.20 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2004 1/1/2004 
$192.51 $87.87 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2004 1/1/2004 
$288.84 $119.38 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2004 1/1/2004 
$288.84 $119.38 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2004 1/31/2004 
$4,867.00 $3,187.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1114/2004 1/14/2004 
$50.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/29/2004 1/29/2004 
$110.00 $12.58 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 2/1/2004 2/1/2004 
$116.76 $78.55 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 21112004 212912004 
$4,553.00 $2,873.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 21212004 21212004 
$12.60 $11.25 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 21212004 21212004 
$15.00 $11.35 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 21212004 21212004 
$15.00 $6.70 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 21212004 21212004 
$22.40 $17.09 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 21212004 21212004 
$29.00 $13.64 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 21212004 21212004 
$173.88 $79.85 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 21212004 21212004 
$236.64 $88.11 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 21312004 21312004 
$50.00 $6.26 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 3/1/2004 3/1/2004 
$15.00 $6.70 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 3/1/2004 3/1/2004 
$31.00 $14.24 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 311/2004 3/1/2004 
$43.40 $28.48 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 3/1/2004 3/1/2004 
$192.51 $87.87 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 3/1/2004 3/1/2004 
$252.96 $93.85 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 31112004 3/1/2004 
$377.58 $109.29 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 3/1/2004 3/31/2004 
$4,867.00 $3,187.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/1/2004 4/1/2004 
$6.34 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/1/2004 4/1/2004 
$15.00 $6.70 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/1/2004 4/1/2004 
$30.00 $13.94 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/1/2004 4/1/2004 
$42.00 $27.72 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 411/2004 4/1/2004 
$159.90 $85.20 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/1/2004 4/1/2004 
$244.80 $90.98 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/1/2004 4/1/2004 
$365.40 $206.90 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 411/2004 4/30/2004 
$4,710.00 $3,030.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/1/2004 5/1/2004 
$4.20 $4.20 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/1/2004 5/1/2004 
$6.34 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/1/2004 5/1/2004 
$12.20 $12.20 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/1/2004 5/1/2004 
$15.00 $6.70 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/1/2004 5/1/2004 
$3.1.00 $14.24 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/1/2004 5/1/2004 
$46.58 $26.96 
BOUNDABY_Q.Q~MUNffYHOSPIIAL 51112004 5/1/2004 - $16~3 ----------- $77.Q.15 ____ --·- --····-····- -------------~ 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/1/2004 5/1/2004 
$178.56 $93.85 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/1/2004 5/1/2004 
$243.18 $146.31 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/1/2004 5/31/2004 
$4,867.00 $3,187.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 6/1/2004 6/1/2004 
$6.34 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 6/1/2004 6/1/2004 
$15.00 $6.46 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 6/1/2004 6/1/2004 
$29.50 $13.79 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL ·6/1/2004 61112004 
$51.04 $27.74 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 6/1/2004 6/1/2004 
$63.72 $63.72 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 6/1/2004 6/1/2004 
$90.90 $74.73 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 6/1/2004 6/1/2004 
$108.58 $90.02 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 6/1/2004 613012004 
$4,710.00 $3,030.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/1/2004 7/1/2004 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/1/2004 7/1/2004 
$14.98 $14.98 
....... r"'.:'.'. I"'\.--->')-• n 
1199099 MELVIN PETERSd. 
Provider FOOS 
TDOS Billed Am Paid Amt 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/1/2004 71112004 
$15.00 $6.46 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/1/2004 71112004 
$31.00 $14.24 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/1/2004 71112004 
$54.56 $29.31 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 71112004 7/1/2004 
$66.96 $66.96 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/1/2004 7/1/2004 
$93.93 $77.05 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 71112004 7/1/2004 
$113.46 $93.85 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/1/2004 7/31/2004 
$4,867.00 $3,187.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 712412004 712412004 
$50.00 $7.07 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2004 8/1/2004 
$5.35 $5.35 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2004 8/1/2004 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2004 8/1/2004 
$15.00 $6.46 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2004 8/1/2004 
$20.52 $20.52 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2004 8/1/2004 
$23.76 $23.76 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2004 8/1/2004 
$31.00 $14.24 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2004 8/1/2004 
$54.56 $29.31 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2004 8/1/2004 
$93.93 $77.05 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2004 8/1/2004 
$113.46 $93.85 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2004 8/31/2004 
$4,867.00 $3,187.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/10/2004 8/10/2004 
$110.00 $14.29 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/10/2004 8/10/2004 
$140.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/10/2004 8/10/2004 
$140.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/13/2004 8/13/2004 
$30.00 $1.28 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/13/2004 8/13/2004 
$132.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2004 9/1/2004 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2004 9/1/2004 
$15.00 $7.97 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2004 9/1/2004 
$20.74 $18.24 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2004 9/1/2004 
$30.00 $7.98 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2004 9/1/2004 
$30.00 $13.94 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2004 9/1/2004 
$32.40 $32.40 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2004 9/1/2004 
$36.00 $36.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2004 9/1/2004 
$52.80 $28.53 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2004 9/1/2004 
$90.90 $74.73 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2004 913012004 
$4,710.00 $3,030.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2004 10/1/2004 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2004 10/1/2004 
$31.00 $14.24 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2004 10/1/2004 
$33.48 $33.48 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2004 10/1/2004 
$46.50 $46.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2004 10/1/2004 
$54:56 $29.31 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1011/2004 10/1/2004 
$93.93 $77.05 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2004 10/31/2004 
$4,867.00 $3,162.85 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2004 11/1/2004 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2004 11/1/2004 
$15.00 $6.46 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2004 11/1/2004 
$30.00 $13.94 
__ _SOUNQARY .Q9_MMV_NITY J:LOSPJTA_L ________________ 1J!1[2004 ____ 11/1/2004 $32.40 
$32.40 
~--- --
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2004 11/1/2004 
$34.00 
-$14.29 ______ 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2004 1111/2004 
$44.50 $44.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2004 11/1/2004 
$52.80 $13.36 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2004 11/1/2004 
$90.90 $74.73 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2.004 11/30/2004 
$4,710.00 $3,006.63 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2004 12/1/2004 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2004 12/1/2004 
$14.50 $13.08 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2004 12/1/2004 
$15.00 $6.46 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1211/2004 12/1/2004 
$31.00 $14.24 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2004 12/1/2004 
$33.48 $33.48 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2004 12/1/2004 
$46.50 $46.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2004 12/1/2004 
$93.93 $77.05 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 3tt 12/1/2004 12/31/2004 
$4,867.00 $3,162.85 
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BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
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BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL ?51 
FOOS TDOS Billed Ant Paid Amt 
1/1/2004 .1/1/2004 $39.50 $9.68 
1/1/2004 1/1/2004 $63.50 $46.00 
2/1/2004 2/1/2004 $79.00 $0.00 
2/1/2004 2/1/2004 $127.00 $30.52 
5/1/2004 51112004 $79.00 $0.00 
5/1/2004 5/1/2004 $127.00 $17.12 
6/1/2004 6/1/2004 $79.00 $0.00 
6/1/2004 6/1/2004 $127.00 $17.12 
7/1/2004 7/1/2004 $79.00 $0.00 
7/1/2004 7/1/2004 $127.00 $7.94 
712612004 712612004 $12.62 $11.36 
8/1/2004 8/1/2004 $12.62 $2.18 
11/1/2004 11/1/2004 $12.62 $2.18 
12/1/2004 12/1/2004 $12.62 $2.18 
1/14/2004 1/14/2004 $68.00 $0.70 
7/14/2004 7/14/2004 $68.00 $0.00 
10/13/2004 10/13/2004 $68.00 $0.00 
4/14/2004 4/14/2004 $68.00 $0.00 
$41,104.31 
10/1212005 10/12/2005 $68.00 $0.00 
1/1/2005 1/1/2005 $10.00 $5.50 
1/1/2005 1/1/2005 $13.00 $12.24 
1/1/2005 1/1/2005 $30.00 $7.98 
1/1/2005 1/1/2005 $31.00 $14.24 
1/1/2005 1/1/2005 $33.48 $33.48 
1/1/2005 1/1/2005 $46.50 $46.50 
1/1/2005 1/1/2005 $93.93 $77.05 
1/1/2005 1/31/2005 $4,867.00 $3,156.03 
2/1/2005 211/2005 $2.50 $2.50 
2/1/2005 2/1/2005 $10.00 $5.50 
2/1/2005 2/1/2005 $12.00 $11.28 
21112005 2/1/2005 $15.00 $6.46 
2/112005 2/1/2005 $28.00 $15.81 
2/1/2005 2/1/2005 $42.00 $25.60 
2/1/2005 2/1/2005 $84.84 $59.06 
2/1/2005 2/1/2005 $155.40 $127.17 
2/1/2005 2/28/2005 $4,508.00 $2,797.03 
212712005 212712005 $100,00 $0.00 
31112005 3/1/2005 $10.00 $5.50 
3/1/2005 3/1/2005 $13.50 $12.07 
3/1/2005 3/1/2005 $31.00 $16.97 
311/2005 3/1/2005 $73.26 $32.23 
- --3!1-/2El85---- --3-/412805----- --- -$9&93-- ------$64.86--------
31112005 3/1/2005 $172.05 $140.26 
3/1/2005 3/31/2005 $4,991.00 $3,862.41 
4/1/2005 4/1/2005 $7.50 $7.50 
4/1/2005 4/1/2005 $15.00 $6.46 
4/1 /2005 4/1 /2Q05 $24.24 $20.40 
4/1/2005 4/1/2005 $44.40 $39.86 
4/1/2005 41712005 $1,127.00 $0.00 
4/8/2005 41812005 $12.41 $0.00 
4/8/2005 41812005 $16.07 $0.00 
4/8/2005 41812005 $16.94 $0.00 
41812005 41812005 $28.40 $0.00 
41812005 41812005 $29.00 $0.00 
1199099 MELVIN PETERSd. 
Provider FOOS TDOS 
Billed Am Paid Amt 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/8/2005 4/8/2005 
$31.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/8/2005 4/8/2005 
$31.20 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/8/2005 4/8/2005 
$37.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/8/2005 4/8/2005 
$59.28 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/8/2005 4/8/2005 
$77.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/8/2005 4/8/2005 
$104.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/8/2005 4/8/2005 
$140.15 $16.69 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/8/2005 4/8/2005 
$146.11 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/8/2005 4/8/2005 
$226.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/8/2005 41812005 
$227.09 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/8/2005 4/8/2005 
$248.12 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/8/2005 4/8/2005 
$250.25 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 41812005 4/12/2005 
$912.00 $912.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 41912005 4/9/2005 
$52.00 $1.69 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/10/2005 4/10/2005 
$75.00 $0.04 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/11/2005 4/11/2005 
$75.00 $0.04 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/12/2005 4/12/2005 
$0.50 $0.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/12/2005 4/12/2005 
$8.50 $8.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/12/2005 4/12/2005 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/12/2005 4/12/2005 
$21.42 $21.42 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/12/2005 4/12/2005 
$99.90 $83.51 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/12/2005 4/1212005 
$150.00 $12.84 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/12/2005 4/12/2005 
$166.50 $6.46 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/12/2005 4/30/2005 
$3,059.00 $1,348.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/13/2005 4/13/2005 
$117.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/14/2005 4/14/2005 
$8.47 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/14/2005 4/14/2005 
$16.07 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/14/2005 4/14/2005 
$30.96 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/14/2005 4/14/2005 
$31.20 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/14/2005 4/14/2005 
$37.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/14/2005 4/14/2005 
$54.08 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/14/2005 4/14/2005 
$77.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/1/2005 5/1/2005 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/1/2005 5/1/2005 
$15.00 $6.36 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 51112005 5/1/2005 
$15.50 $13.13 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 511/2005 5/1/2005 
$15.50 $10.96 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/1/2005 5/1/2005 
$93.93 $64.86 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/1/2005 5/1/2005 
$166.50 $6.46 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 511/2005 5/1/2005 
$172.05 $140.26 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/1/2005 5/31/2005 
$4,991.00 $3,280.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 5/28/2005 512812005 
$71.00 $6.44 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 6/1/2005 6/1/2005 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 6/1/2005 6/1/2005 
$15.00 $12.86 
.. ___ £QUNDARYCOMMUNOYJioseITAL _______________ .6LV2005_ 6/1/2005 $22.25 ----- $16.01 _____ 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 6/1/2005 6/1/2005 
$27.27 $22.34 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 6/1/2005 6/1/2005 
$166.50 $135.90 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 6/1/2005 613012005 
$4,830.00 $3,119.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 61312005 61312005 
$71.00 $6.44 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 61612005 6/6/2005 
$100.00 $10.70 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 612012005 612012005 
$288.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 6/30/2005 613012005 
$20.25 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 613012005 6/30/2005 
$27.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 613012005 613012005 
$32.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 613012005 613012005 
$46.80 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/1/2005 7/1/2005 
$3.00 $3.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/1/2005 7/1/2005 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL ?'l1i 7/1/2005 7/1/2005 
$12.00 $11.23 
1199099 MELVIN PETERSO~ 
Provider FOOS 
TDOS Billed Am Paid Amt 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/1/2005 7/1/2005 
$15.50 '$10.96 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/1/2005 7/1/2005 
$22.96 $7.34 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/1/2005 7/1/2005 
$23.25 $16.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/1/2005 7/1/2005 
$166.50 $6.46 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/1/2005 7/31/2005 
$4,991.00 $3,280.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 71212005 71212005 
$80.80 $31.11 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 7/2912005 712912005 
$100.00 $10.70 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 81112005 8/1/2005 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2005 8/1/2005 
$15.50 $13.07 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 811/2005 8/1/2005 
$15.50 $10.96 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2005 8/1/2005 
$23.25 $16.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2005 8/1/2005 
$36.60 $35.30 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2005 8/1/2005 
$193.05 $119.81 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 81112005 8/1/2005 
$333.00 $7.98 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2005 8/31/2005 
$4,991.00 $3,280.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 911/2005 9/1/2005 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2005 9/1/2005 
$15.00 $12.81 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2005 9/1/2005 
$15.00 $10.76 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2005 9/1/2005 
$22.50 $16.01 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2005 9/1/2005 
$36.60 $35.30 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 911/2005 9/1/2005 
$166.50 $6.46 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2005 9/1/2005 
$297.00 $186.79 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 9/1/2005 913012005 
$4,830.00 $3,119.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2005 10/1/2005 
$1.00 $1.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1011/2005 10/1/2005 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2005 10/1/2005 
$15.00 $12.81 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2005 10/1/2005 
$15.50 $10.96 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2005 10/1/2005 
$23.25 $16.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2005 10/1/2005 
$37.82 $36.32 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2005 10/1/2005 
$172.05 $6.51 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1011/2005 10/1/2005 
$306.90 $192.85 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL· 10/1/2005 10/31/2005 
$4,991.00 $3,280.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/20/2005 10/20/2005 
$10.76 $10.76 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/20/2005 10/20/2005 
$71.00 $6.44 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2005 11/1/2005 
$4.00 $4.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2005 11/1/2005 
$9.68 $7.04 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2005 11/1/2005 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1111/2005 11/1/2005 
$11.00 $10.71 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1111/2005 11/1/2005 
$15.00 $10.76 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1111/2005 11/1/2005 
$17.70 $17.70 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2005 11/1/2005 
$22.50 $16.01 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSP IT AL 11/1/2005 11/1/2005 
$51.60 $16.22 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1111/2005 11/1/2005 
$166.50 $140.48 
__ BOUNDARY _COMM.UNlTY_HQSPJIAL _ 1Jl1!2005 ____ _11/1/2_0..QQ__ _______ 
_ __1166 .5j) ___ --- -- _ $6.46 -----
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2005 11/1/2005 
$297.00 $186.79 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2005 11/30/2005 
$4,830.00 $3,119.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2005 12/1/2005 
$2.00 $2.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2005 12/1/2005 
$3.50 $3.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2005 12/1/2005 
$4.50 $4.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2005 12/1/2005 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1211/2005 12/1/2005 
$11.00 $10.71 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2005 12/1/2005 
$15.00 $6.46 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1211/2005 12/1/2005 
$15.50 $10.96 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2005 12/1/2005 
$18.29 $18.29 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2005 12/1/2005 
$22.50 $8.62 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2005 12/1/2005 
$23.25 $16.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 3'1 12/1/2005 12/1/2005 
$172.05 $145.00 
Paae 7 of 9 
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Provider FOOS 
TDOS Billed Am Paid Amt 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1211/2005 12/1/2005 
$306.90 $192.85 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2005 12131/2005 
$4,991.00 $3,280.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/8/2005 12/8/2005 
$132.00 $15.08 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 1/3/2005 1/3/2005 
$12.62 $11.36 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 1/3/2005 1/3/2005 
$79.00 $0.00 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 1/3/2005 1/3/2005 
$127.00 $65.39 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 21112005 2/1/2005 
$79.00 $0.00 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 2/1/2005 2/1/2005 
$127.00 $7.94 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 21412005 21412005 
$12.62 $11.36 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 6/1/2005 6/1/2005 
$79.00 $0.00 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 81412005 81412005 
$20.00 $1.67 
HOSTETLER, MICHAEL 7/13/2005 7113/2005 
$68.00 $0.00 
WILLIAMS, MICHAEL 1/1212005 1/12/2005 
. $68.00 $2.09 




BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 111/2006 1/1/2006 
$166.50 $6.46 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2006 1/31/2006 
$5,270.00 $3,543.22 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/16/2006 1/16/2006 
$71.00 $4.97 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/31/2006 1/31/2006 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 211/2006 212812006 
$4,760.00 $3,034.75 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 21212006 21212006 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 2/16/2006 2116/2006 
$71.00 $30.68 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 2116/2006 2/16/2006 
$71.00 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 3/1/2006 3/31/2006 
$5,270.00 $3,543.22 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 312812006 312812006 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4/1/2006 413012006 
$5,100.00 $3,336.83 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 41712006 41712006 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 413012006 413012006 
$71.00 $8.25 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 51112006 5/31/2006 
$5,394.00 $3,505.09 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 51712006 51712006 
$20.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 6/1/2006 6/1/2006 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 61112006 613012006 
$5,220.00 $3,336.83 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 612912006 612912006 
$71.00 $8.25 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 71112006 7/31/2006 
$5,394.00 $3,683.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 716/2006 71612006 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2006 8/1/2006 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/1/2006 8/31/2006 
$5,394.00 $3,683,03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/21/2006 8/21/2006 
$8.47 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/21/2006 8/21/2006 
$35.45 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 8/31/2006 8/31/2006 
$71.00 $9.47 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 911/2006 9/30/2006 
$5,220.00 $3,509.03 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 91412006 91412006 
$10.00 $5.50 
. - -· ·-s-oUNDA:RY-COMMtJNITYr!OSPtTAL ___ -- .. . . - 9/25/20{)6- - -·. -!}/2512006. ~· ·- .. -
. -$-8:4-7-. - -$0:90- - --
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 912512006 912512006 
$35.45 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2006 10/1/2006 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/1/2006 10/31/2006 
$5,394.00 $3,636.62 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/23/2006 10/23/2006 
$71.00 $9.47 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/27/2006 10/27/2006 
$8.47 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 10/27/2006 10/27/2006 
$35.45 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2006 11/1/2006 
$10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/1/2006 11/30/2006 
$5,220.00 $3,462.62 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/27/2006 11/27/2006 
$8.47 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/27/2006 11/27/2006 
$35.45 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 11/30/2006 11/30/2006 
$51.76 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 4-b 12/1/2006 12/1/2006 
$10.00 $5.50 
D"'"'" A nf Cl 
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BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/1/2006 12/31/2006 $5,394.00 $3,636.62 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/26/2006 12/26/2006 $8.47 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12126/2006 12/26/2006 $35.45 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/29/2006 12/29/2006 $71.00 $9.47 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12130/2006. 12/30/2006 $8.47 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12/30/2006 12130/2006 $47.20 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 12130/2006 12130/2006 $59.28 $0.00 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 3/28/2006 3/28/2006 $64.80 $0.00 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 3/28/2006 3/28/2006 $118.32 $42.78 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 5/28/2006 512812006 $13.78 $11.36 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 5/28/2006 5/28/2006 $64.80 $0.00 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 5/28/2006 512812006 $118.32 $23.96 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 612612006 612612006 $13.78 $4.80 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 612612006 612612006 $25.30 $0.00 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 7/31/2006 7/31/2006 $29.58 $4.93 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 10/27/2006 10/27/2006 $25.30 $0.00 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 10/27/2006 10/27/2006 $64.80 $0.00 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 10/27/2006 10/27/2006 $118.32 $33.02 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 11/27/2006 11/27/2006 $25.30 $0.00 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 11/27/2006 11/27/2006 $29.58 $12.83 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 11/27/2006 11/27/2006 $32.40 $0.00 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 12127/2006 12127/2006 $25.30 $2.50 
HEART CLINICS NORTHWEST 1/13/2006 1/13/2006 $68.00 $0.85 
HEART CLINICS NORTHWEST 4/1212006 4/1212006 $68.00 $2.59 
ORME, ERIC 10/11/2006 10/11/2006 $68.00 $0.00 
$42,203.53 
2007 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2007 1/1/2007 $10.00 $5.50 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/1/2007 1/31/2007 $5,735.00 $3,940.62 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/22/2007 1/22/2007 $8.47 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/22/2007 1/22/2007 $35.45 $0.00 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 1/30/2007 1/30/2007 $71.00 $49.61 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 2/1/2007 211/2007 $132.00 $17140 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 2/1/2007 212812007 $13,720.00 $3,448.62 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 2121/2007 2121/2007 $108.00 $4.09 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 212212007 212212007 $82.00 $4.98 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 212312007 212312007 $108.00 $4.09 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 212612007 212612007 $82.00 $4.98 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 212812007 212812007 $166.00 $5.55 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 3/1/2007 3/1/2007 $82.00 $4.98 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 31212007 31212007 $82.00 $4.98 
BOUNDARY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 3/3/2007 31312007 $114.00 $12.38 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 1/2712007 1/27/2007 ' $13.78 $0.00 
-EVERGREEl'irPRAR~ACEOTICAt - -·- ----- ---T121-r2:0r:rr- -112712001-- · -$-25~0--- --$-1-2:56- ---- -
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 1/27/2007 1/27/2007 $29.58 $9.50 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 1/27/2007 1/27/2007 $32.40 $20.70 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 212612007 212612007 $13.78 $0.00 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 212612007 212612007 $25.30 $8.51 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 212612007 212612007 $29.58 $0.00 
EVERGREEN PHARMACEUTICAL 212612007 212612007 $32.40 $0.00 
HEART CLINICS NORTHWEST 1/10/2007 1/10/2007 $68.00 $3.75 
$7,562.74 
41 +-MeoL ·w, ~ B $167,837.24 I ~ '8,5'ftf/l0 
lo-ta.\ 'fa.\~ tf 11/, 8 86 .41, 
• H--- l) ,,...+a 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law FILED 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate ) Case No. CV-2007-266 
) 
of, ) NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF 
) AMENDED CLAIM AGAINST 
) ESTATE 
MELVIN PETERSON, ) 
) 
Deceased. 
TO: State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare: 
Your am.ended claim against the Estate, dated December 4, 
2007, is disallowed and denied. This disallowance further gives 
you notice of the impending bar of Idaho Code §15-3-806 unless, 
as claimant, you take the action set forth in said Idaho Code 
§15-3-806(a). ~ 
DATED this~ day of December, 2007. 
Attorney for CATHIE L. PETERSON, 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of MELVIN PETERSON 
NOTICE OF OISALLOWANCE OF AMENDED CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - l 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, this il~day of December, 
2007, and was addressed to: 
Larry L. Goins 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
Cathie L. Peterson 
P.O. Box 442 
Moyie Springs, ID 83845 
By:~~ 
NOTICE OF OISALLOWANCE OF AMENDED CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 2 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder Street, Suite B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov] 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BOUNDA~Y. Of 
FILED (H/0/07 AT .. 
GLENDA POSTON, CLERi 
av ~µ..._,\ 
DEPU 1-i:tt< 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDRY 
) 
IN THE MA TIER OF THE ESTATE OF: ) Case No. CV-2007-266 
) 
MELVIN PETERSON, ) PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE 
) OFCLAIM 
deceased. ) 
) Fee: exempt (Idaho Code§ 31-3212) ---------------· 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter 
"Department"), by and through its attorney, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy Attorney General, claimant 
in the above matter, and pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-806, petitions the Court as follows: 
1. The Department paid medical assistance (Medicaid) benefits on behalf of MEL VIN 
PETERSON (hereinafter "Decedent") in the amount of$171,386.94; 
2. After appointment and pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 15-3-804 and 56-218, a written 
statement of the Department's claim, in the amount of$171,386.94, and an Amended Claim Against 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 1 
Estate was timely mailed to the Personal Representative of the estate and filed with the Court on 
December 4, 2007; 
3. On November 28, 2007, the Department received aDisallowanceofCreditor's Claim 
and Request for Itemization without a stated reason for the disallowance; and 
4. The Department's statutory claim is just and valid, and payment should be allowed for 
the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the Decedent to the fullest extent possible. 
WHEREFORE, THE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS that the Court enter an Order allowing 
the above listed claim to be paid to the fullest extent possible. 
DATED this ~ay of DECEMBER, 2007. 
~~· 
Deputy Attorney General 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2 4-S 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the </IA day of 
DECEMBER, 2007, to: 
CATHIE PETERSON 
CIO JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE ST STE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
BOUNDRYCOUNTYCLERK 
BOUNDRY COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
POBOX419 
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - I 
~ 61'h<£) 
Marchelle Premo, Legal Assistant 
Division of Human Services 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief Human Services Division 
LARRYL. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov] 
FILED 
1001 DEC l q P l ~ 0 0 
STATE Of IOAHO 
COUNTY Of BOUHOA.R'( 
GL~D~.oH.CLERK 
BY ~--
0 , . r-1,;Lfo0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
MEL VIN PETERSON, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV-2007-266 
PETITION TO REQUIRE PAYMENT 
OF CLAIM 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter 
"Department"), by and through its attorney, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy Attorney General, claimant 
in the above matter, and pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-3-806, petitions the Court as follows: 
1. The Department paid medical assistance (Medicaid) benefits on behalf of MEL VIN 
PETERSON (hereinafter "Decedent") in the amount of $171,386.94; 
2. After appointment and pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 15-3-804 and 56-218, a written 
statement of the Department's claim, in the amount of $171,3 86.94, and an Amended Claim Against 
Estate was timely mailed to the Personal Representative of the estate and filed with the Court on 
December 4, 2007; 
PETITION TO REQUIRE PAYMENT OF CLAIM - 1 
y:\mrcaseslestate recoveryler cases\petersonmlpetition to require payment.doc q ~ 
3. On December 11, 2007, the Department received a Notice of Disallowance of 
Amended Claim Against Estate without a stated reason for the disallowance; and 
4. The Department's statutory claim is just and valid, and payment should be allowed for 
the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the Decedent to the fullest extent possible. 
WHEREFORE, THE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS that the Court enter an Order allowing 
the above listed claim to be paid to the fullest extent possible. 
DATED this J!{_~ay of DECEMBER, 2007. 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION TO 
REQUIRE PAYMENT was mailed first class in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the / V'ifl day 
of DECEMBER, 2007, to: 
CATHIE L PETERSON 
C/O JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE STREET SUITE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
BOUNDARY COUNTY CLERK 
BOUNDARY COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
POBOX419 
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805 
PETITION TO REQUIRE PAYMENT OF CLAIM - 2 
y:\mrcases\estate recovery\er cases\petersonm\petition to require payment doc 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
A ITORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder Street, Suite B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov] 
FILED 
ZOOl OEC 28 P 1~ 45 
STATE OF i::JAHO 
COUNTY OF 80UN:JARY 
GLUWA P 'STON. CLER!\ 
t'"'l'-J 
[) '~~O'L·-b<_......-+rr_ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDRY 
) 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: ) Case No. CV-2007-266 
) 
MEL VIN PETERSON, ) PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE 
) OF AMENDED CLAIM 
deceased. ) 
) Fee: exempt (Idaho Code§ 31-3212) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·
COMES NOW t.lie State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter 
"Department"), by and through its attorney, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy Attorney General, claimant 
in the above matter, and pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-806, petitions the Court as follows: 
1. The Department paid medical assistance (Medicaid) benefits on behalf of MEL VIN 
PETERSON (hereinafter "Decedent") in the amount of$171,386.94; 
2. After appointment and pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 15-3-804 and 56-218, a written 
statement of the Department's claim, in the amount of$ l 71,386.94, and an Amended Claim Against 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF AMENDED CLAIM - 1 tf 9 
Estate was timely mailed to the Personal Representative of the estate and filed with the Court on 
December 4, 2007; 
3. On December 11, 2007, the Department received a Notice of Disallowance of 
Amended Claim Against Estate without a stated reason for the disallowance; and 
4. The Department's amended claim is just and valid, and payment should be allowed 
for the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the Decedent to the fullest extent 
possible. 
WHEREFORE, THE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS that the Court enter an Order allowing 
the above listed claim to be p~he fullest extent possible. 
DATED this ;J/~ayofDECEMBER, 2007. 
~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF AMENDED CLAIM - 2 50 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF AMENDED CLAIM was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the 
9./ §..i day of DECEMBER, 2007, to: 
CATHIE PETERSON 
CIO JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE ST STE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
BOUNDRYCOUNTYCLERK 
BOUNDRY COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
POBOX419 
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 3 5 \ 
'-1'1'1~ GJ.&Vr!:!IJ 
Marchelle Premo, Legal Assistant 
Division of Human Services 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL Dis':fiit[. E D 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
MELVIN PETERSON, 
Deceased. 
ZOOB APR -4 P I: 24 
Case No. CV-2007-266 STA.TE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
GLENDA POSTON. Cl RK 
ORDER GRANTING~JITION FOR 
ALLOWANCE OF AMEJ'Qf1EIJ)Ydll,.l~1\1 
This matter came before the Court on March 25, 2008, pursuant to the Petition for Allowance 
of Amended Claim filed by the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare. Larry L. Goins, 
Deputy Attorney General, appeared in person on behalf of the Claimant while John A. Finney 
appeared telephonically on behalf of the Personal Representative. Rex A. Finney was also present. 
The Court heard argument from counsel and being fully advised in the premises and good cause 
appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim filed by the 
State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, be and the same is hereby, GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that subject to the availability of estate funds as 
may be determined at a later time by the Court, the Personal Representative shall allow said claim in 
the amount of $171,386.94. 
SO ORDERED this <f .!y of April, 20 
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR 
ALLOWANCE OF AMENDED CLAIM - 1 
CLERKS CERTIFICATE FOR SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED CERTIFIES that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
GRANTING PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF AMENDED CLAIM was mailed first class, 
postage prepaid, in the US Mail, to the following: 
LARRYL. GOINS 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0036 
CATHIE L PETERSON 
C/O JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE STREET SUITE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
t::::'#:. 
DATED this U day of April, 2008. 
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR 
ALLOWANCE OF AMENDED CLAIM- 2 53 
May. 5. 2008 10:34AM LFALTH & WELFARE DIV OF MEDICAID No. 7368 P. 2/25 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Seivices 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
Jn the Matter of the Estate of 
MELVIN PETERSON, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV-2007-266 
PETITION TO REQUIRE 
PAYMENT OF CLAIM 
COMES NOW the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department), by and 
through its attorney, Larry L. Goins, Deputy Attorney General, and pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-
3-807(a) hereby petitions the Court as follows: 
1. Melvin Peterson (Decedent) was bor nd died at the age of 83 on 
March 3, 2007. 
2. Prior to his death but after reaching the age of 55, Decedent applied for and 
received state medical assistance (Medicaid) benefits in the amount of$l 71,386.94. 














May. 5. 2008 10:34AM ~~A'TH & WELFARE DIV OF MEDICAID No. 7368 P. 3/25 
3. Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 15-3-80S(a)(S) and 56-218/(l)and (5), the Department 
has a priority claim against the estate of Decedent for Medicaid benefits paid on his behalf. 
4. Pursuant to Order Granting Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim filed on 
April 4, 2008, the Court ordered the Personal Representative to allow the Department's 
Amended Claim Against Estate in the amount of$171,386.94~ subject to the availability of estate 
funds. 
5. Since then and despite a request for payment fonn the estate, the Personal 
Representative has taken no action and the Department has received no payment on its Amended 
Claim Against Estate. 
6. Assets of the estate include a life estate interest Decedent held in his home located 
in Moyie Springs, Boundary County, Idaho. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit A and made a part hereof, is a 1Iue and correct copy of 
a Gift Deed whereby Decedent conveyed his interest in the home to the Personal Representative 
and reserved a life estate interest unto himself, Instrument No. 204218, December 6, 2001, 
Boundary County, Idaho. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit B and made a part hereof, is a true and correct copy of 
a Tax Master Inquiry from the Boundary County Treasurer which reflects a 2007 market value 
for the home in the amount of $107 ,250. 
9. Given the Decedent's age at the time of death, the Life Estate Remainder Table 
contained in IDAP A § 16.03.05.837 (Mar. 30, 2007) and the applicable factor of .38642, the 
value of the life estate interest is $41,444. 
10. Other assets of the estate include a one-half interest in a Deed of Trust Note 
executed in favor of Decedent by Isaac V. Robinson and Carol. J. Robinson, for the principal 
PETITIONTOREQUJREPAYMENTOFCLAIM-2 
5·5 
May. 5. 2008 10:34AM & WELFARE DIV OF MEDICAID No. 7368 P. 4/25 
amount of$31,500 and payable in the monthly amount of$382.18 from August 18, 2003, and to 
July 18, 2013. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit C and made a part hereof, is a true and correct copy of 
the Deed of Trust Note. 
12. As of March, 2007, and presmning the debtors were current on the Deed of Trust 
Note, the principal balance was approximately $22,499 and the Decedent's one-half interest 
therein was approximately $11,250. 
13. Pursuant to IDAPA § 16.03.09.900.18a (Mar. 30, 2007), assets in an estate 
subject to estate recovery claims by the Department, include the outstanding balance of a 
promissory note or loan at the time of death. 
WHEREFORE, the Department prays for the following relief; 
1. An order requiring the Personal Representative to promptly pay the Department's 
Amended Claim Against Estate in an amount of $52,694, less reasonable costs and expenses of 
administration; 
2. In the alternative, and if the Personal Representative is unable to so pay the 
Department's Amended Claim Against Estate, an order requiring the prompt sale of Decedent's 
assets for fair market value, plus an accounting of the Personal Representative's dealings with 
respect to all assets of the estate; and 
3. Such other relief as may be appropriate and proper. 
DATED this ~day of May, 2008. 
PETITION TO REQUIRE PAYMENT OF CLAIM • 3 
'5Lp 
May. 5. 2008 10:34AM JCAJTH & WELFARE DIV OF MEDICAID No. 7368 P. 5/25 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE 
~ Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for Department 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION TO 
REQUIRE PAYMENT was served via facsimile to (208) 263-8211 and mailed first class via 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the ..S!:!:l day of May, 2008, to: 
CATHIE L PETERSON 
CIO JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE STREET SUITE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
PETITION TO REQUIRE PAYMENT OF CLAIM· 4 
t51-
May. 5. 2008 10: 34AM ''CAI TH & WELFARE DIV OF MEDICAID 













IN CONSIDERATION of loYe and af!:ctioDt and in addition, in conSderation of~ aid 
and assistance grantee bas give grantor in the care and~ of grantor 8lld the property 
bereinafier described without tOOugbt or request for remmeratioD of any type M kimi 
w.ha1soever, MELVIN PETERSON, a single person, grat:ItO.r. does hereby give, ~ ~ 
QOllYey and confirm unto CATBIE PETERSON, a lingle person, grantee, whose address is 
f·O. f2tN :td<?i ' m~ Spr.i~) ~the properly described as fbDows: 
Tax #s. being pn1 ofLOt Five (5), Bicek T~ (2), MC)'ie S~ Town.sfe: 2!l1d desi.TI'bed as 
ibl]ow.s; 
Q:immencil:ig at the Northeast Caner of Ut Five (S), Block Two (2), Moyie Sprines Towmite; 
thmce Wd. atons lhe Notth Line of Lat Five CSA. a distaru:e of. 40 feet to a point; thence 
Southwesterly aloo8 Moyie Sired a dislanQe of 140 fl:et to a point thence Somh 63 &et to a 
point; thm~ East' 9S id at a point on the East line of Lot s: thence NMh l2S k to the 
POINf OF BEG.INNING. 
RESERVING t.JNrO caAN'l'O.a A LIFE ESrATE lN SAID PR.OPIRTY. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD~ said premises with the appurtenances unt.o the grantee, 
its heirs and assigns fbrever. And the gtmtor does hereby covenant to ml with the said pntee 
that it is the ovvner i'n :tee simple of said~ mi that they are ftee fi'om all~ 
and that it will WARRANT and DEFEND the same from all Iawful claims whatsoever. 
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':t'AX MASl"ER INQUIRY - BOUNDARY COUNTY TREASURER 
~:S.2:50 
4/lE/2008 
TX0040 ~.O. BOX 218 
eo~ PERRY, ID SJB05 
208-267-3291. 
No. 7368 P. 7/25 
PMPKEJY; RP M0740002005A A Y13AR 2007 SILL# 2949 
'?XPKEY: R.PM074000200.5AA :SUaI.iSlJ TO= PETERSON, MELVIN I.t:S 
NAME PETBRBON, ME!..V!N 1.E CODE AREA 2- 000 0 ACCT TYP 
& PETERSON, CATKIE BANK COW FI.B OWNER PUP 
ADI>R.SSS PO SOX 442 
MOYIE SPRINGS 
LEGAL TAX 5 UT LOT 5 
~t.OCK 4 
MOYlS SPRINGS 'l'OWNSI!E 
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PAGE 02 
Order No.: BFSM5 
DEED OF TRUST NOTE 
$31,500.00 
Data¢ July 17, 2003 
f!or Value received, the undersfgned pl'Dl'niM to PEI'/ to the order of: Melvin Pftlnson 
and Catherine Lynne P&Mon. joint tenants wtlh right dsurvivOrship the Principal 
sum oflltlrty One Thousand Five Hundl'id and 001100 Dolf•N ($31,SOO.DOj In lawful 
money Of tht United States of Amerblt, with interest thereOn .t th• nrte of Eight percent 
( 8% per annum) from JIQ !€"'. 2003 in lnsfaffmems as follows: 
2003. and a ffke sum of saa2.1a, which inoh.tdes interee~ to be paid on or before 1 
The aum of $382. 18, which induCleB inteRJat, to be paid on or before August 18, ~ 
18th of each and evezy month theruftet. until July 11, 2013, at which time the I . ~ l ~ 
enlh bafanee of pl'incfpaf, plus accrued interest fhareon, shall be due and 
4 
I ~ · 
payable. t:7"' 
All payments than be credited first to interest and hr remainder, if any, top~. 
The Makem reserva the option to prepay thlt abllgatlon at any time without nob or 
incuning a penally for $UOh prepayment or~. An prepaymentS enaa be 
applied by the Holder hereof against principal I!" the lnVerat order of maturity wtthout 
reducing the amount of the remaining cblgafor,/ inGtaRmente as prcMded herein above, 
nor shall any such prepayments have the effect of emJ:Sing the next monthly inatallment 
payment due, 
In caaa of failure to pay any ITT$talment wneri 8llT18 ahaY become due. the holder at his 
oplon, may declare the whore principal hereof u lmmedfatt.IY due and payable. In Gase 
thla nola 1$ coUacfed by an aftom.y. elher With or wftheut twit the und~ hentby 
89ft!e 1o pay II COBtt and a reasonable a~ ff!e. 
This nele is aeeured by a Deed of TJUSt Qf even data executed by the underafgned on 
OE.!rtain raat property deso1lbed therein. 
TM Undersigned hereby waive presentment, protest, and nl'Jtice. 
~ offkt. P4'6*'..,:r- eou )c. Mel11M. ~--­
~di~ Y\..t ~tnW"" ,,. )o CA.fh.,/~· ~ 
.:
ISC!RM£DTO SEA'TlWEAND 
.4,. c· ~ -=" ~ COPJOFTH&OlllSINAL 
Isac V. RoMnsan 








Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515 
!SB No. 2295 . 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov] 
& WEL~ARE DIV OF MEDICAID No. 7368 P. 9/25 
FILED 
lOOB MAY -5 A IO: 38 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
MELVIN PETERSON, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV-2007-266 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION TO REQUIRE 
PAYMENT OF CLAIM 
COMES NOW the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department), by and 
through its attorney, Larry L. Goins, Deputy Attorney General, and hereby submits this Brief in 
Support of Petition to Require Payment of Claim as follows: 
BACKGROUND 
On April 4, 2008, the Court entered its Order Granting Petition for Allowance of 
Amended Claim filed by the Department in the amount of $171,386.94. Thereafter, the 
Department made demand on the Personal Representative for payment, subject to the availability 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETmON TO lo I 
REQUIRE PAYMENT OF CLAIM - 1 
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of estate funds. The Personal Representative has taken no action to satisfy the claim and the 
Department has received no payment. As a result, the Department filed a Petition to Require 
Payment of Claim in the amount of $52,694, less reasonable costs and expenses of 
administration. In the alternative, the Department requested an order requiring the assets of 
Melvin Peterson (Decedent) be sold for fair market value and for an accounting from the 
Personal Representative. 
At issue is whether the Decedent's life estate interest in the Moyie Springs home and his 
one-half interest in a Deed of Trust Note (Note) are assets for estate recovery purposes by the 
Depar1ment. Attached to the Petition to Require Payment of Claim are copies of the Gift Deed 
whereby Decedent reserved a life estate interest, and Note in which Decedent had a one-ha1f 
interest along with the Personal Representative. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Life Estate Interest Is an Asset Subject to the Department's Estate 
Recovery Claim. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-218( 4), the term "estate" shaH include all assets defined by 
the probate code, and all other assets the medic.aid recipient had an interest in at the time of 
death, including a ''life estate" interest. In addition, case law confirms that life estates heJd prior 
to death, .,must be included in the estate inventory and a value determined and attributed to the 
life estate real property interest for the limited purpose of satisfying, in part or in whole, the State 
of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare's valid and timely filed claim for recovery of 
Medicaid benefits .... " In re Estate of Grothe, Nez Perce County No. CV 02-02163, Gaskill, 
M.J. (Opinion and Order on Petition for Inclusion of Life Estate in Estate Inventory at 9, Aug. 9, 
2007)( Copy attached). 
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Also attached is a copy of the county treasurer's printout which reflects the 2007 assessed 
value of the home at $107,250. Decedent died at the age of 83 on March 3, 2007. The value of 
bis life estate interest at the time of death is computed by using the Life Estate Remainder Table 
contained in IDAPA § 16.03.05.387 (Mar. 30~ 2007). The applicable factor for the life estate 
interest at age 83 is .38462 (l.00000 minus .61358). The assessed value of the home multiplied 
by this factor equals $41,444, or the statutory value of the life estate interest for medicaid 
recovery purposes. Therefore~ the life estate interest is an asset subject to the Department's 
estate recovery claim. 
2. Decedent's One-Half Interest in the Note Is Another Asset Subject to the 
Department's Estate Recovery Claim. 
The Note in favor of the Decedent and the Personal Representative jointly was for the 
principal amount of $31,500 and payable in the monthly amount of $382.18 from August 18, 
2003, and to July 18, 2013. 
Assets in the estate from which the claim can be satisfied must include ... 
IP ]ayments to the participant under an installment contract on any real 
or personal property to which the deceased participant had a property 
right. The value of a promissory note, loan, or property agreement is 
its outstanding principal balance at the date of death of the participant. 
IDAPA § 16.03.09.900.18(a)(Mar.30, 2007). 
Using the financial calculators at www.yourmoneypage.com, the principal balance of the 
Note was approximately $22,499 in March, 2007. One-half of the balance or Decedent's 
individual interest should be $11,250. This analysis presumes the debtors were current on the 
Note. Therefore, Decedent's one-half interest in the Note is another asset subject to the 
Department's estate recovery claim. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION TO 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Department's medicaid recovery claim against the estate is 
$52,694, or the combined values of the life estate interest and Note. The Court should grant the 
Departmenf s Petition to Require Payment of Claim and enter an appropriate order to require 
payment and sale of home, if necessary. 
DATED this ~day of May, 2008. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE 
~Pi= YL. INS 
DePUtYAttOmeY General 
Attorney for Department 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION TO REQUIRE PAYMENT OF CLAIM was served via facsimile 
to {208) 263~8211 and mailed first class via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the~ day of 
May, 2008, to: 
CATHIE L PETERSON 
CIO JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE STREET SUITE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
'--rn~aku_ ~ o 
MarcheRe Premo, Legal ASSiStant 
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CASE NO. CV02-02163 
OPINION AND ORDER ON 
PETITION FOR ThTCLUSION 
OF LIFE ESTATE IN 
ESTATE INVENTORY 
This matter is before the Court on the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welf~e>s 
(hereina.trer "Department'') Objection to Inventory and Final Account, and Petition to Require 
Life Estate to be Included in Tnventozy. The Court heard oral ar~en-m on the matter April 19, 
2007 Following arguments, the Court set a status conference in the matter for May 24, 2907. 
On May 29, 2007, the Court ozdered the parties to submit briefing on the inventory issue by June 
25, 2007. The Department is repzesented bY attomey W. Corey Cartwright from the State of 
Idaho Attozney General's office. The Personal Representative ofthf.' Estate (hereinafter 
~state") is represented by attorney Erle K. Peterson. The Court, ha.ving read the objection and 
petitkm, the stipulation offacts and the briefs sl!hmitted by the parties, having heard oral 
arguments of counsel, and being ful]y advised in the matter. hereby renders its decision. 
In IM Matttt of t'M .&fllll /Jf Grotht 
Opinion cl Order on &tzie Inventory 
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SlWJltATEDFAcrSANDPRQCEDURALBACK.GROUND 
Lloyd Grothe was bom on Januaty-16, 1909. On August l, 2000, Mr. Gzothe was 
~ted medical amstance through the Medicaid program The program ex.pended not less~ 
$11,197.21 in medical and nurshig home care benefits for Mz, Grothe ~ming his eligibility 
period Lloyd Grothe died on Deoember 25, 2000, smvived by his wife~ Olive J Gi:othe, who 
died on September 22, 2001. 
On February 19, 2002 a Medicaid lien was filed with the Secretary of State's office 
against any asset of the Lloyd and Olive Grothe estate. Putsuan.tto I.C. § 56-218(1) and (5), the 
Department bas a prio1ity estate claim for :MeQicaid benefits paid on behalf of Lloyd Grothe. On 
September 20, 2002, the Department .filed a Petition fot Appointment of Personal Representative 
in the matter of the estate of Lloyd and Olive Grothe. The Petition asserted the Depa,tment held 
a valid lien against the estate, that no personal reptesentative had been appointed to probate the 
estate and that $e Department sought to assert its claim for Medicaid lien against estate ass~ 
in~uding real p1operty located at 1024 Hemlock in uwiston, Idaho. 
On September 23, 2007 an Order Appointing Public Administratot was entered by the 
Court On Novembe! 4, 2002, the Department filed a Claim A~ Estat.e in the amount of 
$11.197.24 and a Demand foz Notice, serving the same on the administrator. The Department's 
claim was not disallowed and no Notice to Cteditots has been published. 
On January 13, 2003~ attorney Eric Peterson filed a Re.signation of Personal 
Representative and Appointment ofSuooeSSot Pe:csonal Representative in the ab(>ve.entitled 
probate action. The decedents' son, Gary Gxotbe, was appointed successor personal 
tepresentative by the Court on January 16, 2003. 
Jn the Malter of thl. &tare. of G1 otlte 
Opinion & Order on Bstare Inventory 
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On July 13, 2006, the Department filed a Petition to Reqcire Payment of Claim. On 
Jariuaty 16, 2007, the Medicaid lien against the estate was renewed fot five (5) YeafS by the 
filing of a renewal with the Sec:retary of Stme,s office. 
On Aptil 2, 2007; the personal representative filed a Petition fo~ O?der Approving Charge 
and Disehatge statement, Final Accounting, Final Settlement and Disti:ibution and a Cba.tge and 
Discharge Staten:ie.n4 Final Accounting and Distribution Statement. The filed documents listed 
the real ptoperty at issue as having no value and included the notation 4'fot disclosure purposes 
only- no value listed on property as the p.rope.rty is not a probate asset- interest Wore dea:th was 
a life estate ... not subject to probate." A hearing on the Petition for final settlement was 
scheduied for April 19, 2007. However, prior to the hearing date, the Department filed an 
Objection to Invent?ry and Final Aecount and Petition to Require Life Bsts.te to be Included in 
mventory. The objection was raised during the Aprll 19, 2007 hearing, resulting in the Comt 
setting the case for scheduling conference on May 24, 2007. During the scheduling conferenc(\ 
the Court ordered the parties to file briefs by July 25, 2007 on the issue of whether the l;fe estate 
is subject to probate as ari asset of the est.ate. 
The following history is relevant to the issue before the Cqurt. On August 16, 1977, 
Llgyd and Olive Grothe. along with thei1 son Gary Grothe, wexe the grantees of real property 
located at 1024 Hemlock in Lewiston, Idaho The deed provided each of th~ Gtothes a one-third 
interest in the property. 1 OD February 2, 1998, Lloyd and Olive Grothe conveyed their interest in 
the real. property to Gary and Maria Grothez by a deed of gift but 1eserved a life estate in the 
p;ro.perty. 3 On August 11, 2000. Gary Gtotl'!e, acting as attoniey in fact for Lloyd Grothe, 
1 Sxlubit "A" to the Stipulation of Facts filed April 19, 2007 
2 Oazy Grothe is the son of Lloyd and Olive O:oths Maria Grothe is the wife of Gary Grothe 
3 Exhl'bit ''B" to the Sttpulation of Facts nled April 19, 2007. 
In thl Matter of the &tatt qf Grodit 
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conveyed Lloyd's life estate interest in the real property to Olive Grothe. Lloyd Grothe dled 
Decemhel 25, 2000 and Olive Glothe died September 22, 2001. 
ANALYSIS 
The parties agree that the Department has a vali4 claim for r~very of Medicaid benefits 
paid on behalf of Lloyd Grothe and that the Department timely filed a claim in the probate 
action 4 In dispute is whetbez the life estate interest held by Olive Grothe is an asset that must be 
listed ~ the estate inventory. The Deparf;nlent contends the life estate is an asset that must be 
included in the estate in\'entory as I.C. § 56-218(4) allows the Departroent to leok to the life 
est.ate for tecovery of expended Medicaid benefits. The Estate takes the position mat. t.he 
Departme.nt must initiate a separate action outside of the ptobate proceeding t.o enforce what.ever 
right.s the Dq:iartment may have in 1egard to the life estate. At ~su~ are Idaho's probate code 
and I&ibo,s public assistance code, in particular I.C. § 15-1-201(15)' and I.C § 56-218(4). The 
issue, which appears t.o be one of first impression in Idaho, requires the Court to determine 
whether the statutory schemes are in conflict or can be reconciled. 
The Estate begins its argument by propounding the comm<?n law principal that when the 
fute.rest held in teal property is a. life estate, upon the death of the hold.et of the life estate, title 
and control passes immediately to the remainderman. Based on that pte.n:rise, the Estate contends 
Olive Gtotbe's life esta:te extinguished the moment Olhie Grothe died~ thetefore. there is no 
property asset subject to probate and/or inclusion in the prob~ inventory. The common law 
4 The persotlal rep.resenta.tWe states in his brief filed. June 2s. 2007, pages 3-4: "The State. by virtue of the 
application of Idaho Code section 56-218, is a sCC!lrcd aeditor of the probiue estata. A futi.ely cieditor's claim wu 
presented by the Staie and oot denied. The $1Btt, again punmant to the provisions of ~o code .section $6-218, 
holda a seeurcd blterest in the~ real property mist as against the cunent ownsr of the property" 
s The dcfinitioii of 'estllle' is c1lrrC.llt!.Y found at IC § 1S·l·Z01(16) batWQ locat$d atl C § 15-l-:!01(15) in l002. 
Jn the Mtdtst o/ IM .&lall of C»oihe 
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principal espoused by the Estate is correct. Nevertheless, the legislature has the power to modify 
the common law. Kirltkmd v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464> 4 .P .3d 1115 
(2000): 6 "While we recognize that Idaho's infonnal probate laws encourage prompt and eff!cient 
settlement of Csta:tes> they do niJt evince a public policy cf sncouraging. distribution before estate 
li.abtiilies have been ascertained and paid." Htntze v Black, 125 Idaho 655, 659, 873 P. 909 
(Ct.App.1994) femphaSis added]. 
The Estate., while impliedly conceding the life estate may have value in the context of 
IC. § 56-218, contends the life estate interest held by Olive Grothe falls outside the probate code 
de:finitio~ of estate, making it a non·probate asset not SUQject to inc~ion in the probate 
inventory. Idaho's prob~e code defines 'estate' as follows: 
''Estate" means all property of the deceden~ including commutiity property of the r 
survi"ring spouse suiject to a.dmmistmtion, property of trusts, and property of any 
other person whose affaits axe subject to this oode as it exists from time to time 
during administration. 
LC § 15·1·201(15). 
The Estate concedes Idaho,s public assiSt$:lice law specifically includes a life estate as an 
estate asset for purposes of zecovery Of Medicaid benefits; but contends the De.Pattment must 
bring an action outside of the probate proceedings to assert its rights. The relevant public 
assistance law teads as follows: 
For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All zeal and pel'SOllal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal pioperty and Qt.her assebl in which the 
individual had my legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such 
interest), including sucli assets conveyed to a survivor, hei;r, or assign of the 
6 "B~ause it is pzoperiy within th• powi:;r of'the legislatw:e to establisl:i statutes oflimitii.tions, statures ofrepoae,. 
create n.ew causes of action, and otbmlise modify the common law without violating separation ot powers 
princ:!ples, it necessarily follows tbat tbe legislatm also has the power to limtt remedies available to plaintiffs 
without violating the separation of power$ doctrine " Kb-kl.and v BltJine CO'JJf/f)J Md.cal Centt:t, 134 Idaho at 471 
In the Matm ujtiw &tali. of GrCJthe 
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deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, SUNivorsbip, life 
estate. living ·tnlst or other auangement 
l.C: § 56--218(4). 
Tiie question Ialsed m the instant mattez requires the Court to engage in ~tutory · ' 
inteip1etatio.u and cOnstroction in ardetto determine whether I.C. § 15=1-201(15) and J.C. §·56-
218(4) are in conflict; can berewnciled,. or if one statute controls over the other. 
Interpretation of a statute begins with an eicamina1ion of the statllte's literal words. 
State v Bumight; 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P .2d 214, 219 (1999). Where the 
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the statute as 
written.. without engaging in statutory construction State v. Rhoiia, 133 Idaho 
459, 462, 988 P.2d 68S, 688 {1999); Staie v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 
65, 67 (Ct.App. 2000). If a court must engage in statutory constm.roon. then its 
duty·is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislatwe. BBllfd; 135 
Idaho at 646.. 22P.3dat121. In so doing, we look to the context of the statutory 
language in question and·~e public policy behind the statirte. State v Cudd, 137 
Idaho 625, 627, 51 P jd 439, 441 (Ct.App 2002). When an ambiguous statute is 
part of a larger statutory scheme, we not Ollly focus upon the langU.age of the 
ambiguous statute, bat also look at other i1Btutes relating to the same subject 
matter and consider them together in Order to discern ~egislative ~t Stale v. 
Pactorek, 137 Idaho 629, 632, 51 P.3d 443, 446 (Ct.App:2002). · 
State v Shank.s, 139 Idabo 152, 154. 75 P .3d 206 (Ct.App.2003). 
Tue Court has traditiona.lly used a two-siep cipproach to l~gisla.tive intelpretatian. 
"We intei:pret statl.ltes accO'rding to the plain, express meaning of a provision m 
question, and we will i;esort t.o judicial construction only if the provision is 
ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws.'' Peasley 
Trmefu & Storage Co. v. Smilh. 132 Idaho 732, 742, 979 P.2d 605, 615 (1999). 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District v Board of County Commissioners, i38 Idaho 887, 
890, 71 P.3d 1034 (200~). 
The language in I.C. § 56-21g(4) is plain and unatnbiguous. For purposes of Medicaid 
benefits recoYery, the definition of 'estate' has been expanded by the Idaho legislatwe to include 
a life eMate interest in zeal property 7• Yet, the expanded language has not been added to the 
definition of estate in the p1obate oode. Neverthel~ Idaho Code§ 15-1~201(15) includes 
1Addcd.pumwrtto42 U.S C.A § 1396p(b)(4)(B) 
Jn tb4 MatW of the :&ltZlt efG1othe 
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'catch·all' language that reads, .... and pzoper1y of any other persoD whose affairs are su~jeet to 
this code as it exists nom time to time d:ming administration." 
rn comparing the two statutes, it is evident they relate to ~e same subj~ -the 
composition of the 'e.state' of a deceased individual ~ making the statutes in pari materia. 
Statutes a.re in pari material if they :relate to the same subject Grand Cany0n 
Dories v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho l, 855 P.2d 462 (1993). Such 
statutes are const?ued together to effect legislative intent Id. Where two statutes 
appear to apply to the same case or subject.mattei:, the specific statute will control 
over the more geneial statute. State v. !Jarnes, 133 Idaho ~78, 987 P.2d 290 
(1999) ' 
Gooding Countyv. pyybenga, 137 Idaho 201 1 204, 46 P.ld 18 (2002) 
The probate code specifically states, "This code shall be liberally consttued and applied 
to promote its undedying purposes and policies." I. C. § 15-1-102(a). The Code then provides: 
The underlying purposes and policies of this code are: 
(1) to sµn.plify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of deoedents1 ~sslng 
persons, protected persons, minors and incapacitaied persons; 
(2) to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distno'IJ,tion of his 
property; 
(3) t.o promot.e a speedy and efficient system fot liquidating the estate of the 
decedent and ma.king dist:ri'l;mtion to his suooessors; 
(4) to facilitate use and enforoexneµt of Certain trusts; 
(5) to :make uniform 1be law among the various jurisdictions. 
LC.§ 15-1-102(b); See also In re Estate of Ellion.141 Idaho 177,' 181, 108 P.3d 324 (2005). 
When I.C. § 15-1-201(15) and r.c. § 56-218(4) ate considered togethei, along 'W'ith the 
underlying pmposes and policies of the probate code, and the code is liberally consttued and 
applied to promote those PUJl>OseS and policies. the intent of the legislature becomes clear. By 
expanding the definition of 'estate' in I.C. § 56w218, it is clear the legislature intended issues 
regarding recovery of public assistance medical benefits to be addressed in the probate piocess.' 
. 
JWhile the issue be:fure the Cowt mhi1t Estate of Jackmim, 132ldaho21J, 970P.2d 6 (1998) WU d.istingl.lishable 
.fiom the issUt before this Court. the Sttproe Court in Jtld<:mati had no difficulty ItCOD.ciling 42 U S C. § 1396p, 
I}OW codified at IC. § S0-218, with Idaho's ptobate code, and in particulal· with IC. § lH-201(15). 
Jri the Mtt/tfr of die .EJttJN of Gtotk£ 
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How~. because the expanded defi:\lition is applicable only for the limited issue of public 
assist.a.nee recovery, it would have been erro1 to add the same language to the probate code. To 
do so would have o.reated a genm:al expansi0n that would have allowed all creditors to look ~o the 
expanded assm for recovery. Such was clearly not the intelrt of the ~lature nor was it 
.necessary. 
By expanding the assets thai can be reached for the limited purpose of recovery of 
Medicaid benefits. the legislature created a specific statu1b that conttols over the more general 
probate statute. Such a scheme is cODSistent with, and falls within the language ~ J.C. § 15· l ·· 
201 (15), as it allows into the probate proceedings "property of any other person whose a.tmirs are 
subject to this code as it exists froin time to 'lime during administration" Questions relailve to a 
life estate and the property interest of a remaindennan fall squa.tely within this language Those 
questions, such as detezmiclng the value of a partiClllar life estate the m.o~ent before death 
occurred, do not change whetbex asked within the confines of a probate proceeiling or in a 
separate action and the questions are as amenable to being answered in a probate proceeding as 
tbey would be in a separate proceeding.9 
The puzpose of probate p1oceedings is to proVide an e:ffectjve and efficient process in 
which to resolve .§11 creditors' claims and ~t dis1ribution issues as they xelate to a deceased 
individual. This pmpose can only be effectuated wbtn the probate code is h'berally construed 
and applied so that the underlying purposes and policies are attained. That includes addressing 
those assets the legislature declared t.o be estate assets for th~ limited purpose of a claim for 
' The .Estat.e in the :in.stam cast directs the Court to tbe Ian.guage found ill I C. § S0-21 S(S) that reads, "ks.y 
distnbut.iOll or lm:!$ihi of the estate prlo:t to slltiifying sllllh claim is voidable and may be set aside by an action in th& 
district comt" the :Bslate .asserts this Imguage suppons ilE position that the Pepmt.mant must bx:ing a sepame 
action to tec:ov~ against the life e~ intcrat of Olive Grothe. The Col.U't is not pmsuade4 When the .language hi 
read in context with tbe entile code section, it is eVident the JllDgllllge is diJ:e~ at tbe procedural means fur 
cballengfng the distn"lmtion ot an asset by the person appointed within the probate prooeedillg to adminisrer tbc 
estate Tbe language is not directed at a '"1lal.lenge to the propel composition of the estate 
Jn. 1MMatter of :M Ji,staJe q/Grof/11!. 
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recovery of Medicaid benefits. Contrary to the a:rgumeo.ts of the Estate, I.C. § 15-3-709 declares 
it the duty and responsibility of the personal representative to take control and/or possession of 
all potential as,sets of the estate, whether or not titJe is disputed, so that proper administratio? of 
the estate may be accomplished, which includes addr~g !111 claims against the estate along 
with the Qistribution of assets 
ORDER 
It is h~ebythe Order of the Court that, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-1-201(15) and Idaho 
Code § 56-218( 4), the life estate held by Olive Glothe prior to her death m.ust be included m the 
e.state inventory and a value determined ~ attributed to the life estate real property interest for 
the limited purpose of satisfying, in pait or in whole, the St.ate ofidaho, Department of Health 
and Welfare's valid and timely filed claim for recovery of Medicaid benefits received by Lloyd 
Grothe. 
In th$ }.latliu ef ths .Eslat# cf Gto!M 
Ophtlon. & Order on BSta:te rnventory 
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CER.TlFICATE OF MAlLlNG 
I DO HERE.BY CERTIFY that true and eottect copies of the foregoing Opinion 
and Order were mailed by regular first c~ mail, and deposited in the United States Po.st 
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Case No. CV-2007-266 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S 
INVENTORY 
COMES NOW CATHIE L. PETERSON, Personal Representative of the 
Estate, by and through her attorney, JOHN A. FINNEY, and files 
this beginning Inventory of the Estate: 
1. The Decedent died March 3, 2007, intestate. CATHIE L. 
PETERSON is the Court appointed Personal Representative of the 
Estate. 
2. The Personal Representative published a Notice to 
Creditors on August 16, 2007, August 23, 2007 and August 30, 2007; 
and the time to make a creditor's claim has expired. 
3. A Notice to Known Creditor to the State of Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare, dated August 6, 2007, was filed 
August 8, 2007. 
4. A series of claims and amended claims were filed by the 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S INVENTORY - l (to 
State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare for medical 
assistance benefits, which were allowed by the Court in the sum of 
$171,386.94. This claim will be paid in the course of 
administration, if sufficient funds are available. 
5. A "claim" letter dated August 3, 2007 was received from 
Provincial Financial Group for $362.88 for an unreimbursed pension 
payment made to the Decedents account following the date of death. 
This claim has been approved and will be paid in the course of 
administration, if sufficient funds are available. 
6. Several claim amounts were filed by Boundary Community 
Hospital. It appears that the amounts due as of date of death 
were $1,007.42 for pharmacy and $1,794.38 for liability. The 
general nature of the claims have been approved, but final amounts 
have not been established due to partial payments, write-offs, and 
medicare reimbursements. Any final balances will be paid in the 
course of administration, if sufficient funds are available. 
7. The Estate may owe State of Idaho and IRS Federal 
Income taxes for 2007, the amount of which, if any, is yet 
undetermined. 
8. The Estate Beginning Inventory as of the date of death 
March 3, 2007, consisted of the follow: 




Stocks, Bonds & Certificates of Deposit 
None 
Mortgages, Notes & Cash 
(1) Mountain West Bank Acct# ****2078 
as of 03/30/07 
(2) First American Title Escrow 
Acct #*****452 (1/2 interest) as 
of 03/02/07 





D. Other Miscellaneous property 
Miscellaneous Furniture, & clothes 0.00 
E. Debts/.Approved Claims 
(1) Principal Financial Group 
RPS No.:XXXXX4185 -362.88 
(2) Boundary Community Hospital 
Pharmacy -1007.42 
Liability -1794.38 
(3) State of Idaho, Department of 
Health & Welfare -171,386.94 
(3) Taxes - Unknown. 
SUB-TOTAL -$161,797.79 
9. The Estate does not have sufficient assets to satisfy 
all claims . <{0-
DATED this Z,,7 day of ~, 2008. 
~·<±: ~ ~A.FINNEY ~
torney for CATHIE L. 
PETERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of MELVIN PETERSON 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S INVENTORY was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this i,."7-r" day of May, 2008 and was addressed to: 
Cathie L. Peterson 
P.O. Box 442 
Moyie Springs, ID 83845 
Larry L. Goins 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Buman Services 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Boundary Community Hospital 
Attn: Suzi Bishop 
6640 Kaniksu Street 
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S INVENTORY - 3 
Carl Peterson 
1016 South Whitman # 105 
Tacoma, WA 98465-2002 
Provincial Financial Group 
Principal Life Insurance 
Company 
Repetitive Payment Services 
P.O. Box 4926 
Grand Island, NE 68802-4926 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
) 
In the Matter of the Estate of ) Case No. CV-2007-266 
) 
MEL VIN PETERSON, ) ORDER ON PETITION TO REQUIRE 
) PAYMENT OF CLAIM 
Deceased. ) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·) 
THIS MA TIER came before the Court pursuant to the Petition to Require Payment of 
Amended Claim filed by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department), and the 
Court having reviewed the Department's supporting Brief, along with the Objection and 
Inventory filed by the Personal Representative, and having heard oral argument from counsel 
regarding their respective positions, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises with good 
cause appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition to Require Payment of Claim filed by the 
qypartn}ent, l}.e and th~'!111eAs bs:reby,,granted to the exwnt_pf I~lailable a§Se1s in the estate, q.q' "* ()Ider~ 'P'lorrry "1' r/ltP. Cl4'>-!1 'iS st!-- -1.il'M DJ' ~~. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED thatpursuantto Idaho Code§ 56-218 (4)(b), the life 
estate interest decedent held in real property at the time of death, be and the same is hereby, deemed 
to be any asset of the estate for the limited purpose of medicaid estate recovery by the Department. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the Personal Representative of the estate, be and 
she is hereby, directed to forthwith amend the Personal Representative's Inventory and include the 
decedent's life estate interest held in real property at the time of death as an asset of the estate. 
ORDER ON PETITION TO REQUIRE 
PAYMENT OF CLAIM - 1 
IT IS FINALLY HEREBY ORDERED that the Personal Representative of the estate, be and 
she is hereby, directed to further amend the Personal Representative's Inventory and assign an 
appropriate value to decedent's life estate interest held in real property at the time of death. 
SO ORDERED this K day of June, 2008. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON 
PETITION !Jl--REQUIRE PAYMENT OF CLAIM was mailed first class, postage prepaid on 
the ~day of June, 2008 to: 
LARRY L. GOINS 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
3276 ELDER, STE B 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720 
CATHIE PETERSON 
CIO JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE ST STE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
ORDER ON PETITION TO REQUIRE 
PAYMENT OF CLAIM - 2 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: (208) 263-7712 
Fax: (208) 263-8211 
ISB NO. 5413 
(.'~ I ~.I 
''-' : . \: 
FILED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 












Case No. CV-2007-266 
ORDER APPROVING HIRING OF 
APPRAISER 
The Personal Representative's Motion to Hire .Appraiser and 
the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's Objection to Motion 
to Hire Appraiser coming before the Court for hearing on September 
15, 2008 and upon the personal appearance of counsel for the 
Personal Representative, John A. Finney, and the telephone 
appearance of counsel for the Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare, Larry Goins, and upon considering the arguments of 
counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Personal Representative, as a 
first priority cost of the administration of the Estate, is 
approved to hire David Noonan of Appraisal Associates, 120 East 
Lake Street, Sandpoint, Idaho 83864, (208) 263-6322, to complete a 
preliminary, tentative, short form appraisal of the fee simple 
value of the following described real property: 
Tax #5, being part of Lot Five (5), Block Two (2), 
Moyie Springs Townsite and described as follows: 




Commencing at the Northeast Corner of Lot Five (5), 
Block Two (2) , Moyie Springs Townsite; thence West 
along the North Line of Lot Five (5), a distance of 40 
feet to a point; thence Southwesterly along Moyie 
Street a distance of 140 feet to a point; thence South 
63 feet to a point; thence East 95 feet at a point on 
the East line of Lot 5; thence North 125 feet to the 
POINT OF BEGINNING. 
The costs of said appraisal shall not exceed the sum of FIVE 
HUNDRED DOLLARS AND 00/100 ($500.00). 
Upon completion of said appraisal, the counsel for the 
Personal Representative shall provide a copy to counsel for the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. 
The Court reserves ruling on the issue of whether a more 
detailed, long form appraisal is necessary. 
The Court also reserves ruling on the issue as to opinion 
testimony as to life estate valuation or expectancy, until 
presented with said issue by affidavit and/or testimony pursuant 
to 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK'S RULE 77(d) SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy, with the 
clerk's filing stamp thereon showing the date of filing, of the~ 
foregoing, was served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this ~~c 
day of September, 2008, and was addressed as follows: 
John A. Finney 
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Larry L. Goins 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
By~ ~leikOfCOUrt 
ORDER APPROVING HIRING OF APPRAISER - 2 ()~ 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov] 
·FILED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
MEL VIN PETERSON, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV-2007-266 
NOTICE OF FILING 
APPRASIAL REPORT 
AND ADDENDUM 
COMES NOW the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, by and through Larry L. 
Goins, Deputy Attorney General, and hereby files with the Court true and correct copies of the 
Appraisal Report and Addendum thereto prepared by David Noonan on October 30, 2008, and 
June 3, 2009, and marked as Exhibits A and B, respectively. The subject of the Appraisal Report 
and Addendum is certain real property owned by decedent and located at P.O. Box 442 
(Roosevelt), Moyie Springs, Idaho 83845. Pursuant to the Addendum at 2, the "estimated value 
of the subject property as of 03/03/2007 is $139,000." 
NOTICE OF FILING APPRAISAL REPORT AND ADDENDUM- 1 
Dated this /U /\day of July, 2009. 
\ 
~[F 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for the Department 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, on the /{)tt) day of July, 2009 to: 
HONORABLE JUSTIN W. JULIAN 
MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
BOUNDARY COUNTY, IDAHO 
POBOX419 
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805 
CATHIE L PETERSON 
CIO JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE STREET SUITE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
NOTICE OF FILING APPRAISAL REPORT AND ADDENDUM- 2 'glJ 
- ------- ---- ---- APPRAISAL AS so CIA TE s -- - ---- -- ----'-'-Fi_ie;:_;_No-=·.=M_.;;..o_"!;..;;_~~~-s=.!.--Rl=N_"'-'~"-1;..;.12-'-> 
APPRAISAL OF 
·--···----------- ·-·-· ·-··. _. . ·-·-----· ·-----·- ·-------------1 
SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENCE 
LOCATED AT: 
P.O. BOX 442 (ROOSEVELT) 
MOYIE SPRINGS, ID 83845 
-FOR: 
JOHN FINNEY, ATTORNEY AT LAW (FOR THE ESTATE OF M. PETERSON) 
120 E. LAKE ST. 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
BORROWER: 
ESTATE OF MELVIN PETERSON - % .J. FINNEY, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
ASOF: 
October 30, 2008 
BY: EXHIBIT 
DAVID NOONAN IFA 
CGA60 fl 
120 EAST LAKE ST, SUITE 319, SANDPOINT, ID 83864 208-26U322 -FAX 208-265-4484 
is 
COMPLETE SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT 
Uniform Residential Appraisal Report File No. MOYIE SPRINGS 11! 
The purpose of this summary appraisal report is to provide the lender/client with an accurate, and adequately supported , opinion of the mwket value of the subject property. 
""'°""" Addre5$ P.O. BOX 442 lROOSEVEL TI Citv MOYIE SPRINGS state ID Zia Code 83845 
Borrower ESTATE OF MELVIN Pl!TERSON-o/o .J. I OwnerofPUbl'icRec:ord PETERSON Counlv BOUNDARY 
Leoal Oesail>tion (Sl!!E AlTACHED ADDENDUM) 
Assesosor's Paroel # M000002005A TaxY-N/A R.E. Taxes S NJA 
Naiahharhood Name BONNERS SUBURBAN Man Reference SEE ATTACHED Census Tract 9701.00 
OeruoMt I I Owr!er Tenant I !vacant Soedal Aosessmenls $ N/A IPUD HOAS NJA I !.,.. ve• I I oer month 
Pr"""'1V Rights Aooreised lxlFeeSimole ]Leasehold I IO!her (desaibe) 
.wionment Type I PUrd>ase Transaction I \Refinance Transaction IX]O!her (describe\ LEGAL ACTION 
Lender/Client .JOHN FINNEY ATTORNEY AT LAW Address 120 E. LAKE ST. SANDPOINT, ID 831164 
Is the su""'"' -~· wrrentlv offered IDr sale or has It boon ollered tlr sale in the twelw months orior IO the ellactive date of this -aisal7 I Yes IXINo 
Report data &OUrce(s) used. o!lering pri<;e(s). aod date(•). THE SUBJECT HAS NOT BEEN LISTED FOR SALE IN THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS 
ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL MLS. 
I LJ did ~did not analyze the comract ror sale for the subject purohase vansactfon. Explain tt>e results of tt>e anatysis of 1he ®tract for sae or vlhy the analysis was not petlcrmed. 
THIS IS NOT A PURCHASE TRANSACTION. 
Contract Price S NIA Date of Con~act NIA 1s the D1008rtv seller the °""«of ou1>1ic record? I Yes I INo Da13 Sctwools\ NIA . Is !here any fnancial assistance (loatl charges. sale ®cessions. gilt or do~I assistance, etc.) to be paid by ony pa1y on boh# of lhe borrcwer7 LJYes LJNo 
W Yes. report !he tctal dolls amount and desaibe Ult Items tc be paid. S N/A NIA 
-·---·-~~-
Location I I tkban X Subutt>an Rural """"-"'Values I Ina.-., Ix IS!able I llleclinina PRICE N3E One-Unit 70 ,. 
Built-Up I l0ver75% x 25-75% I 1Under25% I DemandlSJoolv I ISholtloe X hn Balanoa I I Over Su""'• S/000\ fvr.\ 2-4 U'lit 0 ,. 
G-owth I IRaold Stable lxlStow I MarketinQ rime I I lhlder 3 m1hs x 13-& mtt>s Ix !Over 6 mlhs 1001..ow NEW Multi-Femilv 0 ,. 
Neighborhood Bound.W.. SEE ATTACHED ADDENDUM. 800"""' 80 CommerOal 0% 
250~. 15 Other 30 VAC% 
Neighborllood Desaiption SEE ATTACHED ADDENDUM. 
Marlcet Conditions (mduding support br the above <endusions) PLEASE SEe A TT ACHED ADDENDUM. 
Dimensions IRREGULAR hea 0.299 ACRE+/. Shaoe IRREGULAR View NEIGHBORHOOD 
- ·- - . Oassification COMMERCIAL Zonina Desoiotion COMMERCIAL 
ZoniM CM!nliance I ILeoaf IX IL.,.., Nonconmnlnn(Grandfathered Use\ I INoZOninQ I llllaoal(desaibe) H & BUSE IS RESIDENTIAL 
Is the highest and best use of Ille subject property as improved (er as proposed per plans and opeeilcations) the present use? [KjYes lJNo ~No. desalba. 
Utl- Public; Other fdosalbo\ Public Olhor fdosalbol Olf-lm,.....,monts-Tvae Public Prlvoto -- lxl I Water lx l I Street HARD SURFACE lxl I I Gas I I I SanitJlrv Sewer lx l I -. NONE/TYPICAL I I I I 
FEMA"'-'•'FloodHazardhea I Ives IXINo FEMA Flood Zone NIA FEMAMep# UNKNOWN FEMA....., Date NOT MAPPED 
ke tt>e utiliti«< and okite irmroilements !Wical tlr !lie ll18'ket erea? lxlYes I INo tt No desaibe. 
he there any adverse site conditions cr external fact!>rs (easements. enaoadlments, environmel1tal oondit'oo$, land uses, etc.)? 00Yes LJNo J Yes. des<nbe. SEE 
ATTACHED ADDENDUM. 
Linits IX I One I I One with Acoessorv Unit I I Conaete Sal> IX IO'awt S.soa Foundation W.lls CONCRETE/AVG Floors VIN/CP/AVG 
#ofSl!Jrie$ 1 STORY !Full~ I I Partial Basement Exterior Walls WOOD/AV&f'AIR Walls DWALL/AVG 
1._ IXIOet. I I Att. I I S.Det./End Unit Basement kea NIA sa.t. Roof SUrfaoa METALJAVG T rim/F'aiish WOOD/AVG 
h r lo""'""" I IPr~sed I IUnderConst. Basement Finish NJA% Gutters & """"""""'"" SOME Bath Floor VINYLJAVG 
Oesion ISMe\ 1 STORY !Outside En~/ElOI I l&JmpPumo WindowTwe VINYLJAVG Bath Wainscot FGLASS/AVG 
Ye81'Built 1987 Evidence of I I Infestation Stilrm SasMnsulated YES eer-..... I INone 
--l'lh\ 7 10a-· I I Settlement Saeens YES/AVG X'""'-· #ofC:n 4+ 
Allie None - 1 IFWA II IHWBS 11 !Radiant Amenities Wood~"""'s\# Or' _,.,Surface GRAVEL 
lnm. Stair Slairs XIO!herEL I Fuel IFir~""""sl# Fenoa X'r.....,,e #ofC:n 2 
IRoor x Scul!Je Coolina I !Central Air Condltfonlnn XI Patio1Ceck A TT. Pllrch .............. #ofC:n 
1-... Heated 1 .......... II IOlw !Poot Other Alt. IXIDet. I IBuilt.ln -- Jp1--1x1~ Xillishwash« IXI"'~•• IPIMicrowave IPIW..........._ IX I ether ldesalbal HOOD FAN F'1r1ished area above arade contains: 5 Rooms 2 Bedrooms 2 ......,., 1 292 Sau8l'e Feet of Gross Livino Nu Allow Grade 
Additional features (special en.-gy elllcient items, etc.). SEE ATTACHED ADDENDUM. 
Desaibe Ille <On<filion of the property (10cluding needed repan, deterioration, renovalions, remodeling, etc.). SOME SHORT AND LONG TERM COMPONENTS 
HAVE BEEN UPGRADED WITH SOME NEW ROOF COVERINGS. NEW EXTERIOR PAINTING AND OTHER ITEMS YET SOME 
MINOR DEFERRED MAINTENANCE ITEMS REMAIN. OVERALL THE SUBJECT DWEWNG IS CONSIDERED TO BE IN AVERAGE 
CONDITION. 
he ll!ere any physical defu:iencies er adverse o:>ndilions that affect the livability. soundness, er stnJctural Integrity of the prcperty? LJYes [X)No Hes.desaibe. 
Does U>e propeny generally c:onb'm to the neighborhood (lunaion81 utility, S!yfe, condition. use, ccnstnJc:lion. etc.)? ~Yes LJ No ff No. desaibe. 
.. litlc fO'T!l lY .... - Pio$1cedUW,.-Cl.ce..e .800.23'4.8727-~CO'I\ ---1004-lOOS 
COMPLETE SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT 
Uniform Residential Appraisal Report FUe No. MOYIE SPRINGS 11! 
There are 61 OO""""able crooerties currentlv offered fur sale in the sobie<:i neiohborhood rannino in l>'ice tom S 80,000 to$ 200.000. 
Thereare 36 OO'"""""'le sales in the subie<:! nPinhhNhood within the cast twelW! months r.r '""' in sale rvioe tom $ 80000 to$ 200000. 
FEATURE SUBJECT COMPARASl.E SALE NO. 1 COMP.ARABLE SALE NO. 2 COMPARABLE SALE NO. 3 
P.O. BOX 442 (ROOSEVELT) 146 E. RAILROAD AVE 141 ELECTRIC AVE ROOSEVELT RD 
Address MOYIE SPRINGS MOYIE SPRINGS ID MOYIE SPRINGS. ID MOYIE SPRINGS ID 
Proximitv to Subled: NORTHEAST .JUST NORT 
Sale Price $ 1 130 
124.01 SQ.ft.~ 93.15 so. It. $ 108.70 so. Sale Aia>Q'OSS Liv. kea $ $ 
Data Source($) Ml.$#2083033 DOM-8 Ml.$#2063242 DOM-619 Ml.5#2080167 DOM·21 
Verification Source1s) ASSESSOR ASSESSOR ASSESSOR 
VALUE ADJUSTMENTS DESCRIPTION <(.)$"""""""' DESCRIPTION -<·JIM;>..- DESCR!PflON <(.)$-
Sale or Financing FHA CONVENTIONAi USDA 
Concessions EKNOWN NONE KNOWN NONE KNOWN 
Date of Sale/Tllne 04/16/2008-CC>E 04/01/2008-COE 
Localion SUBURBAN SIMILAR SIMILAR SIMILAR 
l.easehold/Fee lllmnle FEE SIMPLE FEE SIMPLE FEE SIMPLE FEE SIMPLE 
Site 0.299 ACRE+/· ~RE+/. O.SOACRE +/. 1.47 ACRES+/. -8.500 
\1ew NEIGHBOR HD. R SIMILAR SIMILAR 
n..;,,nf-e\ 1 STORY y 1 STORY OB 1 STORY OB 
aualltv of Conslrodion AVERAGE SIMILAR INFERIOR 6000 SIMILAR 
Actual Alie 21Al20E 16A/10E -s.ooo 70A/20E 36Al15E 2.500 
Condition AVERAGE SIMILAR SIMILAR SIMILAR 
AboveG'ade r...,1..._1 - r .... l!ldm>o.I - r ... Js.m. - ·2000 TOlrll f..._I -Room Count 5121 2 5\21 1 2.500 513 1 2-SOO 5 21 1 2.500 
Gres$ I Mnn kea25.00 1-~SO.lt. 1 008 so.It. 7100 1.162 SQ, ft. ~ 1.196 SQ. ft. ,.AM 
Basement & Finished NONE NONE 742SFBSMT -4,500 836SFBSMT -S,000 
Rooms Below Grade NONE NONE NO SF FINISH 836 SF FINISH -6 700 
Functional lllllliv AVERAGE SIMILAR SIMILAR SIMILAR 
Healino/Cooling F.AELNONE B.B. EL/NONE -2.000 MIXED/NO MIXED/NO 
~ EMmv Efficient Items AVERAGE SIMILAR SIMILAR SIMILAR 
• C'""""'e/Ca'OOi't 2CARGARAGE 1 CARCRPT 4.000 1 CAR GARAGE 3.000 NONE 7.000 
Porch/Patio/Iled< DECK.ETC. SIMILAR INFERIOR 3..SOO SIMILAR . 
SITEIMPRO. SUPERIOR ·2000 INFERIOR 2.000 SIMILAR 
• Net Adiustment (Total) • I 1- Is 4600 IXI• ,_ ls 13.800 I I+ IXI- Is s.aon 
Adjusted Sale Price ~ 3.7%1 Net Adj. 12.7% I Net Adj. -4.5 % I$ 
of Comnarables 18.1% $ 129.600 GrossAdi 24.8% $ 122.ll40 Grcss,ll;f, 26.6 % 124.200 
I 00dld LJdid not research the sale or transfer history of the subject property and oomparable sales. w not. explain 
Mvresearch I ld'id IX did not reveal anvorior sales or transfers of the subiect~""'""'br the three._s tt'ior to the e11ectivedateofthis """""""'· 
Data sauroels\ MLS/ASSESSOR 
Mv research I !did Ix d'Kl not reveal any nritr sales or transfers of the """""'able sales br the """'orior to the date of sale of the """"""able sale. 
Data ~·-"'sl MULTIPLE USTING RECORDS 
ReDOrt the results of the research and analvsis of the orior sale or transfer himrv of the !IUbiott "'"""""and mm~ sales (rMOtt addi!ional prior sales on !>80• 3). 
ITEM SUBJECT COMPARABLE SA!.E NO. 1 COMPARABLE SALE NO. 2 COMPARABLE' SALE NO. 3 
Date of Prior SalelT ransfer NONE NONE NONE NONE 
Price of Prior Sale/Transfer NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Data Source!s) MLS RECORDS/ASSESS MLSRECORDS MLSRECORDS MLSRECORDS 
Effective Date of Date Sotm»ls) 11/02/2008 11/02/2008 11/0212008 11/02/2008 
Analysis of prior sale or transfer history of the subject property and oomparable sales NO SALES OR TRANSFERS OF THI!. SUB.IECT FOR THE PAST 36 
MONTHS. NO SALES OF THE COMPARABLE$ IN THE 12 MONTHS PRIOR TO THEIR EFFECTIVE DATE OF SALE. 
summary of Sales Comparison />;)preach. SEE ATTACHED ADDENDUM 
Indicated Value bv Sales C..omnaison Aonmat'.h $ 126 000 
lndicotod V"""' bv: Safes ComclV'lson --each S 126 000 Cost •-oach lif-1--" $ 1-•-0<ICl>fofdowl__,..,$ NIA 
. 
This appraisal is made (KJ•as is; lJsubject to completion per plan$ and specifications on the basis of a hypothetical oondi!ion that the improvements have been oompleted, 
0 subject to the bllowing repairs or alteratlons on the basis of a hypothetical <:Ondltion that the repairs or alterations have been rompleted, or 0 subject to the fbHowing requi"ed 
• inspection based on the extraordinary assumption that the oondi1ion or deficiency does not require alt«ation or repair: 
BO$Cd on a complete vlsual lnsJHctlon of the lntetlct and cxterlcr areas of tho subject pr-rty, ®fl nod scopo of work, statement of assumptions and llmlting 
conditions, and appraiser's cortlflcatlon, my (our) opinion of the market value, as c!Gfined, of tho re:11 pr_.-ty that Is the subject of this report is $ 127,500 
as of 10130/2008 
Frecl:fio M:ic FOi"!tl 70 Match 2005 




FantitMoe-""'"' 10CW Morch ZOO! 
ADDENDUM 
Borrower: ESTATE OF MEL VIN PETERSON - % J. FINNEY. ATTORNEY AT LAW FileNo.: MOYIE SPRINGS 111 
Property Address: P.O. BOX 442 (ROOSEVELT) CaseNo.: 
City; MOYIE SPRINGS State: 10 Zip: 83845 
Lender: JOHN FINNEY. ATTORNEY AT LAW 
CONDITIONS/COMMENTS 
THE INTENDED USER OF THE APPRAISAL REPORT IS THE CUENT ALONG WITH THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE. 
THE INTENDED USE IS TO EVALUATE THE PROPERTY THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS APPRAISAL FOR POSSIBLE 
SETTLEMENT OF A MEDICARE CLAIM. THIS REPORT IS SUBJECT TO THE STATED SCOPE OF WORK,. PURPOSE OF 
THE APPRAISAL, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPRAISAL REPORT FORM, AND DEFINITION OF MARKET 
VALUE. THE COURT ORDER REQUESTING THE APPRAISAL REPORT IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT. 
NO APDITIONAL OR OTHER INTENDED USERS ARE IDENTIFIED BY THE APPRAISER. 
NEIGHBORHOOD BOUNDARIES: 
THE SUBJECT NEIGHBORHOOD IS CONSIDERED ALL OF BOUNDARY COUNTY. THE COUNTY HAS A TOTAL 
POPULATION OF APPROXIMATELY 9,871. BONNERS FERRY, THE COUNTY SEAT, HAS A POPULATION OF 
APPROXIMATELY 2,515. BOUNDARY COUNTY IS IDAHO'S NORTHERNMOST COUNTY, BORDERING BONNER 
COUNTY TO THE SOUTH, WASHINGTON TO THE WEST, CANADA TO THE NORTH AND MONTANA TO THE EAST. 
THE MAJOR ROADWAYS ARE U.S. HIGHWAY 95 RUNNING NORTH AND SOUTH AND U.S. HIGHWAY 2 RUNNING 
EAST AND WEST. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA INCLUDE THE CABINET AND SELKIRK MOUNTAIN RANGES WITH PEAKS IN 
EXCESS 7,000 FEET, THE KOOTENAI AND MOYIE RIVERS AND LARGE ACREAGE AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS. 
SURROUNDING THE CITY UM'ITS, SITES RANGE FROM 0.5 ACRE TO 20 ACRES, AND MORE. BONNERS FERRY IS 
THE COUNTY SEAT AND PROVIDES THE BULK OF EMPLOYMENT, SERVICES, SCHOOLS AND SHOPPING 
FACILITIES. 
NEIGHBORHOOD DESCRIPnON 
BONNERS FERRY IS THE LARGEST CITY IN THE COUNTY AND THE PRIMARY EMPLOYMENT CENTER. THE 
BOUNDARY COUNTY EMPLOYMENT BASE IS SOMEWHAT DIVERSE AND THE MAJORITY OF THE JOBS ARE 
GENERA TED FROM SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED EMPLOYERS WITH AGRICULTURE, TIMBER, GOVERNMENT AND 
TOURISM TYPE EMPLOYMENT PROVIDING THE MAJORITY OF THE BASE. THE TIMBER AND AGRICULTURAL 
INDUSTRIES REMAIN THE LARGEST IN THE AREA. 
CONVENIENCE SHOPPING AND GENERAL SHOPPING, JUNIOR AND SENIOR SCHOOLS, AND MEDICAL 
FACILITIES ARE ALL LOCATED IN BONNERS FERRY. THERE IS LITTLE OR NO PUBUC TRANSPORTATION 
SERVING THE SUBJECT AREA, HOWEVER THIS HAS NO NEGATIVE EFFECT. 
PROPERTY COMPATIBIUTY IS CONSIDERED AVERAGE FOR THE AREA. MAJOR RECREATION INCLUDES THE 
SELKIRK AND CABINET MOUNTAIN RANGES, KOOTENAI AND MOYIE RIVERS AND A PUBUC GOLF COURSE. 
SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENCES ARE LOCATED ON WATERFRONT, SECONDARY WATERFRONT, FOOTHILL AND 
MOUNTAIN VIEW SITES OF VARYING SIZES, SMALLER SIZE SUBURBAN PROPERTIES AND URBAN PROPERTIES 
IN SEVERAL SMALL CITIES. 
THE SUB-NEIGHBORHOOD IS THE "THREE MILE"', MOYIE SPRINGS AREA, SITUATED NORTH AND NORTHEAST 
OF THE CITY OF BONNERS FERRY APPROXIMATELY 4 MILES. THIS SUB-NEIGHBORHOOD IS DEVELOPED WITH A 
GENERAL MIXTURE OF HOMES RANGING FROM CUSTOM BUILT TO AVERAGE BUILT DWELUNGS AND 
MANUFACTURED HOMES. THE SUBJECT IS LOCATED IN THE TOWN SITE OF MOYIE SPRINGS THAT IS THE 
LOCATION OF A LUMBER MILE AS SHOWN ON THE ATTACHED AERIAL PHOTOS. THERE IS SCHOOL BUS SERVICE 
TO THE AREA, BUT NO PUBUC TRANSPORTATION WHICH IS TYPICAL FOR THE AREA. FOR THE MOST PART 
HOMES IN THE AREA DEMONSTRATE AN AVERAGE DEGREE OF EXTERIOR MAINTENANCE AND UPKEEP. THE 
MARKET AREA FOR THE SUBJECT WOULD INCLUDE All OF BOUNDARY COUNTY. 
EMPLOYMENT ST ABILITY FOR THE AREA IS AVERAGE WITH AN ECONOMY RELIANT ON TIMBER AND TOURISM 
BASED EMPLOYMENT. THE SUBJECT HAS AVERAGE PROXIMITY TO SCHOOLS, EMPLOYMENT, SHOPPING 
CENTERS, AND MEDICAL FACILITIES. POUCE AND FIRE PROTECTION ARE CONSIDERED AVERAGE. PROPERTY 
COMPATIBILITY IS CONSIDERED AVERAGE FOR THE AREA. IT IS TYPICAL IN THIS MARKET FOR PROPERTIES 
OF DIFFERENT SIZES ANO DESIGNS TO BE LOCATED IN THE SAME AREA. LAND IN THE IMMEDIATE 
NEIGHBORHOOD IS IN A COMBINATION OF uses INCLUDING SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENTIAL, RECREATIONAL, 
TIMBER REPRODUCTION AND VACANT LAND. THE LOWER END OF THE VALUE RANGE IS REPRESENTED BY THE 
SECONDARY PROPERTIES AND THE UPPER END BY THE WATERFRONTAGE PROPERTIES. 
NEIGHBORHOOD MARKET CONDinONS 
FOR 2004 IN THE BONNERS FERRY AREA FOR SINGLE FAMILY DWELUNGS, THE AVERAGE SALE PRICE WAS 
$132.:aoz. AVERAGE DAYS ON MARKET WAS 192. THE SALES PRICE AS A PERCENTAGE OF UST PRICE WAS 
96.90/o. THE NUMBER OF SALES FOR THE YEAR TO DATE WAS 186. 
FOR 2005 IN THE BONNERS FERRY AREA FOR SINGLE FAMILY DWELLINGS, THE AVERAGE SALE PRICE WAS 
$174.no. AVERAGE DAYS ON MARKET WAS 99. THE SALES PRICE AS A PERCENTAGE OF UST PRICE WAS 
97 .80/o. THE NUMBER OF SALES WAS 222. 
FOR 2006 IN THE BONNERS FERRY AREA FOR SINGLE FAMILY DWEWNGS, THE AVERAGE SALE PRICE WAS 
$206.949. AVERAGE DAYS ON THE MARKET WAS 86. THE SALES PRICE AS A PERCENTAGE OF LIST PRICE WAS 
96.00/o. TOTAL NUMBER OF SALES WAS 161. 
FOR 2007 IN THE BONNERS FERRY AREA FOR SINGLE FAMILY DWELUNGS, THE AVERAGE SALE PRICE WAS 
S222,9ZO. AVERAGE DAYS ON THE MARKET WAS 95. THE SALES PRICE AS A PERCENTAGE OF UST PRICE WAS 
96.50/o. TOTAL NUMBER OF SALES WAS 141. 
FOR 2008 IN THE FIRST 1/2 OF THE YEAR IN THE BONNERS FERRY AREA FOR SINGLE FAMILY DWEWNGS, THE 
AVERAGE SALE PRICE WAS $215.724. AVERAGE DAYS ON MARKET WAS 101. THE SALES PRICE AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF UST PRICE WAS 970/o. TOTAL NUMBER OF SALES WAS 49. 
Addendum Page 1 of 3 
ADDENDUM 
Borrower: ESTATE OF MELVIN PETERSON-%J. FINNEY. ATTORNEY AT LAW File No.: MOYIE SPRINGS 119 
Property Address: P.O. BOX 442 (ROOSEVELD CaseNo.: 
Ci!y: MOYIE SPRINGS State: 10 Zip: 83845 
Lender. JOHN FINNEY. ATTORNEY AT LJlJN 
5206,949. AVERAGE DAYS ON THE MARKET WAS 86. THE SALES PRICE AS A PERCENTAGE OF LIST PRICE WAS 
96.00/o. TOTAL NUMBER OF SALES WAS 161. 
FOR 2007 IN THE BONNERS FERRY AREA FOR SINGLE FAMILY DWELLINGS, THE AVERAGE SALE PRICE WAS 
$222.970. AVERAGE DAYS ON THE MARKET WAS 95. THE SALES PRICE AS A PERCENTAGE OF LIST PRICE WAS 
96.50/o. TOTAL NUMBER OF SALES WAS 141. 
FOR 2008 IN THE FIRST 1/ 2 OF THE YEAR IN THE BONNERS FERRY AREA FOR SINGLE FAMILY DWELLINGS, THE 
AVERAGE SALE PRICE WAS $215.724. AVERAGE DAYS ON MARKET WAS 101. THE SALES PRICE AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF LIST PRICE WAS 970/o, TOTAL NUMBER OF SALES WAS 49. 
FOR 2008, THE TREND APPEARS TO BE ONE OF A FLAT MARKET. SALES PRICES REMAIN CLOSE TO THE 
PREVIOUS YEARS AVERAGE SALES PRICE. TOTAL NUMBER OF SALES APPEARS DOWN SUGHTLY COMPARED TO 
THE FIRST 1/2 OF 2007 (45 VS. 67), YET THIS IS NOT UNEXPECTED. THE WINTER OF 2007-2008 WAS THE 
MOST SEVERE ON RECORD FOR THE AREA. SNOW FALL TOTALS WERE IN EXCESS OF 12 FEET (TYPICAL S-6 
FEET). THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE CALENDAR IS ALWAYS THE SLOWEST, AND THIS YEAR WAS 
EXCEPTIONALLY BAD, SO IT IS NO SURPRISE THAT SALES VOLUME .IS LESS THAN THE PREVIOUS YEAR. 
BASED ON TREND ANALYSIS AND NEIGHBORHOOD INFORMATION AND WITH SUPPORT FROM THE 
COMPARABLES' DAYS ON MARKET, THE SUBJECT IS ESTIMATED TO SELL AT THE APPRAISED VALUE IN A TIME 
PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY 3 TO 9 MONTHS WITH APPROPRIATE MARKETING TECHNIQUES. THESE 
TECHNIQUES INCLUDE PROPER EXPOSURE WITH AN ASKING PRICE AT APPROXIMATELY MARKET VALUE. MANY 
ITEMS CAN DRASTICALLY AFFECT MARKETING TIMES INCLUDING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, PROPERTY 
CONDITION, ASKING PRICE, ACCESS, ETC. 
SITE COMMENTS 
THE SUBJECT DWELUNG IS LOCATED ON A LEVEL, TOTALLY USABLE PARCEL THAT XS WITHIN THE MOYIE 
SPRINGS TOWNSITE. DOMESTIC WATER AND SEWAGE DISPOSAL IS VIA CENTRAL SERVICES. MOST UTIUTIES 
ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUBJECT SITE INCLUDING ELECTRICITY, PHONE AND PUBUC WATER. THESE TYPES OF 
SYSTEMS ARE VERY TYPICAL OF THE MARKETPLACE AND DO NOT HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT MARKETABILITY 
ORVAWE. 
THE SITE IS VERY TYPICAL OF OTHER SITES IN THE AREA AND WOULD BE WELL ACCEPTED IN THE MARKET 
PLACE. THE LOCATION PLACES IT SUBJECT TO THE NOISE FROM THE LUMBER MILL. 
ADDITIONAL FEATURES 
THE DWELUNG IMPROVEMENTS INCLUDE AVERAGE QUALITY MATERIALS AND WORKMANSHIP AND 
ASSOCIATED SITE IMPROVEMENTS PLACING IT FIRMLY WITH THE "AVERAGE" Cl.ASS OF CONSTRUCTION. 
ITEMS INCLUDE DECKING, GARAGE, WALKWAYS, ETC. THE SUBJECT DOES HAVE SOME DEFERRED 
MAINTENANCE ITEMS AND THOSE ITEMS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED UNDER THE "EFFECTIVE AGE" SECTION OF 
THE ADJUSTMENT GRID. 
COMMENTS ON SALES COMPARISON 
THE COMPARABLE PROPERTIES PRESENTED ARE THE MOST COMPARABLE, RELEVANT SUBSTITUTE PROPERTIES 
FOUND IN MY INVESTIGATION. PRIMARY SEARCH PARAMETER WAS FOR SIMILAR LOWER/MIDDLE PRICE 
RANGE PROPERTIES ON SMALL ACREAGE AND/OR SITES AND LOCATED IN OR NEAR MOYIE SPRINGS THAT 
HAVE SOLD RECENTLY. 
THESE ARE THE MOST SIMILAR COMPARABLES FOUND XN MY INVE$TIGATION. ALL THE SALES FELL WITHIN 
INDUSTRY GUIDEUNES REGARDING MINIMAL NE! AND GRQS$ ADJUSTMENTS IN THE ADlUSIMENT GRID. THE 
SALES UTILIZED ARE THE BEST AVAILABLE. 
ALL COMPARABLE SALES ARE WrTHIN THE PAST 6 MONTHS. EVERY ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO FIND THE MOST 
RELEVANT RECENT SUBSTITUTE PROPERTIES THROUGH THE COVERING OF THE BONNER/BOUNDARY COUNTY 
MULTIPLE USTING SERVICE, THE BONNER/BOUNDARY COUNTY ASSESSOR'S OFFICE DATA AND FILES AND 
LOCAL BROKERS. 
LARGER ADJUSTMENTS FOR FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE VALUE ARE UNAVOIDABLE AND VERY TYPICAL IN THE 
APPRAISAL OF CUSTOM TYPE DWELUNGS IN BOUNDARY COUNTY. THESE LARGER ADJUSTMENTS ARE 
GENERALLY DUE TO THE DIFFERENCE IN VALUE OF THE SITES, QUALITY DIFFERENCES AND SIZES OF 
DWELUNGS. SITE VALUES ARE INFLUENCED BY QUAUTY OF LOCATION, SITE SIZE, ACCESS, VIEWS, 
TOPOGRAPHY, SOLAR EXPOSURE, VIEW, ETC. THESE FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO THE OVERALL VAWE OF THE 
SITE, AND THEY ALSO EXPLAIN THE OCCASIONAL LACK OF CONSISTENCY AT TIMES WHEN COMPARING SITES 
OF A SIMILAR SIZE OR IN SOME CASES OF A DIFFERING SIZE. OVERALL SITE VAWE INCWDING SITE SIZE, 
VIEW AMENITY, PROXIMITY, LOCATION, PRIVACY, TRAFFIC, ETC. IS TAKEN AS A ONE UNE ADJUSTMENT IN 
THE GRID UNDER "SrTE". 
ADJUSTMENTS WERE BASED ON MY INTERIOR AND/OR EXTERIOR INSPECTIONS OF THE COMPARABLE 
PROPERTIES AND ON THE DATA SOURCES INDICATED. ADlUSTMENTS IN THE GRID FOR "QUAUTY", "SIZE", 
"DESIGN" "SITE IMPROVEMENTS", "ETC.", HAVE BEEN MADE ON EACH COMPARABLE PROPERTY BASED ON THE 
QUAUTY, SIZE AND OVERALL CONTRIBUTION, ETC., WHEN COMPARED TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. SOME ARE 
INFERIOR OR SUPERIOR TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN A LESSER DEGREE THAN OTHERS. THESE FACTORS 
HAVE RESULTED IN THE ABOVE ADJUSTMENTS. 
ALL COMPARABLE SALES CONTRIBUTED RELEVANT ELEMENTS OF COMPARISON WHEN CONSIDERING THE 
ESTIMATED VALUE IN THE FINAL RECONCIUATIOlll, THEREFORE THEY WERE GIVEN SIMILAR WEIGHT IN THE 
DECISION PROCESS. 
CONDITIONS OF THE REPORT 
EASEMENTS, RESTRICTIONS AND RESERVATIONS: ONLY EASEMENTS, RESTRICTIONS, ETC. OBSERVED DURING 
THE PHYSICAL INSPECTION AND/OR POINTED OUT BY THE OWNER/TENANT, ETC. DURING THE PHYSICAL 
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WAS TAKEN EARLY OR LATE IN THE DAY. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: PERSONAL PROPERTY IS IDENTIFIED AS PORTABLE AND TANGIBLE OBJECTS AND 
WHICH ARE CONSIDERED BY THE GENERAL PUBUC AS BEING PERSONAL, EG., FURNISHINGS, MACHINERY AND 
EQUIPMENT, ETC., AS DEFINED BY USPAP. WOOD AND PELLET STOVES ARE CONSIDERED REAL PROPERTY. NO 
PERSONAL PROPERTY HAS BEEN INCWDED OR VALUED IN THIS REPORT. 
ASSUMPTIONS: THE APPRAISER ASSUMES THE BORROWER, IF ANY, IS AWARE THAT: 1) THIS APPRAISAL DOES 
NOT SERVE AS A WARRANTY ON THE CONDITION OF THE SUBlECT PROPERTY; 2) IT IS THE RESPONSIBIUTY 
OF THE BORROWER AND/OR OWNER TO EXAMINE THE PROPERTY CAREFULLY AND TO TAKE ALL PRECAUTIONS 
PRIOR TO ENTERING INTO ANY AGREEMENTS; 3) IT IS ASSUMED THAT THERE ARE NO HIDDEN OR 
UNAPPARENT STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS OF THE PROPERTY THAT WOULD RENDER IT MORE OR LESS 
VAWABLE; THE APPRAISER IS NOT QUALIFIED TO MAKE DETERMINATIONS REGARDING THE STRUCTURAL 
INTEGRITY OF THE DWELLING; 4) IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE DATA SOURCES LISTED PROVIDED ACCURATE 
AND RELIABLE INFORMATION. 
CERTIFICATION: I CERTIFY THAT, TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF: 1) THE STATEMENTS OF FACT 
CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT ARE TRUE AND CORRECT; 2) THE REPORTED ANALYSES, OPINIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS ARE LIMITED ONLY BY THE REPORTED ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITING CONDITIONS, AND ARE MY 
PERSONAL, UNBIASED PROFESSIONAL ANALYSES, OPINIONS AND CONCWSIONS; 3) I HAVE NO PRESENT OR 
PROSPECTIVE INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT AND I HAVE NO PERSONAL 
INTEREST OR BIAS WITH RESPECT TO THE PARTIES INVOLVED; 4) MY COMPENSATION IS NOT CONTINGENT 
ON ANY ACTION OR EVENT RESULTING FROM THE ANALYSES, OPINIONS OR CONCLUSIONS IN, OR THE USE OF, 
THIS REPORT; 5) MY ANALYSES, OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS WERE DEVELOPED, AND THIS REPORT HAS 
BEEN PREPARED, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE; 
6) DAVID NOONAN IFA/CGA#60 HAS MADE A PERSONAL INSPECTION OF THE PROPERTY THAT IS THE SUBJECT 
OF THIS REPORT 
COMPETENCY: BY ACCEPTANCE OF THIS ASSIGNMENT, THE APPRAISER WHO SIGNED THE REPORT CERTIFY HE 
POSSESSES SUFFICIENT EDUCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL SKILLS REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THIS APPRAISAL IN 
A PROFESSIONAL MANNER. 
Addendum Page 3 of 3 
!SUBJECT PROPERTY PHOTO ADDENDUM 
Borrower: ESTATE OF MELVIN , ..t50lll . % J. FINNEY, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Property Address: P.O. BOX 442 (ROOSEVELT) 
City: MOYIE SPRINGS State: ID 
Lender: JOHN FINNEY ATTORNEY AT LAW 
·---····· ---·----·- .. • ·-----.. -- ·---·--·-·- ---1 
' ··· ·-·--·-·--·-·--- ---·······--- - -· ·-·- - ·--i
File fy llOYIE SPRINGS 111 
Case No.: · 
Zip: 83845 
FRONT VIEW OF 
SUBJECT PROPERTY 
Appraised Date: October 30, 2008 
Appraised Value: $ 127,soo 
REAR VIEW OF 
SUBJECT PROPERTY 
STREET SCENE 
SUBJECT PROPERTY PHOTO ADDENDUM 
Borrower: ESTATE OF MELVIN f' .tSON - % J. Fl-"N~N::.E=-Y~,'"'A::.TT::..:..;O::R:.::N:EY~-=-A'-'T--'LA=W~----F'--'i""le'-'-l"i= ..---"M"'O~Y"'l=E-=SP"'-"R"'l"'N=GS=--'1c.:1..:.1 __ _ 
Property Address: p .o. BOX 442 (ROOSEVELT) Case No.: 
City: MOYIE SPRINGS State: ID Zip: 83845 




1 SUBJECT PROPERTY PHOTO ADDENDUM 
Borrower: ESTATE OF MELVIN N . % J. FINNEY, ATTORNEY AT LAW File No .. MOYIE SPRINGS 111 
Property Address: P.O. BOX 442 (ROOSEVELT) Case No. : 
City: MOYlE SPRINGS State: ID Zip: 83845 





' SUBJECT PROPERTY PHOTO ADDENDUM l ' c I Borrower: ESTATE OF MELVIN • .::RSO-N---°"-.-.,-. F_l_N_N_E_Y_._A_TT_O_R_N_EY_A_T_LA_W _____ F_ile-1 o.: -MO~E SPRINGS 111 
Property Address: P.O. BOX 442 (ROOSEVELT) Case No.: 
City: MOYIE SPRINGS State: ID 
Lender: .JOHN FJNNl!Y ATTORNEY AT LAW 




l"EAUNG PAINT· GENERAL 
DEFERRED MAINTENANCE 
Borrower: ESTATE OF MELVIN PETERSON • % J. FINNEY, ATTORNEY AT LAW File No.: MOYIE SPRINGS 111 
Property Address: P.O. BOX 442 (ROOSEVELT) Case No.: 
City: MOYIE SPRINGS State: ID Zip: 83845 

























Borrower: ESTATE OF MELVIN PETERSON-% .J. FINNEY, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Property Address: P.O. BOX 442 (ROOSEVELT) 
City: MOYIE SPRINGS State: ID 














MPARABLE PROPERTY PHOTO ADDENDUM 
Borrower: ESTATE OF MELVIN • % J. FINNEY, ATTORNEY AT LAW File MOYIE SPRINGS 111 
"".P 'ro"'pe""rty'-"'-A"-d=d"-'re"'s"'-s:'""'P"'".o"".'""'B""O"':X~44.::2:..c.IR::::OO=SEVE==LT).:.L. ___________ ___ _;C::.:ase=-'-'N"'o"".: _____ _______ _ 
Q!LMOYJE SPRINGS State: ID Zip: 83845 
Lender: JOHN FINNEY ATTORNEY AT LAW 
qg 
COMPARABLE SALE #1 
146 E. RAILROAD AVE 
MOYIE SPRINGS, ID 
Sale Date: 08/04/2008..COE 
Sale Price: $ 125,000 
COMPARABLESALE#2 
141 ELECTRIC AVE 
MOYIE SPRINGS, ID 
Safe Date: 04116/2008-COE 
Sale Price: $108,240 
COMPARABLE SALE #3 
ROOSEVELT RD 
MOYIE SPRINGS, ID 
Sale Date: 041D1120os-cOE 
Sale Price: $130,ooo 
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F\"ovlde adeauate infu<malion fer the lenderldient to reoficate the below a>st fiaures and calrula!lons. ·--
Support for the opinion of site value (su"""11)' of c:ompa-able land safes or other methods for estimating site value) THE COST APPROACH DOES NOT MEASURE 
THE INTERACTIONS OF BUYER AND SEUERS AND FOR THAT REASON HAS NOT BEEN INCLUDED. 
ESTlMATED I IRE!'ROOUCTIONOR IXIREPLACEMENTCOSTNEW OPINION OF SITE VALUE ••...•... ....... = $ 
Source of cost data MARSHALL AND SWIFT AND LOCAL BUILDERS Owellino Sa. FL Ill!$ ............ = $ 
Oualilv ratino tom cost service AVG Effective date of (l)St data CURRENT Sa.Ft.@$ .. = $ 
Comments on Cost A""'oach loross livina area calaulations. deorecialion. etc.' 
Sc. Ft.@$ = $ 
.... = $ 
Less Phwical I Functtonal I ~ 
0enreeation I I = $( 
Detlmdated Cost of lmnmvamsnls . . . . .. ..• $ 
"As-ls" Value of Site tmnmvements . = $ 
Estimated Remainina Ec:onomicLifelHUOandVAMM 43 Years INOICATEOVA!.UEBYCOST APPROACH................. : $ 
Estimated Monthlv Market Rent$ X Gross Rent Multiplier = $ NIA Indicated Value bv Income Aooroach 
Summary of Income Approacf\ Qnduding wpportfor market rent and GRM) ------------------------------< 
l.eaal name of""""°' 
Total number of chases Total number of units Total number of units sold 
• Was the,,,,,..,. aeated bvthe conversion of an existino buildinalsl into a PUO? I Ives I No ffVes. date of conversion. 
;. Does the croiect contain anv muffi.dwellirul units? I Ives I !No Data SOU!cels\ 
Are the units, common elements. and recreation facilities complete? LJves LjNo ff No, desaibe the status of c:omplefion. ______________ _.., 
Are the CtlmmOll elements leased to or by the Homeowners' hsociation? lJYes LJNo lfYes. desaibe the rental terms and oplions. -------------! 
Desaibe common elemenls and ~tional fadrmes. 
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APPRAISER'S CERTIFICATION: The Appraiser certifies and agrees that: 
1. I have, at a minimum, developed and reported this appraisal in accordance With the scope of work requirements stated in this 
appraisal report. 
2. I performed a complete visual inspection of the interior and exterior areas of the subject property. I reported the condition of 
the improvements in factual. specific terms. I identified and reported the physical deficiencies that could affect the livability, 
soundness. or structural integrity of the property. 
3. I performed this appraisal in accordance With the requirements of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice 
that were adopted and promulgated by the Appraisal Standards Board of The Appraisal Foundation and that were in place at the 
time this appraisal report was prepared. 
4. I developed my opinion of the market value of the real property that is the subject of this report based on the sales comparison 
approach to value. I have adequate comparable market data to develop a reliable sales comparison approach for this appraisal 
assignment. I further certify that I considered the cost and income approaches to value but did not develop them. unless otherWise 
indicated in this report. 
5. I researched. verified. analyzed, and reported on any current agreement for sale for the subject property. any offering for sale 
of the subject property in the twelve months prior to the effective date of this appraisal, and the prior sales of the subject property 
for a minimum of three years prior to the effective date of this appraisal, unless otherWise indicated in this report. 
6. I researched. verified. analyzed. and reported on the prior sales of the comparable sales for a minimum of one year prior to the 
date of sale of the comparable sale. unless otherWise indicated in this report. 
7. I selected and used comparable sales that are locationally. physically, and functionally the most similar to the subject property. 
8. I have not used comparable sales that were the result of combining a land sale with the contract purchase price of a home 
that has been built or will be built on the land. 
9. I have reported adjustments to the comparable sales that reflect the market's reaction to the differences between the subject 
property and the comparable sales. 
10. I verified. from a disinterested source. all information in this report that was provided by parties who have a financial interest in 
the sale or financing of the subject property. 
11. I have knowledge and experience in appraising this type of property in thls market area. 
12. I am aware of. and have access to, the necessary and appropriate public and private data sources. such as multiple listing 
services, tax assessment records. public land records and other such data sources for the area in which the property is located. 
13. I obtained the information. estimates. and opinions furnished by other parties and expressed in this appraisal report from 
reliable sources that I believe to be true and correct. 
14. I have taken into consideration the factors that have an impact on value with respect to the subject neighborhood. subject 
property. and the proximity of the subject property to adverse influences in the development of my opinion of market value. I have 
noted in this appraisal report any adverse conditions (such as, but not limited to. needed repairs. deterioration. the presence of 
hazardous wastes. toxic substances. adverse environmental conditions, etc.) observed during the Inspection of the subject property 
or that l became aware of during the research involved in performing this appraisal. I have considered these adverse conditions in 
my analysis of the property value, and have reported on the effect of the conditions on the value and marketability of the subject 
property. 
15. I have not knowingly withheld any significant information from this appraisal report and. to the best of my knowledge, all 
statements and information in this appraisal report are true and correct. 
16. I stated in this appraisal report my own personal, unbiased. and professional analysis. opinions, and conclusions. which are 
subject only to the assumptions and limiting conditions in this appraisal report. 
17. I have no present or prospective interest in the property that is the subject of thiS report, and I have no present or prospective 
personal interest or bias with respect to the participants in the transaction. I did not base, either partially or completely. my 
analysis and/or opinion of market value in this appraisal report on the race. color. religion, sex. age, marital status. handicap, 
familial status. or national origin of either the prospective owners or occupants of the subject property or of the present owners or 
occupants of the properties in the vicinity of the subject property or on any other basis prohibited by law. 
18. My employment and/or compensation for performing this appraisal or any future or anticipated appraisals was not conditioned 
on any agreement or understanding, Written or otherwise, that l would report (or present analysis supporting) a predetermined 
specific value, a predetermined minimum value. a range or direction in value, a value that favors the cause of any party, or the 
attainment of a specific result or occurrence of a specific subsequent event (such as approval of a pending mortgage loan 
application). 
19. I personally prepared all conclusions and opinions about the real estate that were set forth in this appraisal report. If I relied on 
significant real property appraisal assistance from any individual or individuals in the performance of this appraisal or the 
preparation of this appraisal report. I have named such individual(s) and disclosed the specific tasks performed in this appraisal 
report. I certify that any individual so named is qualified to perform the tasks. I have not authorized anyone to make a change to 
any Item in this appraisal report: therefore, any change made to this appraisal is unauthorized and I Will take no responsibility for it. 
20. I identified the lender/client in this appraisal report who is the individual. organization, or agent for the organization that ordered 
and will receiVe this appraisal report. 
JOO 
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21. The lender/client may disclose or distribute this appraisal report to: the borrower: another lender at the request of the borrower: 
the mortgagee or its successors and assigns: mortgage insurers: government sponsored enterprises; other secondary market 
participants: data coflection or reporting services; professional appraisal organizations; any department. agency, or instrumentality 
of the United States: and any state, the District of Columbia, or other jurisdictions: without having to obtain the appraiser's or 
supervisory appraiser's {if applicable) consent. Such consent must be obtained before this appraisal report may be disclosed or 
distributed to any other party {including, but not limited to. the public through advertising, public relations. news, sales. or other 
media). 
22. I am aware that any disclosure or distribution of this appraisal report by me or the lender/client may be subject to certain laws 
and regulations. Further. I am also subject to the provisions of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice that 
pertain to disclosure or distribution by me. 
23. The borrower. another lender at the request of the borrower. the mortgagee or its successors and assigns. mortgage insurers. 
government sponsored enterprises, and other secondary market participants may rely on this appraisal report as part of any 
mortgage finance transaction that involves any one or more of these parties. 
24. If this appraisal report was transmitted as an "electronic record" containing my "electronic signature: as those terms are 
defined in applicable federal and/or state laws (excluding audio and video recordings), or a facsimile transmission of this appraisal 
report containing a copy or representation of my signature, the appraisal report shall be as effective, enforceable and valid as if a 
paper version of this appraisal report were delivered containing my original hand written signature. 
25. Any intentional or negligent misrepresentation{s) contained in this appraisal report may result in civil liability and/or criminal 
penalties including, but not limited to. fine or imprisonment or both under the provisions of Title 18. United States Code, Section 
1001. et seq .. or similar state laws. 
SUPERVISORY APPRAISER'S CERTIFICATION: The Supervisory Appraiser certifies and agrees that: 
1. I directly supervised the appraiser for this appraisal assignment. have read the appraisal report, and agree With the appraiser's 
analysis, opinions. statements. conclusions. and the appraiser's certification. 
2. I accept full responsibility for the contents of this appraisal report including. but not limited to, the appraiser's analysis. 
opinions, statements. conclusions. and the appraiser's certification. 
3. The appraiser identified in this appraisal report is either a sub-contractor or an employee of the supervisory appraiser (or the 
appraisal firm), is qualified to perform this appraisal. and is acceptable to perform this appraisal under the applicable state law. 
4. This appraisal report complies with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice that were adopted and 
promulgated by the Appraisal Standards Board of The Appraisal Foundation and that were in place at the time this appraisal 
report was prepared. 
5. If this appraisal report was transmitted as an "electronic record" containing my "electronic signature; as those terms are 
defined in applicable federal and/or state laws (excluding audio and video recordings}, or a facsimile transmission of this appraisal 
report containing a copy or representation of my signature, the appraisal report shall be as effective, enforceable and valid as if a 
paper version of this appraisal report were delivered containing my original hand written signature. 
APPRAISER SUPERVISORY APPRAISER (ONLY IF REQUIRED) 
Signatu~~.J_..,... 
Name DAVID  
Signature 
Name 
Company Name APPRAISAL ASSOCIATES Company Name 
Company Address 120 EAST LAKE STREET, #319 Company Address 
$.ANDPOINT1 ID 83864 
Telephone Number 208-263-6322 Telephone Number 
Email Address DNOO@SANDPOINT.NET Email Address 
Date of Signature and Report 10/31/2008 Date of Signature 
Effective Date of Appraisal 10/30/2008 State Certification 
State Certification # CGA 60 or State License# 
or State License # State 
orOther{describe) State# Expiration Date of Certification or License 
State ID 
Expiration Date of Certification or License 07119/2009 
ADDRESS OF PROPERTY APPRAISED SUBJECT PROPERTY 
P.O. BOX 442 fROOSEVEL!) 0 Did not inspect subject property 
MOYIE! SPRINGS, ID 83845 0 Did inspect exterior of subject property from street 
Date of Inspection 
APPRAISED VALUE OF SUBJECT PROPERTY $127,500 0 Did inspect interior and exterior of subject proper{y 
Date of Inspection 
LENDER/CLIENT 
Name COMPARABLE SALES 
Company Name JOHN FINNEY, ATTORNEY AT LAW a Did not inspect exterior of comparable sales from street 
Company Address 120 E. LAKE ST. Did inspect exterior of comparable sales from street 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 Date of Inspection 
Email Address 
Freddie Mac Forl'n 70Morct2005 P~ ~ ACf soffwnm. 800.234-&1'2:1-·.~ClOl'll F:m'11c Mom l'ttm 1004 Muth 2005 
APPRAISAL ASSOCIATES 
I - I 
APPRAISAL ASSOCIATES 
120 E. LAKE STREET. SUITE 319 • SANDPOINT IOAHO 83864 • (208) 263-6322. FAX (208) 2654484 
DAVID NOONAN !FA - QUALJFICATIONS 
STATE OF IDAHO CERTIFIED GENERAL APPRAISER CGA #60 
OWNER: APPRAISAL ASSOCIATES/120 E. LAKE STREET, SUITE #319 
SANDPOINT, IDAHO 83864 
PHONE: (208) 263-8322 FAX: (208) 265-4484" 
ORGANIZATIONS: 
Designated Member National Association of Independent Fee Appraisers 
Past State Director/National Association of Independent Fee Appraisers 
President/ Sandpoint Chapter, N.A.l.F.A. 1985-96 
Member of National Association of Realtors 
Member Selkirk Association of Realtors 
Member MLS Systems Covering Bonner, Boundary and Kootenai Counties 
EDUCATION: 
Graduated Chaminade College Prep High Schoo/11965-1969 
Graduated University of Northern Colorado with B.S. degree in 
Business Final1C4J and Economics/1969-1973 
Completed Educational Requirements and Courses given by The National 
Association of Independent Fee Appraisers 
Completed and passed Educational Requirements given by the State 
of Idaho for Real E$tJJte Brokers Licensing/1981 
Certified through 2001 in the Mandatory Program of Continuing Education 
in the National Association of Independent Fee Appraisers 
On more than One Occasion ApDOinted "SPJ!Cial Master" Under Provision 706 
Actina as an Expert Witness "For the District Coutt". 
MOST RECENT APPRAISAL CLASSES: 
"National USPAP Update Equivalent" 
Coeur 'Alene, ID/July, 2008 
"Real Estate Investing & Development-A Valuation Persp." 
Las Vegas, NV!Juty 2007 
"Rates and Ratios: Making Sense of G/Ms, OARs, and DCFs" 
Las Vegas, NV/July 2007 
"Real Estate Investing & Development-A Valuation Persp." 
Las Vegas, NV/July 2007 
"Rates and Ratios: Making Sense of GIMs, OARs, and DCFs" 
Las Vegas, NV/July 2007 
"The Real Estate Economy: What's in Store for 2008?" 
Las Vegas, NV/July 2007 
"Fannie Mae Revisions and the Appraiser" 
Spokane, WA/August, 2005 
"Appraisal Trends" 
Spokane, WA/Augu~ 2005 
National USPAP Update Equivalent" 
Boise, ID/July, 2005 
"Appraising Multi-Family Properties" 
Boise, ID/July, 2005 
"National USPAP Update Equivalent" 
Boise, ID/July, 2005 
"Rates & Ratios: Making Sense of G/Ms, OARs & DCF" 
Boise, ID/Sept. 2003 
"Market Data Abstraction" 
Boise, ID/Sept. 2003 
"The Effects of Wetlands & Other Factors on Rural Land Value" 
Las Vegas, NV/July 2000 (Valuation 2000) 
''The Fannie Mae REO Appraisal Workshop" 
Las Vegas, NV/July 2000 (Valuation 2000) 
"Conservation Easements Seminar" 
Las Vegas, NV/July 2000 {Valuation 2000) 
"Appraisal Technology Forum" 
Las Vegas, NV/July 2000 {Valuation 2000) 
"Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice" 
St. Louis, MO/June 1999 {NA/FA) 
/OOI 
"Thirty Specialized Appraisal Issues" 
Spokane, Washington/April 1998 (Appraisal Institute) 
"Income Capitalization Techniques" 
Boise, Idaho/April 1998 (McKissock Systems) 
"Review Appraising" 
Boise, Idaho/April 1998 (McKissock Systems) 
"Environmental Considerations" 
Boise, Idaho/April 1998 (McKissock Systems) 
"Rural Business Valuation" 
Jackpot, Nevada/May 1998 (Farm Managers & Rural Appraisers) 
"Market Data Analysis of Residential Real Estate" 
Helena, Montana/September 1991 (NAJFA/Challenge) 
"Report Writing of Residential Real Estate" 
Helena, Montana/September 1991 (NAJFA/Challenge) 
"Real Estate Construction & Development" 
Helena, Montana/September 1991 (NA/FA) 
"Techniques of Income Property Appraising" 
Helena, Montana/December 1990 (NAJFA) 
"Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice" 
Spokane, Washington/July 1990 (NA/FA) 
"Legal Aspects of Easements" 
Spokane, Washington/April 1990 {IRIWA) 
"Review of the New URAR" 
Spokane, Washington/December 1993 (NAJFA) 
"Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice" 
Spokane, Washington/May 1994 (NAJFA) 
"Market Data Analysis" 
Sandpoint, Idaho/May 1994 (NAJFA) 
EXPERIENCE: 
Owner, Appraisal Associates in Sandpoint, Idaho (1985-CurrentJ 
Associate Appraiser, Appraisal Associates (1980-85) 
Associate Appraiser, Noonan Appraisers (1977·80) 
Inactive Sales Broker, State of Idaho 
Active Sales Broker, State of Missouri (1974-81) 
Associate Appraiser, Noonan Appraisers (1978-80) 
Numerous Court Appearances in Bonner, Boundary, Kootenai Counties 
In Idaho and in St Louis County, Missouri 
APPRAISED REAL PROPERTY IN THE FOLLOWING STA TES: 
Missouri, Illinois, Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington 
VALUATION OF THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF REAL PROPERTY: 
Apartment Buildings Office and Professional Buildings 
Condominiums Lakefront 
Manufacturing Facilities Churches 
Industrial Properties Schools 
Retail Sales Buildings 
Service Stations 
Single Family Dwellings 
Farms 
VALUATION OF THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF REAL PROPERTY continued ... 
Restaurants Ranches 
Vacant Land Recreational Retreats 
Shopping Center Sites Subdivisions 
Watehouses Grain Elevators 
Sawmills Sand and Gravel Pits 
Timberlands and Stumpage Beer Distributorship 
Golf Courses Bonner County Airport 
Research and Development Centers Convenience Stores 
Motels Manufactured Home Parlcs 
Marinas Theaters 
Many Others .••..•. 
ASSIGNMENTS COMPLETED FOR: 
District of Idaho Department of Justice 
State of Idaho 
County of Bonner 
City of Sandpoint, Idaho 
Farmers Home Administration 
Bank of America/Sandpoint, Coeur d'Alene 
First Interstate Bank/Sandpoint, Bonners Feny, Boise 
First Security Bank/Sandpoint, Bonners Ferry, Hayden Lake 
103 
Pend Oreille Bank/Sandpoint, Idaho, Newport Washington 
Panhandle State Bank/Sandpoint, Bonners Ferry, Priest River 
Transamerica Rnance Company Better Homes & Gardens 
Bancshares Mortgage Company Relocation Service 
Equitable Relocation Company Stars Mortgage 
Metropolitan Mortgage Company Farmers and Merchants Bank 
Lenders Services Moore Rnancial Service 
Credit Union Mortgage Association Liberty Funding 
Comprehensive Marketing Systems, Inc. Seatirst Private Banking 
Sterling Savings & Loan Association Many More ••.... 
Rainier Financial Services United Pacific Insurance 
Co-op Federal Credit Union Pacific National Mortgage 
Safeway Credit Union Transamerica Insurance Company 
Mountain Ben Company Safeco Insurance Company 
Ticor Title Company Bonners Ferry Grain 
First American Tlt/e Company Wood River Pipeline 
Caldwell Banker Relocation Schweitzer, Inc. 
CityFed Associates Relocation 
Washington Water Power Pac-West Services, Inc. 
C-21 Mortgage Company Relocation Resources 
Many More .... 
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FROM FINNEY FINNEY & Fl _J825ss211 (WED)JUN 3 2009 15:40 
ADDENDUM 
.40/No.6810297137 P 
I APPRAJSED THIS PROPERTY ON 10/30/2008.. J HAVE NOW BESI ASKED TO VALUE THE !PROPERTY WlTH AN 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF VAWE OF 03/03/2007. nas ANALYSIS rs TO BE A PORl'JON OFTHt! APPRAISAi. REPO«T 
COMPLETED WITH AN EFFECrIVE DATE OF VALUI! OF 10/30/2008 AND COMPLETED ON 10/31/2008. 
THIS JS HOT A STAND ALONE ANALYSIS, JT JS PART OF THE REPORT wrrN AH EfFEC1'IYE D.ATA OF VAWE OF 
10/30/2008. IF YOU HAVE nas DOCUMENT Al.ONE DO NOT CONSIDER rr A STANDAU>NE DOCUMENT. 
FDR THIS ANALYSIS, I HAVE INVESTIGATED THE MARICET ANO THERE JS NO DATA THAT WOULD~ THI! 
VAWE ESTDIATE OTHER THAN THE BELOW C>JSCUSSlON. FOR THJS ANALUJS, I HAVE NOT RE•lNSl'ECTED 
THE PROPERTY. 
FOR THIS ANALYSIS, I AM USING A ~PAIRED SALE9 ANALYSIS THAT OUR FIRM HAS BUN USING FOR SOME 
MONTHS fOR DWEWNGS IN THE GENERAL AREAS SURROUNDING THE 80NNERS FERRY AREA. MY 
JNVESTlGATlON HAS POINTED OUT THAT DURING THE ENTDIE YEAR OF 2008 RE.At.PROPERTY VAWES HAD 
DECUNED AT A RATE OF APPROXIMATELY l'llt PEil MONTH (:l:z<M. FOR THI! YEAR). TffERE IS NO MEASURAllU: 
DATA FOR THE YEAR OF 2007, BUT INDIRECT DATA FROM CONSTANT MONJTOR.tNG OF THE MARKET HAS 
SUGGESTED THAT THIS 1qi. WOULD NOT INCLUDE 2007. 
JN THE PARJNG SALES ANALYSIS ON Rl!S1DENT'l'AL PllOPERT'IES A SAU PRoPEn'Y THAT SOLD IN SAY, 2007 15 
"PAIRl!D"' WITH THAT SAME PROPERTY THAT SOLD lN 2008 JN AN EFl'ORT TO DErERMJNI! THE DIFFERENCE IN 
SALE PRICe$ THER£8Y USING TttJS INFORMATION TO APPLY TO SALES DURING THAT PERIOD, 
THIS APPRAISER IS AWARE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SOM& MONJ:ES SPEN'I' ON THE PllOPERTV BETWEEN 
THOSE TWO DATES (03/03/2007 AND 10/30/2008). If JS MY ESTJMATJON THAT TMESE MONDS SPENT ON 
THE SUBJECT PROPERrY ARE PREDOMINATELY THOSE THAT AMOUNT TO MAINTENANCE, AND NOT NEW MAJOR 
CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS SUCH AS A Nl!W aEDROON, TOTALLY REMODELED KITCHEN, A Nl!W BATHROOM, NEW 
GARAGE, ETC. DUE TO lltE FACT THAT THESE n'EMS ARE GENEAALL Y MAINTENANCE AND REPlACEMENT 
ITEMS, POSSIBL V EXTENDING THE PHYSICAL UFE BUT NOT THE ECONOMIC UFE, 
NO UPWARD ADJUSTMENT FOR TH!SE ITEMS JS TAKEN. rT JS POINTED OUT THE EVEN XF THESE ITEMS WERE 
f'OR SNAUER CAPJTAL XMPllOYl!Ml!!NTS, THCRe IS INSUrrJCUNT MARKET DATA TO MEASURE ANY VAWE 
DIFFERENCE BASED ON THOSE lMPROVEtENTS. 
SO, TAICJNG THE 2008 ESTIMATE OF VALU&,, AND LOOKING BACKWARDS TO THE MARCH 3, 2007 DATE OF 
VAWE, THE SU8.J&CT HAD A HJGHER ESTIMATE OF VAWE THAN IN 10/30/2007. THE ESTIMATED VAWE 
NUMBERS AIU! BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWING: 
BASED ON THE 1.,., PER MONTH, THE TOTAL TIME ADJUSTMENT JS ES'l'JMAT&DAT 9CM>. 
ESnMATED VAWE ON OCTOBER 30, 200815 $127,500; ADDING THE NINE MONT'MS (01/01/2008 TO 
10/30/2008), AT 1"'4 PER MONTH OR 9"" IS $127,500; ADD 9'tb = $139,000(r). 
ESnMATED VAWE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS 01' 03/03/2007 ts $139,000. 
-
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LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov] 
FILED 
zooq JUL I 5 p I: 2 b 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
MELVIN PETERSON, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV-2007-266 
PETITION TO COMPEL SALE 
OFHOMEANDPAYMENTTO 
DEPARTMENT 
COMES NOW the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, by and through Larry L. 
Goins, Deputy Attorney General, and hereby petitions the Court for an order compelling the 
Personal Representative to forthwith sell the home of decedent located at P.O. Box 442 
(Roosevelt), Moyie Springs, Idaho, and to use the proceeds therefrom along with other available 
assets of the estate, to pay the claim of the Department with interest but less reasonable costs and 
expenses of estate administration. 
This Petition is supported by the Appraisal Report and Addendum, and the Brief in 
Support of Petition filed herewith by the Department. 
PETITION TO COMPEL SALE OF HOME AND PAYMENT TO DEPARTMENT- 1 
/()~ 
Dated this ~ay of July, 2009. 
. Goins 
eputy Attorney General 
Attorney for the Department 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served via U.S. 
Mail, postage prepaid, on the { Qt{lday of July, 2009 to: 
HONORABLE JUSTIN W. JULIAN 
MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
BOUNDARY COUNTY, IDAHO 
POBOX419 
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805 
CATHIE L PETERSON 
C/O JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE STREET SUITE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
PETITION TO COMPEL SALE OF HOME AND PAYMENT TO DEPARTMENT- 2 
!OF 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov J 
F\LED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of Case No. CV-2007-266 
MELVIN PETERSON, BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
Deceased. 
COMES NOW the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department), by and 
through Larry L. Goins, Deputy Attorney General, and hereby submits this Brief in Support of 
Petition to Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Department as follows: 
BACKGROUND 
On June I 2, 2008, the Court entered its Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim in 
favor of the Department. Among other things, the Court granted the Department's medicaid 
estate recovery claim and deemed decedent's life estate interest in his home to be an asset of the 
estate. The Court further required the Personal Representative to amend her Inventory, list the 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION* 1 
life estate interest as an asset of the estate and assign an appropriate value thereto " at the time of 
death." Order at 2. 
On September 23, 2009, and upon motion by the Personal Representative, the Court 
entered an Order Approving Hiring of Appraiser to allow David Noonan to appraise the fee 
simple value of the home. On October 30, 2008, Mr. Noonan completed his Appraisal Report 
and valued the home at $127 ,500 as of the date of appraisal rather than " at the time of death" on 
March 3, 2007. On June 3, 2009, and only after a Motion to Compel Short Form Appraisal by 
the Department, Mr. Noonan opined in an Addendum that the value of the home at the time of 
death was $139,000. The Department filed the Appraisal Report and the Addendum with the 
Court as a result of the Personal Representative's failure to do so. 
Presuming the Personal Representative lacks sufficient private resources to purchase the 
decedent's life estate interest and pay the Department's claim, the Department filed its Petition to 
Compel Sale of Home and Payment to the Department. This Brief is filed in support thereo£ 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Appropriate Value of Decedent's Life Estate Interest Is $53,712.38. 
Pursuant to the appraiser's opinion contained on page two of the Addendum, the 
"estimated value of the subject property as of 03/03/2007 is $139,000." See Notice of Filing 
Appraisal Report and Addendum. Decedent died at age 83 on March 3, 2007. The value of 
decedent's life estate interest at the time of death is computed by using the Life Estate Table 
found in IDAPA 16.03.05.837.02 (Apr. 2, 2008). The applicable factor for the life estate interest 
at age 83 is .38642. The appraisal value of the home times this factor equals $53,712.38. 
"Where the language of a rule is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the rule as 
written, without engaging in construction." Schroeder v. Department of Transportation, 2009 
Opinion No. 34 at 5 (Idaho Ct. App., Apr. 30, 2009). Because the rule for the valuation of life 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION- 2 , , 0 
estate interest is plain and unambiguous, the Court herein must give full force and effort to the 
rule. Therefore, the appropriate value of decedent's life estate interest is $53,712.38. 
2. Decedent's Estate Has $66,466.21 in Available Assets to Pay the 
Department's Claim. 
Given the life estate value and other estate assets contained in the Personal 
Representative's Inventory filed herein, assets available to pay the Department's claim are 
computed as follows: 
a. Life Estate Interest 
(1) Moyie Springs Home 
b. Cash and Notes 
( 1) Bank Account 






Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-3-805 only reasonable costs and expenses of administration 
may be deducted from this amount. The approved claims from Principal Financial Group and 
Boundary Community Hospital may not be paid ahead of the Department under this provision. 
Principal Financial is clearly a general claimant while the local hospital was obliged to either 
timely bill medicaid or accept its payments in full. IDAPA 16.03.09.210 (Mar. 30, 2007). 
Therefore and subject to cost of administration, the decedent's estate has $66,466.21 in available 
assets to pay the Department's claim. 
3. The Department Is Entitled to Prejudgment Interest. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-806 ( d), "allowed claims bear interest at the legal rate for 
the period commencing sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of the claim has 
expired .... " According to the Affidavit of Publication on file with the Court, Notice to Creditors 
was first published August 16, 2007. The six month period thereafter (4 months plus 60 days) 
expired on February 16, 2008, or the time prejudgment interest began to run. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION- 3 J J J 
The prejudgment rate of interest under Idaho Code § 28-22-104(1) is 12 percent per 
annum. Prejudgment interest from February 16, 2008 and through July 10, 2009, computes to 
$11,362. 70. Per diem interest is $21.85 thereafter. Prejudgment interest is especially 
appropriate in the present case since the Personal Representative has been living in the home 
since decedent died, and has paid no rent to the estate based on his life estate share in the 
property. Therefore, the Department is entitled to prejudgment interest. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should compel the Personal Representative to 
forthwith sell the home in Moyie Springs. Her free ride at the Department's expense is over. 
The Court should also order the Personal Representative to take sale proceeds and pay the 
Department $66,466.21, plus allowable prejudgment interest thereon and less reasonable costs 
and expenses of estate administration. 
Dated this /{)(\.,day of July, 2009. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE 
A:<2ki= 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for the Department 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION- 4 /I@ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, on the l ()1, day of July, 2009 to: 
HONORABLE JUSTIN W. JULIAN 
MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
BOUNDARY COUNTY, IDAHO 
POBOX419 
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805 
CATHIE L PETERSON 
CIO JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE STREET SUITE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF~~.1Wo~Rf' 2: 12 
In the Matter of the Estate of 





) ORDER GRANTING PETITION TO 
) COMPEL 
) 
THIS MATTER crune before the Court on July 28, 2009, pursuant to the Petition to 
Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Department, and the Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare (Department) appeared through counsel, Larry L. Goins, Deputy Attorney General, 
while the Personal Representative appeared in person and through counsel, John A. Finney, and 
the Court having heard argument from respective counsel and with good cause appearing 
therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department's Petition to Compel Sale of Home and 
Payment to Department be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Personal Representative shall use all due diligence and 
vigor to forthwith prepare and list for sale the home located at P.O. Box 442 (Roosevelt), Moyie 
Springs, Idaho. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the listing price shall be reasonable and reflect fair market 
value for the home and area. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Personal Representative shall accept the first 
reasonable offer received from a qualified buyer. 
ORDER GRANTING PETITION TO COMPEL - 1 l I~ 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any closing or settlement charges for such items as realtor 
commissions, title insurance and related items, shall be shared in accordance with the proportionate 
interests in the home of the Personal Representative (remainderman) and decedent (life estate) at the 
time of death on March 3, 2007. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the decedent's estate shall be entitled to receive the life 
estate value of $53,712, less the decedent's proportionate share of closing or settlement charges 
incurred. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon receipt of net sale proceeds by the estate, the 
Personal Representative shall timely prepare and file all necessary papers to close this estate and pay 
the Department the monetary value of all assets contained in the estate, less reasonable costs of estate 
administration as may be determined by the Court, if necessary. 
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that upon the failure of the Personal Representative to comply 
with this Order, she may be subject to removal and a successor personal representative may be 
appointed in her place and stead, or ft{h other judicial r 
SO ORDERED this // day of A st, 2009. 
Magi 
ORDER GRANTING PETITION TO COMPEL - 2 115 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
GRANTING PETITION TO COMPEL was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the 
\\ ~ day of August, 2009 to: 
LARRY L. GOINS 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
3276 ELDER, STE B 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720 
CATHIE PETERSON 
C/O JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE ST STE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
ORDER GRANTING PETITION TO COMPEL - 3 '\ ~ 
ORIGINAL 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: 208-263-7712 
Fax: 208-263-8211 
ISB No. 5413 
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TO: THE RESPONDENT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH .AND WELFARE, .AND 
THE RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY, LARRY L. GOINS, DEPUTY ATTORNEY 
GENERAL .AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT CATHIE PETERSON, PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MELVIN PETERSON, herein 
APPELLANT, appeals pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83 and Idaho Code § 17-
201, as follows: 
1. The title of the court from which the appeal is taken 
is the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the First 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of 
Boundary, Magistrate Judge Justin W. Julian, presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 ll1 
2. The title of the court to which the appeal is taken is 
the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho in and for the County of Boundary. 
3. The date and heading of the judgment or decision from 
which the appeal is taken is the Order Granting Petition To 
Compel, filed August 11, 2009. 
4. The appeal is taken upon both matters of law and 
matters of fact. 
5. The testimony and proceedings of the original trial or 
hearing were recorded by the Boundary County Clerk and are in 
the possession of the Boundary County Clerk. The proceedings 
resulting in the order were held on July 28, 2009, as well as 
related proceedings held June 3, 2008. 
6. The issues on appeal upon which the appellant intends 
to assert in the appeal (but such list is not an exhaustive 
list), and provided that any such list of issues on appeal shall 
not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal 
thereafter discovered by the appellant is as follows: 
a. Did the Magistrate err in its application and 
interpretation of Idaho Code § 58-218? 
b. Did the Magistrate err in its application and 
interpretation of IDAPA 16.03.05.833, .837, and .841? 
c. Did the Magistrate err in its making findings 
when no evidence was ever presented? 
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d. Did the Magistrate err in its purported assertion 
of jurisdiction over real property vested in a person not a 
party to the proceeding? 
e. Did the Magistrate err in purportedly concluding 
that the decedent had an interest at the time of death (or 
alternatively in determining the extent of such interest) in 
certain real property? 
f. Did the Magistrate err in proceeding with bias 
and animosity toward the personal representative? 
g. Upon remand, should the Magistrate be removed 
from further proceedings 
Dated this ~ 
in the matter? 
of August, 2009. 
f-4-t ~ JJ HN A. FINNEY ~
rNNEYF:NNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Division of Human Services 
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COM&$ NOW the Appellant, CA.THIE PETERSON, PPSORAL 
RIPRESEN'l'ATIVB OF TD ESTATE OF MILVIN PETERSON, by and thr:ouqh 
counsel, JOBN A. FINNEY, of FINNEY FINNEY & F:nontY, P . A. , and 
subait• this Appellant'• Brief pu:suant to the Notice Of Settlinq 
Transcript On Appeal, filed October 9, 2009, as fol1ows: 
I . S'l"ATEMBN:t' 01' THE CASE 
A. Hature Of The Case 
This :i.• an appeal pursuant to J:.R..C.P. 83 and Idaho Code S 
17-201 in the above referenced estate from the Magistrate 
Pivi•ion of the District Court of the First Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Boundary, Magistrate 
Judge Justin W. Julian, presiding. The judgment or decision from 
which the appeal is taken is the Order Granting Petition To 
Compel, filed August 11, 2009, which is based upon proceedings 
held on July 28, 2009, as well as proceedings held June 3, 2008. 
The nature of the issue on appeal is the application of Idaho 
Code § 56-218 to the life estate interest held by Melvin 
Peterson, the Decedent herein, immediately prior to death. 
B. Course Of Proceedings In The Court Below 
Relevant to the issue upon this appeal, Melvin Peterson died 
on March 3, 2007. At the time of his death, the Decedent was 
domiciled of Boundary County, Idaho. 
An Application For Informal Probate And Appointment Of A 
Personal Representative was filed July 26, 2007 and the estate 
was opened. Cathie Peterson was appointed as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Melvin Peterson, with Letters Of 
Personal Representative issued July 26, 2007. 
On April 4, 2008, an Order Granting Petition For Allowance 
Of Amended Claim was entered allowing a claim in favor of the 
State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare in the sum of 
$171,386.94. 
On or about May 5, 2008, the State of Idaho, Department of 
Health and Welfare filed its Petition To Require Payment Of 
Claim. On May 28, 2009 the Personal Representative's Inventory 
was filed as well as an Objection To Petition To Require Payment 
Of Claim. On June 3, 2008 the Petition To Require Payment Of 
Claim came for hearing, following which an Order On Petition To 
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Require Payment Of Claim was entered on June 12, 2008. The order 
provides for the payment of the claim to the extent of available 
assets and by priority set forth by statute. 
On or about July 10, 2009, the State of Idaho, Department of 
Health and Welfare filed its Petition To Compel Sale Of Home And 
Payment To Department. The Petition came for hearing on July 28, 
2009 came, following which an Order Granting Petition To Compel 
was entered on August 11, 2009. The order purports to require 
Cathie Peterson, in her individual capacity to sell real property 
solely vested in her individual name with a fixed sum paid to the 
State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare. 
On August 20, 2009 the Personal Representative filed her 
Notice Of Appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83 and Idaho Code§ 17-201. 
This proceeding follows. 
C. Statement Of Facts 
In this matter the Magistrate has not heard any testimony 
nor taken any evidence. All such matters have come as positions 
or attachments by counsel and/or essentially as offers of proof. 
It appears to be undisputed that: 
By a Gift Deed dated December 5, 2001, recorded December 6, 
2001 as Instrument No. 204218 records of Boundary County, Idaho, 
Melvin Peterson, a single person, conveyed to Cathie Peterson, a 
single person, certain real property located in Moyie Springs, 
Idaho, reserving unto himself a life estate in said property. 
Melvin Peterson began receiving Medicaid benefits from the State 
of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, some time after 
December 5,·2001. Melvin Peterson died on March 3, 2007. 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal the appellant identified in the Notice 
Of Appeal are, as follows: 
Did the Magistrate err in its making findings when no 
evidence was ever presented? 
Did the Magistrate err in its application and 
interpretation of Idaho Code § 58-218? 
Did the Magistrate err in its application and 
interpretation of IDAPA 16.03.05.833, .837, and .841? 
Did the Magistrate err in its purported assertion of 
jurisdiction over real property vested in a person not a party to 
the proceeding? 
Did the Magistrate err in purportedly concluding that 
the decedent had an interest at the time of death (or 
alternatively in determining the extent of such interest) in 
certain real property? 
III . ARGUMENT 
A. Standard Of Review 
In the Matter of Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 316, 320, 678 
P.2d 108, 112 (Idaho App., 1984), the applicable standard of 
review was set forth as follows: 
Ordinarily, in reviewing a decision of the .district court on 
appeal from a magistrate, we must determine from the trial 
court (magistrate) record whether substantial evidence 
supports the magistrate's findings of fact and whether those 
findings support the magistrate's conclusions of law. 
Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981); 
Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 
(Ct.App.1983). If so, and if correct legal principles have 
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been applied, then the district court's decision affirming a 
magistrate's judgment will be upheld. Id. Only where the 
record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete 
understanding of the material issues and the basis of the 
magistrate's reasoning will the absence of findings of fact 
not result in a remand for adequate findings. See Pope v. 
Inter.mountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988 (1982); 
In re Estate 0£ Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 525 P.2d 357 (1974). 
The standard would similarly apply to the District Court's review 
of a decision of the Magistrate Court in a probate matter. 
B. The Magistrate Erred As No Evidence Was Ever Taken And 
No Findings Ever Made 
As shown by the record and the Transcripts of the 
proceedings on June 3, 2008 and July 28, 2009, the Magistrate did 
not hear any testimony nor taken any other evidence, documents or 
otherwise. 
As set forth in the Matter of Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 
316, 320, 678 P.2d 108, 112 (Idaho App., 1984) (citations 
omitted) , "Only where the record is so clear as to give the 
appellate court a complete understanding of the material issues 
and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning will the absence of 
findings of fact not result in a remand for adequate findings." 
The Magistrate failed to make any findings of fact upon which to 
base its conclusions, and failed to make a record to provide an 
understanding of the basis for the Magistrate's reasoning in 
entering the Order Granting Petition To Compel. 
As set forth below, the Magistrate failed to take any 
evidence and failed to even set forth findings and conclusion as 
to the applicability of the statute proffered by the State of 
Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare. The Magistrate failed 
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to properly consider the statutes and rules in place. 
C. The Magistrate Mis-Applied Idaho Code § 58-218 In 
Determining An Interest In The Estate 
Idaho Code§ 58-218 provided at the time of the Decedent's 
death in 2007, as follows: 
§ 56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance 
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with 
federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid 
on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) years of 
age or older when the individual received such assistance 
may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the 
estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or 
both: 
(a) There shall be no adjustment or recovery until 
after the death of both the individual and the spouse, 
if any, and only at a time when the individual has no 
surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of 
age or is blind or permanently and totally disabled as 
defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c. 
(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint 
probate will be authorized pursuant to section 15-3-
111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under this 
section may be established in the estate of the 
deceased spouse. 
(c) The claim against the estate of the first deceased 
spouse must be made within the time provided by section 
15-3-80l(b), Idaho Code, if the estate is administered 
and actual notice is given to the director as required 
by subsection (5) of this section. However, if there is 
no administration of the estate of the first deceased 
spouse, or if no actual notice is given to the director 
as required by subsection (5) of this section, no claim 
shall be required until the time provided for creditor 
claims in the estate of the survivor. 
(d) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of 
the amount of any aid from the estate or surviving 
spouse of a recipient to the extent that the need for 
aid resulted from a crime committed against the 
recipient. 
(2) Transfers of real or personal property, on or after the 
look-back dates defined in 42 U.S.C. 1396p, by recipients of 
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such aid, or their spouses, without adequate consideration 
are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the 
district court. 
(3) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surviving 
child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind 
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 
1382c, the amount of any medical assistance paid under this 
chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) 
years of age or older when the individual received such 
assistance is a claim against the estate in any guardianship 
or conservatorship proceedings and may be paid from the 
estate. 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall 
include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets 
included within the individual's estate, as defined for 
purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other 
assets in which the individual had any legal title or 
interest at the time of death (to the extent of such 
interest) , including such assets conveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual 
through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, 
life estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified 
and paid as a debt with preference as defined in section 15-
3-805 (5), Idaho Code. Any distribution or transfer of the 
estate prior to satisfying such claim is voidable and may be 
set aside by an action in the district court. The personal 
representative of every estate subject to a claim under this 
section must, within thirty (30) days of the appointment, 
give notice in writing to the director of his or her 
appointment to administer the estate. However, if an exempt 
property allowance claim is made in an estate subject to a 
claim under this section by one (1) or more persons not 
described in subsection (2) of this section, then, to the 
extent such exempt property allowance claim exceeds the fair 
market value of the actual personal property of the decedent 
held by the estate subject to a claim under this section 
(including, but not limited to, such items as household 
furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and 
personal effects) , the persons making such exempt property 
allowance claim must file with the court, and with the 
personal representative or administrator of the estate, and 
with the department, a written statement under oath 
containing the following: 
(a) A statement that no personal property of the 
decedent has been transferred without adequate 
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consideration to any person or entity, including any 
one (1) or more of the persons making the exempt 
property allowance claim, to the actual knowledge of 
any of the persons making the exempt property allowance 
claim, within a time period commencing one (1) year 
prior to the death of the decedent and ending on the 
date of the statement; or 
(b) A statement that personal property of the decedent 
has been transferred without adequate consideration to 
any person or entity, including one (1) or more of the 
persons making the exempt property allowance claim, 
within a time period commencing one (1) year prior to 
the death of the decedent and ending on the date of the 
statement, to the actual knowledge of any of the 
persons making the exempt property allowance claim, and 
stating the fair market value of the personal property 
so transferred, and stating a reasonable description of 
such property, and stating the method of determining 
the fair market value of the personal property so 
transferred. If the written statement indicates that 
there has been such a transfer of personal property, 
then the fair market value of the personal property so 
transferred shall be subtracted from the remaining 
exempt property allowance claim, after subtraction of 
the personal property held by the estate, as described 
above, and only any still remaining portion of the 
exempt property claim may be paid by the estate to the 
persons making the exempt property allowance claim. The 
statement submitted under paragraph (a) or (b) of this 
subsection, must be signed under oath by all persons 
making the exempt property claim. 
(6) The department may file a notice of lien against the 
property of any estate subject to a claim under this 
section. 
(a) In order to perfect a lien against real or personal 
property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days 
after the personal representative or successor makes a 
written request for prompt action to the director, or 
three (3) years from the death of the decedent, 
whichever is sooner, file a notice of lien in the same 
general form and manner as provided in section 56-
218A ( 3) (a), Idaho Code, in the office of the secretary 
of state, pursuant to section 45-1904, Idaho Code. 
Failure to file a notice of lien does not affect the 
validity of claims made pursuant to this section. 
(b) The department may release the lien in whole or in 
part to permit the estate property to be administered 
by a court-appointed personal representative. 
(c) The department may foreclose its lien, without 
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probate, in any of the following circumstances: 
(i) Where no personal representative has been 
appointed after one (1) year from the date of 
death of the survivor of both the individual and 
spouse, if any; 
(ii) Where the property has been abandoned by the 
decedent's heirs or successors, if any; 
(iii) Where the real property taxes that are due 
and payable have remained unpaid for two (2) years 
and, after demand by the department, the heirs or 
successors, if any, have failed to seek 
appointment or pay the property taxes; or 
(iv) Where all parties interested in the estate 
consent to foreclosure of the lien. 
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary 
to implement this section including, but not limited to, 
rules establishing undue hardship waivers for the following 
circumstances: 
(a) The estate subject to recovery is income-producing 
property that provides the primary source of support 
for other family members; or 
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in 
the rules; or 
(c) Recovery by the department will cause the heirs of 
the deceased individual to be eligible for public 
assistance. 
(8) The cause of action to void a transfer without adequate 
consideration established in this section shall not be 
deemed to have accrued until the department discovers, or 
reasonably could have discovered, the facts constituting the 
transfer without adequate consideration. 
The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare 
("Department") has taken the position that the life estate held 
by Melvin Peterson, by the operation of Idaho Code § 56-218, has 
a value in the estate. The language relied upon is set forth in 
Idaho Code§ 56-218(4), was at the time of the Decedent's death, 
as follows: 
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(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" 
shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other 
assets included within the individual's estate, as 
defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other 
assets in which the individual had any legal title 
or interest at the time of death (to the extent of 
such interest) , including such assets conveyed to 
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased 
individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or 
other arrangement. 
The operative language in paragraph (4) does not show any 
intention by the legislature to modify the common law principals 
of property ownership, specifically including a life estate 
interest. The language specifically recognizes that the legal 
title or interest is not fee simple absolute, by the the 
parenthetical "(to the extent of such interest)". By this 
language the estate (or interest) of the remainderman and the 
estate (or interest) of the life estate holder at common law are 
recognized. 
As set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Tobias v. State 
Tax Commission, 85 Idaho 250, 255, 378 P.2d 628, 630 (1963), 
Estates or interests in lands are of two kinds: freehold 
estates, consisting of any estate of inheritance or for life 
in either a corporeal or incorporeal hereditament existing 
in or arising from real property of free tenure; and estates 
less than freehold, consisting of estates for years, estates 
at will and estates at sufferance. Fowler v. Marion & 
Pittsburg Coal Co., 315 Ill. 312, 146 N.E. 318. 
'* * * a freehold estate is an interest in real property, 
that is measured at least by a life, and * * * includes all 
lifetime interests as well as for such as are greater. * * * 
A life estate is an interest in real property, the duration 
of which is limited by the life of some person. * * * It is 
of no consequence how uncertain the duration of the estate 
may be. If it can or may continue during a life, it is a 
freehold or life estate. It outranks an estate for hundreds 
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of years, because it is said that no one knows how long a 
man may live.' Thompson on Real Property, Vol. 2, § 780. 
An estate measured by a tenant's life is a freehold, though 
subject to termination upon a future contingency during the 
lifetime. Jones v. Jones, 281 Ill. 595, 117 N.E. 1013. 
A life estate is followed by a remainder interest. In this 
action, the remainder interest was held at the time of the 
instrument of conveyance and is now held by Cathie Peterson in 
her individual capacity. The remainder interest is not held by 
the Estate or by Cathie Peterson in her capacity as Personal 
Representative of the Estate. As set forth in Wilson v. Linder, 
110 P. 274, 275 (Idaho 1910), 
* * * they take the property, not by descent or as 
successors of the [deceased], but by virtue of the remainder 
which was created for them at the execution of the deed to 
him. This remainder, although not capable of immediate 
enjoyment (Id. section 690), and therefore denominated a 
'future interest,' is, nevertheless, an estate in the 
property capable of being transferred in the same manner as 
a present interest. (Id. § 699) . 
Lastly, a life estate terminates upon the moment of death, 
and the deceased person at the moment of death, has no interest 
or estate. The remainder interest previously vested, becomes the 
present possessory interest at the moment of death. As set forth 
in Coats v. Harris, 75 P. 243, 245 (Idaho 1904), 
The title to property is always in some one, and in this 
case upon the death of Levi Harris it immediately vested in 
Alvin M. Harris, and if he had died without the transfer to 
his mother, his children would have inherited it. State v. 
Stevenson et al. (Idaho) 55 Pac. 886; Page on Wills, §§ 657, 
658, 659, 695. 
Even pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4), the life estate 
interest held by Melvin Peterson up to the moment of this death, 
terminated at the moment of this death. The Magistrate erred in 
purportedly concluding that the decedent had an interest at the 
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time of death in certain real property based upon a life estate. 
D. The Magistrate Mis-Applied Idaho Administrative Code 
Provisions in 16.03.05.831 to .841 In Determining An 
Interest In The Estate 
The Idaho Administrative Code provisions set forth in 
16.03.05.831 though .841, provide for a penalty for transfers of 
assets prior to obtaining Medicaid assistance. The State of 
Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare proffered that I.A.C. 
16.03.05.837 provides for a valuation of the life estate held by 
Melvin Peterson prior to death. The Magistrate mis-applied the 
provisions of .837, which provide the calculation for a penalty 
imposed for a transfer for less than fair market value during the 
applicable look back period. Idaho Administrative Code 
16.03.08.837 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
01. Transfer of a Remainder Interest. When a life estate in 
real property is retained by an individual, and a remainder 
interest in the property is transferred during the look-back 
period for less than the fair market value of the remainder 
interest transferred, the value of the uncompensated 
remainder is subject to the asset transfer penalty as 
described in Sections 831 through 835 of these rules. To 
compute the value of the life estate remainder, multiply the 
fair market value of the real property at the time of 
transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age 
at the time of transfer listed in the following table: 
TABLE 837.01 -
REMAINDER TABLE 
[table omitted, except for:] 
Age 83, Remainder = .61358 
02. Transfer of a Life Estate. When a life estate in real 
property is transferred by an individual during the look-
back period for less than fair market value, the value of 
the life estate is subject to the asset transfer penalty as 
described in Sections 831 and 835 of these rules. To compute 
the value of the life estate, multiply the fair market value 
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of the real property at the time of transfer by the life 
estate factor for the participant's age at the time of 
transfer listed in the following table: 
TABLE 837.02 -
LIFE ESTATE TABLE 
[table omitted, except for:] 
Age 83, Life Estate = .38642 
Idaho Administrative Code 16.03.08.833 provides for the 
applicable look back-periods with transfers prior to February 8, 
2008 having a thirty-six (36) month look-back period. In 
addition, Idaho Administrative Code 16.03.08.841 provides for 
Penalty Exceptions To Asset Transfers, and .04 thereof provides 
for transfers to adult children that provide care. The only 
scenario under which these provision would apply to Melvin 
Peterson, would be in determining if a transfer was made during 
the look-back period for less than fair market value and what the 
applicable penalty period (unless an exception applied) would be 
imposed prior to receiving Medicaid coverage. The tables are 
inapplicable to determining the claimed value of a life estate at 
the moment of death. The tables provide for valuations for 
transfers made during life, at the time of transfer. The tables 
do not apply as urged by the State of Idaho, Department of Health 
and Welfare. 
The Magistrate erred in purportedly concluding that the 
decedent had an interest at the time of death and in purportedly 
determining the extent of such interest, in certain real property 
based upon a life estate. 
E. The Magistrate Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over Real 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 13 
Property Vested In A Person Not A Party To The 
Proceeding (Cathie Peterson in her individual capacity) 
And Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over Real Property Not 
Vested In the Estate 
The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare seeks 
relief (sale of real property) against real property that is not 
a part of the Estate and which is not vested in the Estate. 
There is no authority in the statutes cited for any such relief 
to the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare in the 
administration of in the probate Estate. There is no authority 
for the Magistrate Court to order a person to sell their 
property. The Magistrate has no jurisdiction over Cathie 
Peterson in her individual capacity. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(b) is not authority for the proposition 
that a third party must sell its property in an estate 
proceeding. There is no cause of action or claim against the 
third party or the third party's real property properly able to 
be brought in the probate proceeding. The vested owner of the 
property is Cathie Peterson, in her individual capacity. 
At the hearing of July 28, 2009, the State of Idaho, 
Department of Health and Welfare, unequivocally conceded as 
follows: 
* * * 
COURT: So Mr. Goins, if - if the decedent has simply 
Quitclaimed in full fee simple the property to his daughter 
in 2001 and then began receiving the services for which the 
Department is now seeking reimbursement, it looks like 
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beginning March 1st, 2003, would you have any remedy under 
those facts? 
MR. GOINS: No. 
COURT: You'd be completely out? 
MR. GOINS: We would. 
COURT: So .. 
MR. GOINS: Unless within a four year period from the 
date of transfer we could have filed a district Court action 
to set aside based upon, uh, uh, inadequate consideration 
for that transfer. 
* * * 
Transcript 07/28/2009, Page 9-10. The Life Estate ceased at the 
moment of death, and the property is vested and has been vested 
since the deed of 2001 in Cathie Peterson. 
F. The Estate Is Entitled To Recover Attorney Fees On 
Appeal To The District Court 
The Estate is entitle to recover attorney fees against the 
State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 12-117. The application of the statute is explained 
in another estate involving another Medicaid recovery claim by 
the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare in In re 
Estate of Kaminsky , 141 Idaho 436, 439, 111 P.3d 121, 124 
(Idaho, 2005), as follows: 
Idaho Code§ 12-117, which governs the award of 
attorney fees in proceedings between persons and state 
agencies, provides: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any 
administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving 
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as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or 
other taxing district and a person, the court shall 
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court 
finds that the party against whom the judgment is 
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law. 
(Emphasis added). Idaho Code § 12-117 is not a discretionary 
statute. It provides that the court shall award attorney 
fees upon a finding that the state agency did not act with a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. Idaho Dept. of Law 
Enforcement v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 685, 873 P.2d 1336, 
1339 (1994). The policy behind I.C. § 12-117 is: "1) to 
serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency 
action; and 2) to provide a remedy for persons who have 
borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending 
against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes 
agencies never should ha[ve] made." Id., (quoting Bogner v. 
State Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859, 693 
P.2d 1056, 1061 (1984)). 
Here, the Department's action invokes both purposes of 
the statutory policy. The action was groundless because the 
Department clearly waited too long to present its claim. It 
was not even required to do so. It is appropriate to 
discourage such action. Further, the Department's action 
placed an unjustified financial burden on the Estate. Thus, 
we award attorney fees on appeal to the Estate pursuant to 
I.C. § 12-117. 
Appeals from the Magistrate Division to the District Court 
are governed by I.R.C.P. 83(a) et seq. Berning v. Drumwright, 
122 Idaho 203, 832 P.2d 1138 (1992). Attorney fee statues, such 
as Idaho Code § 12-117 are applicable on appeal to the District 
Court. The procedure for determining the amount of such fees is 
governed by Idaho Appellate Rules 35 and 41. I.R.C.P. 83(x). 
The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare has 
proffered a position that Idaho Code § 56-218(4) creates an 
interest in real property vested in an estate involving Medicaid, 
when a life estate was held by the decedent prior to death, that 
the valuation tables for transfers for less than fair market 
value during the look-back periods in I.A.C. 16.03.05.837 are the 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 16 \35 
value of the claimed Medicaid life estate interest, and that the 
Magistrate can compel a third-party to sell real property which 
is in no way vested in the Estate. This position is without a 
reasonable basis in law or fact, and attorney fees should be 
awarded to the Estate to discourage such action and to allow 
recovery for the unjustified financial burden placed on the 
Estate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Order Granting Petition To Compel, for the grounds set 
forth above, was entered upon reversible error, and is not 
supported by fact or law, and should be reversed. The Estate is 
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees incurred in this 
appeal to the District Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and 
is entitled to an award of costs. 
DATED this l~y of November, 2009. 
~-T r ~A. FINNEY ==-==---r-
Attorney for Appellant Estate 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a Medicaid estate recovery case governed by Idaho Code § 56-218. "Medicaid 
estate recovery" is a program required by federal Medicaid law that seeks to recover assets of 
deceased Medicaid recipients, from their estates, in order to reimburse the taxpayers for 
expenditures made during the Medicaid recipient's life. This case involves a life estate interest 
which the Medicaid recipient had retained when he gifted his real property to his daughter. The 
Department seeks to recover the value of that life estate interest pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-
218( 4)(b ). 
Course of Proceedings 
Cathie Peterson was appointed personal representative in this matter July 26, 2007. The 
Department filed a "Claim Against Estate," and an "Amended Claim Against Estate," each of 
which was disallowed by the personal representative. Upon the petition of the Department, and 
after a hearing, the Court on, April 4, 2008, entered an "Order Granting Petition for Allowance of 
Amended Claim." This order approved the Department's claim in the amount of$171,386.94. 
On May 5, 2008, the Department filed a "Petition to Require Payment of Claim" asking, 
among other things, for the court to order "the Personal Representative to promptly pay the 
Department's Amended Claim Against Estate." After a hearing held on June 3, 2008, the court 
entered its "Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim" granting the Department's petition, 
and ordered that "the life estate interest decedent held in real property at the time of death, be and 
the same is hereby, deemed to be [an] asset of the estate for the limited purpose of medicaid 
estate reoovery by the Department." The court also ordered, among other things, that the 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 1 Z:\MRCases\Estate\PetersonMelvin\Respondents Brief.wpd 
personal representative pay the Department's claim "to the extent of available assets in the 
estate." 
On August 6, 2008, the personal representative filed a "Motion to Hire Appraiser." After 
a hearing, the court entered its "Order Approving Hiring of Appraiser." The appraisal, showing a 
value of$139,000 at the time of death, was filed with the court through a "Notice of Filing 
Appraisal Report and Addendum" on July 15, 2009. 
On July 15, 2009, the Department filed its "Petition to Compel Sale of Home and 
Payment to Department." After a hearing the court entered its "Order Granting Petition to 
Compel" on August 11, 2009. This appeal followed. 
Statement of the Facts 
Melvin Peterson ("Melvin") was born  and died at the age of 83 on March 
3, 2007. Petition to Require Payment of Claim, ~ 1. Prior to his death, but after reaching the age 
of 55, Melvin applied for and received state medical assistance (Medicaid) benefits in the amount 
of$171,386.94. Petition to Require Payment of Claim,~ 2. Melvin owned real property in 
Moyie Springs which, on December 6, 2001, he conveyed to his daughter Cathie Peterson, 
retaining a life estate. Exhibit "A" to Petition to Require Payment of Claim. Melvin possessed 
this life estate interest at the time of his death. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The personal representative did not number the issues presented for appeal. For clarity in 
argument, the Department sets forth the personal representative's issues and numbers them here: 1 
1. Did the Magistrate err in its making findings when no evidence was ever 
presented? 
2. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code 
§ 58-218? 
3. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation ofIDAPA 
16.03.05.833, .837, and .841? 
4.. Did the Magistrate err in its purported assertion of jurisdiction over real property 
vested in a person not a party to the proceeding? 
5. Did the Magistrate err in purportedly concluding that the decedent had an interest 
at the time of death (or alternatively in determining the extent of such interest) in certain real 
property? 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Department should be awarded its attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-117. 
1By restating the personal representative's issues, the Department does not agree that all of these issues are 
properly before the court. See discussion below. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
ISSUES ARISING FROM THE MAGISTRATE'S JUNE 12, 
2008, ORDER, AND PRIOR ORDERS, ARE FINAL, 
COMPLETE AND NO LONGER SUBJECT TO APPEAL. 
The order which the personal representative appeals from here is dated August 11, 2009. 
The personal representative, however, attempts to challenge issues from the Magistrate's "Order 
on Petition to Require Payment of Claim" which was entered more than a year earlier on June 12, 
2008. The matters decided in that prior order are final, conclusive, and not subject to challenge 
in this appeal. 
A. Probate Petitions, Unlike Ordinary Civil Litigation. Are Swarate, Indtmendent Actions. 
Probate differs from regular civil litigation. Except for supervised administration, each 
probate petition is a separate, independent, matter: 
15-3-107. Scope of proceedings-Proceedings independent-Exception -
Unless supervised administration as described in Part 5, chapter 3, of this code is 
involved, (1) each proceeding before the court or registrar is independent of any 
other proceeding involving the same estate .... 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-107. Unlike regular civil litigation, probate is not a single continuous 
proceeding. The Department's "Petition to Require Payment of Claim" was an independent 
action which was concluded by the court's June 12, 2008 order. Matters arising from that order, 
and prior to it, are final and conclusive and are not subject to challenge here. The June 12, 2008, 
order included the following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition to Require Payment of Claim 
filed by the Department, be and the same is hereby, granted to the extent of 
available assets in the estate, and the order of priority of the claim, as set forth by 
statute. 
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IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 56-218 (4)(b), the life estate interest decedent held in real property at the time of 
death, be and the same is hereby, deemed to be any [sic] asset of the estate for the 
limited purpose of medicaid estate recovery by the Department. 
Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim, p. 1. The personal representative improperly 
attempts to challenge these holdings in appeal in her issues 2, 4, and 5. 
B. The Magistrate's June 12, 2008, Order Directing Payment of the Department's Claim 
from the Life Estate Interest is Final, Conclusive. and Not Subject to Challenge Here. 
Because probate differs from regular civil litigation, probate has a specific statute to 
define finality of probate matters for appeal. Idaho Code§ 17-201 provides, in part, as follows: 
17-201. Appealable judgments and orders. - An appeal may be taken to 
the district court of the county from a judgment, or order of the magistrates 
division of the district court in probate matters: 
*** 
4. Against or in favor of setting apart property, or making an allowance 
for a widow or child. 
5. Against or in favor of directing the partition, lease, mortgage, sale or 
conveyance of real property. 
* * * 
7. Refusing. allowing or directing the distribution or partition of an estate, 
or any part thereof, or the payment of a debt, claim, legacy or distributive share. 
*** 
Idaho Code§ 17-201 (underline added). 
The June 12, 2008, order made two important decisions that were appealable within 42 
days after the entry of the order: First, the order required the payment of the Department's claim. 
This was appealable under subsection (7). Second, the order set aside the life estate interest as an 
asset of the estate for purposes of estate recovery and the payment of the Department's claim. 
This effectively ordered the real property to be partitioned for purposes of payment of the 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 5 Z:\MRCases\Estate\PetersonMelvin\Respondents Brief.wpd 
Department's claim. This was appealable under subsection (4), (5), and (7). The personal 
representative, however, did not appeal. 
In appeal issues 2, 4 and 5, the personal representative attempts to challenge the June 12, 
2008, order setting apart the life estate as an asset of the estate for estate recovery and requiring 
the Department's claim to be paid, if necessary, from those assets. When appealable orders are 
not appealed within the time permitted, they become final and are no longer subject to challenge. 
In re Lundy's Estate, 79 Idaho 185, 190, 312 P .2d 1028, 1030-1 (1957). Issues 2, 4, and 5 are 
final and no longer subject to appeal. 
The case of Wilson v. Fackrell, 54 Idaho 515, 34 P.2d 409 (1934) involved a petition for 
specific performance of a contract to make a gift. The probate court entered an order requiring 
the administrator to convey a two-thirds interest in real property to the petitioner. The order was 
reversed by the District Court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended the 
probate court order was not appealable. The Supreme Court found the argument without merit: 
The contention is without merit. Where, as in this case, the probate court decrees 
specific performance of a contract, one objecting to the petition has no remedy 
except by appeal, and his right to do so is granted by I. C. A.§ 11-401, which 
provides: 
"An appeal may be taken to the district court of the county from a 
judgment, or order of the probate court in probate matters:*** 
5. Against or in favor of directing the*** conveyance of real property." 
Wilson v. Fackrell, 54 Idaho at , 34 P.2d at 410. In this case, by ordering that the life estate 
interest was subject to the Department's claim, the magistrate, in essence, ordered the partition of 
the real property, a portion of which was a part of the decedent's estate for purposes of Medicaid 
estate recovery. 
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Similarly, in a recent, unreported, decision from the state of Montana, the court found an 
order requiring payment in compensation for a life estate interest in real property to be an 
appealable order. In the case of Estate of Burton, 209 WL 2217535 (Mont. 2009) (copy attached) 
the decedent's will left a life estate in certain real property to his domestic partner, Vanek. The 
decedent's ex-wife and business partner, Geshell, was appointed personal representative. The 
probate court held that the interest granted to Vanek had become a financial interest and upon a 
petition for allowance, on September 30, 2005, ordered Geshell to pay $129,679 to Vanek in 
compensation for the life estate interest. More than a year later, the personal representative, 
Geshell, appealed a number of other issues in the probate case and also attempted to appeal the 
September 30, 2005, order as well. The Montana Supreme Court, however, held that the 
September 30, 2005, order had been an appealable order, and the personal representative having 
failed to appeal that order, the issues were waived: 
Geshell's appeal of the September 30, 2005 order to pay Vanek $129,679 
for the life estate is untimely under M.R.App. P. 1 (2005). A party in a civil case 
may appeal from a judgment or order " refusing, allowing, directing the 
distribution or partition of any estate, or any part thereof, or the payment of a debt, 
claim, legacy, or distributive share .... " M.R.App. P. l(b)(3) (2005). M.R.App. P. 
5(a)(l) (2005) requires that a civil appeal be filed within 30 days from entry of 
judgment. Geshell failed to appeal the September 30, 2005 order within 30 days of 
Vanek filing her entry of judgment on October 18, 2005. Thus, we conclude that 
Geshell waived her right to appeal the District Court's decision to grant Vanek 
$129,679 as her financial interest in lieu of the life estate. 
Estate of Burton, slip op. at 2. 
In this case, the June 12, 2008, order was an appealable order. Having failed to appeal 
that order, issues 2, 4 and 5 are no longer subject to appeal. 
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C. The June 12. 2008. Order Should Have Concluded this Matter, Leaving Only an 
Appraisal and a Mechanical Application of the Probate Code Priorities. 
The June 12, 2008, order decided all of the important issues in this matter. That order 
should have concluded the Department's litigation in this estate. Beyond the substantive issues 
decided in that proceeding, the order also required the personal representative to add the life 
estate to the estate inventory and to assign an appropriate value. Assigning a value to the life 
estate interest was a simple matter of valuing the real property, and then applying a mathematical 
calculation from life estate valuation tables. 
The personal representative clearly saw this as a mechanical process, where only the 
value of the real property at the time of the death of the Medicaid recipient was in question and 
then the value of the life estate could be determined by application of the life estate tables. At 
the hearing that resulted in the June 12, 2008, order, the attorney for the personal representative 
stated: 
MR. FINNEY: Correct. Date of death and - I mean .... the factoring 
table is nothing more than an actuary table. It's - it's an actuary table that applies 
to some value. We've got an offer, I guess, of the value but we disagree with it 
and- I don't anticipate them showing up in the- in the Amended or 
Supplemental, Court ordered Inventory or whatever - whatever we end up 
labeling it but, um, I see that determination as another day. But I see the Court 
ordering today. as the Court's going to enter and order. is that we have to assess or 
assign a value to the quote life estate interest and - and file an amended document 
in Court and ifthe State's in agreement with then we probably won't have any 
objections. If the State's in disagreement we'll have objections and have to have 
an evidentiary hearings that I would submit can't come in on my opinion of value 
and Mr. Goins opinion of value. I'd actually like to have some - some evidence 
to make that determination. 
Tr. (Hearing of June 3, 2008), p. 18, L. 11-22 (underline added). 
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Subsequently, the personal representative sought, and obtained an appraisal of the real 
property. This appraisal was obtained by the personal representative, pursuant to the order she 
had sought. However, she did not file the appraisal with the court.2 That was done by the 
Department on July 15, 2009, through its ''Notice of Filing Appraisal Report and Addendum." 
As with other probate documents, this document is deemed to include an oath and affirmation. 
Idaho Code § 15-1-310. Therefore, it could appropriately be considered by the court. The 
personal representative has not objected to this appraisal. Indeed, how could she? She requested 
it. She selected the appraiser. 
Even after having the appraisal in hand, the personal representative refused to comply 
with the court's June 12, 2008, order. Consequently, it was necessary for the Department to 
bring a petition to compel the personal representative to act. The Department did so by filing its 
"Petition to Compel Sale of Home and Payment to the Department." The Department's "Petition 
to Compel Sale of Home and Payment to the Department" sought to compel the personal 
representative to comply with the court's prior order by selling the real property in order to pay 
the Department's claim. It is from the order establishing the value of the life estate (which the 
personal representative should have done once the appraisal was complete), and requiring the 
property to be sold to pay the Department's claim, that the personal representative appeals. 
However, she is also attempting to reach the June 12, 2008, issues by refusing to comply with 
that order and forcing another proceeding to compel compliance. The order appealed from, the 
"Order Granting Petition to Compel" entered August 11, 2009, does not revisit these issues. It 
2This is possibly because the appraised value was substantially higher than the assessed value which the 
Department had offered to use is calculating the value of the life estate. 
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merely gives the personal representative specific instructions for complying with the prior order 
by requiring the estate property to be sold and the Department's claim to be paid. Only issues 1 
and 3 are from the August 11, 2009, order which is the subject of this appeal. The other issues 
are final and not subject to appeal.3 
II. 
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS FAILED TO 
IDENTIFY ANY ISSUE OF FACT THAT WOULD 
REQUIRE FORMAL FINDINGS BY THE MAGISTRATE. 
In the personal representative's first issue on appeal, she complains that the magistrate 
failed to issue findings of facts. Findings of fact are required when matters are tried to the court 
without a jury. Rule 52(a), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, there was no trial of any 
issue of fact. This is because the underlying facts were presented to the court in the form of 
sworn statements, and no factual issue was ever raised. While the Notice of Appeal states that 
the court's August 11, 2009, order was appealed ''upon both matters oflaw and matters of fact" 
(Notice of Appeal, if 4), the issues presented in Appellant's Brief are all issues oflaw, not fact. 
The personal representative does not identify any factual issues. He has identified no offer of 
proof, and no objection to any of the facts presented by the petitions before the court. 
Probate petitions are deemed to include an oath or affirmation: 
15-1-310. Oath or afiirmation on iIIed documents - Except as 
otherwise specifically provided in this code or by rule, every document filed with 
the court under this code including awlications. petitions. and demands for 
notice, shall be deemed to include an oath. affirmation, or statement to the effect 
that its representations are true as far as the person executing or filing it knows or 
is informed, and penalties for perjury may follow deliberate falsification therein. 
3Should the District Court find that the June 12, 2008, order was not an appealable order and the issues decided 
there are subject to appeal here, the Department has provided its arguments to those issues in the appendix to this brief. 
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Idaho Code § 15-1-310 (underline added). Therefore, the facts set forth in the petitions establish 
the underlying facts needed for the court to decide the issues of law presented. The personal 
representative had every right to file objections and put any of those facts into issue. This could 
have been done by filing written objections, counter-affidavits, or by voicing objections and 
offers of proof on the record. None of this was done. As stated in the Matter of Estate of 
Spencer, 106 Idaho 316, 678 P .2d 108 (App.1984), cited by the personal representative, a person 
wishing to contest a probate petition must make proper objections on the record: 
As a general rule, if a person interested in an estate wishes to contest an account 
presented by the executor, 
he must make proper objections .... In adjudicating on an account the 
personal representative occupies the same status as the plaintiff in an 
ordinary civil action and the objector ... occupies the same position as the 
defendant, while the report of the representative and the exceptions thereto 
stand as the pleadings of the parties and limit the issues to be tried. [34 
C.J.S. Executors and Administrators§ 883 (1942) (footnotes omitted).] 
Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho at 320, 678 P.2d at 112. In this case, the personal representative has 
failed to identify any fact, to which he appropriately objected on the record, which might have 
required an evidentiary hearing with the resulting finding of facts. 
III. 
THE MAGISTRATE CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE 
VALUE OF THE LIFE ESTATE INTEREST. 
In her third issue on appeal, the personal representative contends that the magistrate 
incorrectly used the Department's rules governing life estate values in establishing the value of 
the life estate. Again, however, this issue arises in the context of the Department's "Petition to 
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Compel Sale of Home and Payment to the Department." The June 12, 2008, order had required 
as follows: 
IT IS FINALLY HEREBY ORDERED that the Personal Representative of 
the estate, be and she is hereby, directed to further amend the Personal 
Representative's Inventory and assign an appropriate value to decedent's life estate 
interest held in real property at the time of death. 
Order On Petition to Require Payment of Claim, p. 2 (underline added). It was the personal 
representative's refusal to comply with this order that prompted the Department's petition to 
compel. Even at the hearing of the matter, the personal representative refused to offer any 
reasonable valuation of the life estate interest, and wanted only to continue to argue that the life 
estate had no value after the death of the Medicaid recipient, which issue had already been 
decided in the June 12, 2008, order. See Tr. (Hearing of July 28, 2009), p. 4, L. 3 top. 5, L. 9, 
and p. 8, L. 9-23. Just as in argument before the magistrate, in her Appellant's Brief the personal 
representative still fails to suggest a reasonable value for the life estate, or even to suggest a 
reasonable alternative methodology for calculating the value (from, for example I.R.S. or 
insurance company actuarial charts). She only wants to re-argue the issues decided against her in 
the June 12, 2008, order. The magistrate chose the only reasonable valuation method provided 
by either party by adopting the Department's life estate valuation tables found in Department 
rules. 
Obviously, life estates have value. These are values that are determined every day for 
various reasons. The magistrates's June 12, 2008, order required the personal representative to 
value the life estate "at the time of death." The Department has adopted rules for establishing 
these values for Medicaid recipients. The life estate valuation tables are found at IDAP A 
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16.03.05.837. The tables are adopted from the Social Security POMS (Program Operation 
Manual System)4 and are, therefore, the same valuation tables the Social Security Administration 
would use. 
While the personal representative is correct that these tables would be used in 
determining the asset transfer penalty if the life estate had been gifted away during life, there is 
no reason the life estate tables cannot be used in all circumstances where the value must be 
determined for Medicaid purposes. Certainly, there is no language in the rules that places limits 
on their use to only calculating transfer penalties. Had the Medicaid recipient made a voluntary 
transfer moments before his death, these are undisputably the tables that would be used to 
determine the value he had given away. It is logical to use the same tables to determine the value 
passing at death to the remainderman which is recoverable through estate recovery. 
IV. 
THE MAGISTRATE CORRECTLY ORDERED THE 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO LIQUIDATE ESTATE 
ASSETS TO PAY THE DEPARTMENT'S CLAIM. 
In her fourth issue on appeal, the personal representative argues that the court lacked the 
authority to order her to sell the real property, jointly owned by her and by the estate, in order to 
satisfy the Department's claim. In making this argument, she lumps two legal issues into one. 
The first issue is whether the court had personal jurisdiction over her sufficient to determine that 
the real property gifted to her was encumbered by the life estate interest subject to the 
Department's claim. The second issue is whether the court could order her to sell the property in 
order to satisfy the Department's allowed claim against the estate. The first issue was necessarily 
4I>OMS SI 01140.120. 
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decided as part of the court's June 12, 2008, order and is no longer subject to challenge. It is 
established in this case that the real property remains subject to a life estate interest which is an 
asset subject to the Department's claim.5 The second issue is discussed here. 
A. The Real Property Subject to the Department's Claim Is in the Possession of the Personal 
Representative. 
It is without dispute that the personal representative is in possession of the real property 
gifted to her. See Exhibit "A" to Petition to Require Payment of Claim. An estate is not a legal 
entity, natural or artificial person "but merely [a] name to indicate [the] sum total of assets and 
liabilities of decedent." Town of Trumbull v. Palmer, 104 Conn.App. 498, 502, 934 A.2d 323, 
328 (App. 2007); see also In re Peterson, 156 Cal.App.4th 676, 679, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 584, 586, 
fn. 1 (Cal.App. 5 Dist. 2007) ("A probate or trust estate is not a legal entity; it is simply a 
collection of assets and liabilities"). An estate does not own real property. Id. In this case, the 
property is personally owned by the personal representative, subject to the life estate interest, and 
is within her power and control. 
B. The Personal Representative Is a Fiduciary Who Has a Duty to Take Possession of the 
Assets of the Estate. 
The personal representative seeks to divide herself, and claims that she exists as a 
personal representative separately from her existence as an individual. Such a divided person 
doesn't exist even in the hypothetical world. Instead, the personal representative is a single 
person who is also a fiduciary and a trustee. See Idaho Code§ 15-1-201(18). As a fiduciary and 
5This issue is discussed in the Appendix in the event the court determines that the June 12, 2008, order was not 
a final, appealable, order. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 14 Z:\MRCases\Estate\PetersonMelvin\Respondents Brief.wpd 
trustee, she is obligated to use her powers in the best interest of the successors of the estate, 
including the Department: 
15-3-711. Powers of personal representatives-In general - Until 
termination of his appointment a personal representative has the same power over 
the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust 
however, for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate. This 
power may be exercised without notice, hearing, or order of court. 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-711; see also Idaho Code§ 15-3-703 ("A personal representative is a 
fiduciary who shall observe the standards of care applicable to trustees"). She has the duty to 
take possession of the assets of the estate: 
15-3-709. Duty of personal representative- Possession of estate -
Except as otherwise provided by a decedent's will, every personal representative 
has a right to, and shall take possession or control of, the decedent's property .... 
The request by a personal representative for delivery of any property possessed by 
an heir or devisee is conclusive evidence, in any action against the heir or devisee 
for possession thereof, that the possession of the property by the personal 
representative is necessary for purposes of administration .... He may maintain an 
action to recover possession of property or to determine the title thereto. 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-709 (underline added). If the life estate interest weren't already part of the 
real property in her possession, and over which she has control, she could be required to obtain 
possession of it through any necessary legal process. 
C. The Personal Representative Has Authority to Partition and to Sell Real Property and the 
Court Can Require Her to Fulfill Her Duty. 
A personal representative has authority to partition or sell real property. Idaho Code 
§ 15-3-715(6). The court has authority to enter orders to secure proper performance of a personal 
representative's duties. Idaho Code §§ 15-3-607; 15-3-105. In its August 11, 2009, order, the 
court required the personal representative to take several steps to sell the real property and satisfy 
the Department's claim. The court also ordered: 
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IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that upon the failure of the Personal 
Representative to comply with this Order, she may be subject to removal and a 
successor personal representative may be appointed in her place and stead, or such 
other judicial remedy as may be appropriate. 
Order Granting Petition to Compel, p. 2. If a successor personal representative were appointed, 
there is no question but that he would have authority to bring an action against Cathie Peterson, 
the current personal representative, for partition of the real property. This would necessarily 
involve the sale and division of the assets of the estate, just as the magistrate ordered here. 
Since, at present, the personal representative is in possession of the real property, there is no need 
for her to sue herself to acquire possession and control. She already has it. Her argument has 
nothing to do with any legal inability, but rather has to do with her personal interest in keeping 
the real property, including the life estate interest, for herself. 
v. 
THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AW ARD ED ITS 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
CODE§ 12-117. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides, in part, as follows: 
12-117. Attorney's Fees, Witness Fees and Expenses Awarded in 
Certain Instances. - (1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any 
administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state 
agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall award 
the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees. witness fees and reasonable 
expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) (underline added). The personal representative has acted, and has failed 
to act, without any reasonable basis in fact or law. She continues to resist complying with the 
June 12, 2008, order which was never appealed. There is no reasonable basis for this appeal. 
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The personal representative complains about an absence of findings of fact when she herself 
failed to object to any of the facts presented and failed to place any fact into issue. Likewise, the 
personal representative complains about the use of the Department's life estate tables, but failed 
herself to offer any reasonable alternative, and instead continues to simply drag her feet to avoid 
paying the Department's claim. Finally, the personal representative makes an argument, that 
lacks anylegal basis, regarding her inability to partition and sell property which is in her 
possession. The Department should be awarded its attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The personal representative did not appeal the June 12, 2008, order which established the 
availability of the life estate interest and required her to pay the Department's claim. Instead, 
after the Department was forced to bring a petition asking the court to compel her to act, she now 
wishes to go back to "square one." Her failure to comply with the court's June 12, 2008, order 
does not create a new right to appeal. The issues correctly before the court are insubstantial and 
evaporate away under scrutiny. The order appealed from is correct in every way. 
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VI. 
APPENDIX 
A. The Life Estate Is an Asset Subject to Estate Recovery. 
In 1993, Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, commonly 
referred to as OBRA '93. This act, codified primarily in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, contained a number 
of provisions intended to enhance Medicaid estate recovery, including strict restrictions on 
transfers to trusts and an expanded definition of estate. These changes were made to assure 
recovery of property that would otherwise pass outside of probate and, therefore might be lost to 
estate recovery. Idaho adopted the expanded definition of estate effective July 1, 1995. It is 
found in Idaho Code§ 56-218(4): 
( 4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such 
interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor. heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship. life 
estate. living trust or other arrangement. 6 
Idaho Code§ 56-218(4) (emphasis added). Therefore, for purposes of estate recovery, the estate 
subject to the Department's claim includes a retained life estate held by a Medicaid recipient or 
his spouse at time of death. 
This, of course, is contrary to common law. At common law, a life estate terminated and 
the interest passed to the remaindennan upon the death of the holder. Where, as here, the life 
estate passes an interest in property to a survivor or heir, Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b) abrogates 
6This language is taken word for word from 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). 
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common law to the extent necessary to preserve the life estate interest for estate recovery. 
Oregon has an estate recovery law very similar to Idaho's (indeed it is likely that Idaho's original 
estate recovery law was copied from Oregon). Oregon has also adopted the expanded definition 
of estate for purposes of estate recovery. In the case of State Dept. of Human Services v. 
Willingham, 206 Or.App. 156, 136 P .3d 66 (2006) (copy attached), Oregon brought an action to 
recover the value of a life estate of a deceased Medicaid recipient where, like here, the property 
had been conveyed to the son of the Medicaid recipient, retaining a life estate. The facts are 
nearly identical to those here. In the Willingham case, however, the life estate had been created 
in 1993 before the 1995 adoption of the expanded definition of estate. The Medicaid payments 
had been made after the adoption of the new law. Therefore, the primary issue was whether the 
1995 law would be applied to the 1993 life estate. 7 The Oregon Court of Appeals examined the 
legal effect of the expanded definition of estate and its application to life estates and concluded 
that the law abrogated the common law, and the life estate interest was preserved after death for 
purposes of estate recovery: 
Based on that change in the law in 1995, we agree with the state that the legal 
effect of the legislature's amendment was to modify the common law rule that a 
life estate interest is extinguished under the circumstances established by the 
statute. For purposes of the recovery of medical assistance paid by the state during 
the lifetime of the holder of a life estate interest. the life estate continues to exist 
after the death of the person holding the interest. 
Willingham, 206 Or.App. at 160, 136 P.3d at 68 (underline added); see also Bonta v. Burke, 98 
Cal.App.4th 788, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 (2002) (where the Medicaid recipient mother had retained a 
life estate and a right to revoke the remainder, the life estate was not extinguished on her death, 
7This issue is not present here. The life estate in this case was created December 6, 2001, well after the July 1, 
1995, effective date ofldaho's law. 
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but rather was an asset of the estate for purposes of estate recovery); In re Estate of Laughead, 
696 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2005) (life estate in farm owned by deceased Medicaid recipient was 
required to be included in the estate for purposes of estate recovery) (copies of these cases are 
attached). 
All of these cases consistently construe the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) 
which was adopted by each state, including Idaho. 
B. The Value of the Life Estate Is Determined at the Moment Before Death. 
The personal representative seems to argue that the life estate has no value because it is 
extinguished at death. However, as shown by the cases cited above, the value of the life estate is 
determined the moment before death, not after. This issue was specifically addressed in the case 
of In re Estate of Laughead, supra: 
Whether Ruby, "at the time of her death," had an interest in the real property at 
issue here is determined as of a point in time immediately before her death. See In 
re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 2004) (holding ''the phrase 'at the 
time of death' means the time immediately before the Medicaid recipient's 
death"). Immediately prior to her death, Ruby held a life estate in 338 acres of 
land. For reasons that follow, we hold her life estate constituted an interest in real 
property within the meaning of section 249A.5(2)( c ). 
In re Estate of Laughead, 696 N.W.2d at 316. Any other interpretation would make the life estate 
language in Idaho Code § 56-218( 4)(b) a nullity. The court, of course, will not give a statute an 
interpretation which would render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 
121 (App. 2001). The purpose of the expanded definition of estate is met by recognizing the 
value of the property at the moment before the death of the Medicaid recipient. 
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C. The Personal Representative Has Submitted Herself to the Personal Jurisdiction of the 
Court. 
In her fourth issue on appeal, the personal representative argues that "[t]he Magistrate 
does not have jurisdiction over real property vested in a person not a party to the proceeding 
(Cathie Peterson in her individual capacity) .... " Again however, as discussed above, the estate 
is not a legal entity and Cathie Peterson is only a single person, not two. She is an individual 
who has a fiduciary duty in holding and managing property within her possession and control. 
The court has jurisdiction over her personally, and over the real property interest at issue here. 
No one forced Cathie Peterson to serve as personal representative in this case. She 
voluntarily petitioned for appointment. By doing so, she submitted herself to the personal 
jurisdiction of the court: 
15-3-602. Acceptance of appointment-Consent to jurisdiction - fu 
accepting appointment, a personal representative submits personally to the 
jurisdiction of the court in any proceeding relating to the estate that may be 
instituted by any interested person. Notice of any proceeding shall be delivered to 
the personal representative, or mailed to him by ordinary first class mail at his 
address as listed in the application or petition for appointment or as thereafter 
reported to the court and to his address as then known to the petitioner. 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-602 (underline added). The Department, as a creditor of the estate with an 
allowed claim, is an "interested person." Idaho Code§ 15-1-201(25). Therefore, the 
Department's petitions in this matter, properly served upon the personal representative, were 
sufficient for the court to have jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson. Contrary to her arguments, 
Cathie Peterson was a party to all of these proceedings. 
The magistrate court has exclusive jurisdiction over these probate proceedings: 
15-3-105. Proceedings affecting devolution and administration-
Jurisdiction of subject matter - Persons interested in decedents' estates may 
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apply to the registrar for determination in the informal proceedings provided in 
this chapter, and may petition the court for orders in formal proceedings within 
the court's jurisdiction including but not limited to those described in this chapter. 
The court has exclusive jurisdiction of formal proceedings to determine how 
decedents' estates subject to the laws of this state are to be administered, expended 
and distributed. 
Idaho Code § 15-3-105 (underline added). Even if Cathie Peterson could somehow divide 
herself and claim that she must be served individually, the notices she received were sufficient 
under the probate code: 
15-3-106. Civil litigation--Notice - Subject to general rules concerning 
the proper location of civil litigation and jurisdiction of persons, the court may 
herein determine any other controversy concerning a succession or to which an 
estate, through a personal representative, may be a party. Persons notified are 
bound though less than all interested persons may have been given notice. 
Idaho Code § 15-3-106 (underline added). There is no question concerning the magistrate 
court's jurisdiction over the personal representative, whether personally, or in her capacity as 
personal representative of this estate. 
DATED this 10 day of December, 2009, 
~~ W. COREYi RTWRIGHT C> D:Y::Y:: 
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*I , I Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), 
Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal Operating 
Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memor-
andum decision shall not be cited as precedent. It 
shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court and its case title, Supreme 
Court cause number and disposition shall be in-
cluded in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable 
cases published in the Pacific Reporter and 
Montana Reports. 
, 2 Sylvia Geshell (Geshell) appeals from orders of 
the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula 
County, relating to the administration of the Estate 
of Larry Gordon Burton (Burton). We affirm. 
, 3 Geshell presents the following issues on appeal: 
, 4 Whether the District Court was correct in con-
cluding that Geshell waived her right to appeal a 
September 30, 2005 order distributing a portion of 
the estate. 
, 5 Whether the District Court's findings of fact 
were clearly erroneous. 
~ 6 Whether the District Court erred by appointing 
Diana Vanek (Vanek) personal representative in 
preference to those having other priority. 
, 7 Whether the District Court abused its discretion 
in awarding Vanek attorney fees. 
, 8 Burton died testate on August 14, 2004. 
Geshell, Burton's ex-wife and business partner in 
Creative Arts, was appointed personal representat-
ive of the Estate on August 20, 2004. Burton's last 
will and testament made the following devise, 
among others, to Vanek, his domestic partner: "I 
also request [Vanek] be allowed to live at my 
Rattlesnake home free of any rent for as long as she 
chooses to do so, or until she remarries." On 
September 3, 2004, Vanek filed a claim against the 
Estate asserting her status as a creditor and recipi-
ent under the will of a rent-free life estate in the 
Rattlesnake home, along with a notice of !is pen-
dens on the property. On September 14, 2004, 
Geshell filed a motion for approval of sale of real 
estate free oflis pendens, to which Vanek objected. 
, 9 On December 17, 2004, following a hearing, the 
court held that the interest granted Vanek became a 
financial interest and allowed the sale of the 
Rattlesnake residence. Vanek amended her claim 
against the Estate accordingly, but Geshell denied 
Vanek's claim. Vanek filed a petition for allowance, 
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which the District Court granted on September 30, 
2005, "to the extent that [Vanek] is entitled to dis-
tribution of $129,679.00, as her financial interest in 
the specific devise that she be 'allowed to live at 
my Rattlesnake home free of any rent for as long as 
she chooses to do so, or until she remarries.' " 
Vanek filed her notice of entry of judgment on Oc-
tober 18, 2005. 
, IO On October 31, 2005, Geshell filed a motion 
for certification pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 54(b) re-
questing that the District Court certify that all of 
Vanek's claims against the Estate were adjudicated 
within its September 30, 2005 order. Vanek objec-
ted to the certification motion on the grounds that 
Geshell failed to meet the burden of proof required 
by M.R. Civ. P. 54{b) and that the motion was un-
timely since other claims still required adjudication. 
On May 1, 2006, the District Court denied Geshell's 
request for certification. Over a year later, on May 
15, 2007, Geshell moved to reconsider the Septem-
ber 30, 2005 order. The District Court denied 
Geshell's request on August 21, 2007, concluding 
that Geshell failed to act to set aside the judgment 
within a reasonable time. 
*2 , 11 On April 8, 2008, Vanek filed a petition for 
supervised administration arguing that Geshell had 
wrongfully administered the Estate such that 
Vanek's devises could not be satisfied and request-
ing that Geshell be removed as personal represent-
ative. On May 20, 2008, Geshell filed the final ac-
count, petition for determination of testacy, for de-
termination of heirs, and for settlement and distri-
bution of a testate estate by personal representative. 
Geshell's inventory stated that Creative Arts and 
Burton's photography collection, which had been 
devised to her, had no value. Geshell's final account 
did not include payment of the financial interest to 
Vanek. Geshell also had paid $120,000 of Creative 
Arts' debts with Estate money, claiming that the 
money taken was a loan, although no written note 
or security instrument were provided to assure re-
payment. On July 7, 2008, the District Court con-
ducted a hearing on pending petitions, in which 
both Geshell and Vanek testified. The District 
Court issued lengthy findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and an order on August 27, 2008. Geshell 
was removed as personal representative for wrong-
fully administering the Estate and Vanek was inser-
ted in her place. 
, 12 Geshe!l's appeal of the September 30, 2005 or-
der to pay Vanek $129,679 for the life estate is un-
timely under M.R.App. P. I (2005). A party in a 
civil case may appeal from a judgment or order " 
refusing, allowing, directing the distribution or par-
tition of any estate, or any part thereof, or the pay-
ment of a debt, claim, legacy, or distributive 
share .... " M.R.App. P. l(b)(3) (2005). M.R.App. P. 
5( a )(I) (2005) requires that a civil appeal be filed 
within 30 days from entry of judgment. Geshell 
failed to appeal the September 30, 2005 order with-
in 30 days of Vanek filing her entry of judgment on 
October 18, 2005. Thus, we conclude that Geshell 
waived her right to appeal the District Court's de-
cision to grant Vanek $129,679 as her financial in-
terest in lieu of the life estate. 
, 13 Turning to the District Court's August 27, 
2008 findings of fact, a finding is "clearly erro-
neous" if it is not supported by substantial evid-
ence, if the trial court misapprehended the effect of 
the evidence, or if review of the record convinces 
this Court that the district court made a mistake. In 
re Estate of McDermott, 2002 MT 164,, 22, 310 
Mont. 435, 51 P.3d 486. Geshell argues that various 
findings are unsupported by evidence in the record. 
However, Geshell limits her argument to testimony 
presented at the July 7, 2008 hearing and thereby 
ignores previous hearings, argument, testimony, 
and extensive briefing in the almost four years prior 
to that hearing. Our review of the record does not 
convince us that the District Court's findings of fact 
were clearly erroneous. 
, 14 Geshell argues that the District Court erred by 
appointing Vanek personal representative in prefer-
ence to family members that Burton listed in his 
will as alternate executors. We review a district 
court's conclusions of law to determine whether 
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they are correct. Estate of McDermott, , 22. Noth-
ing in the record indicates that Burton's alternate 
executors were willing or able to act as personal 
representative, had any stake in the administration 
of the Estate, or were informed of the current status 
of the Estate. As noted above, the court had the be-
nefit of an extensive record, and we find no reason 
to conclude that the District Court was incorrect by 
appointing Vanek personal representative. 
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*3 , 15 Finally, Geshell argues that the District 
Court erred in awarding Vanek attorney fees since 
she was not personal representative at the time she 
incurred the fees. We review a district court's grant 
of attorney fees for abuse of discretion. In re Mar-
riage of Gorton and Robbins, 2008 MT 123, , 45, 
342 Mont. 537, 182 P.3d 746. The District Court 
determined that Geshell breached her fiduciary duty 
to Vanek by failing to fairly value all Estate prop-
erty, failing to abate devises in order of statutory 
priority, by taking cash from the Estate, and by fail-
ing to distribute money and property devised to 
Vanek. Vanek incurred attorney fees as a result of 
Geshell's wrongful conduct, and by substituting 
Vanek for Geshell as personal representative, the 
District Court ordered recovery of Vanek's attorney 
fees. The District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding Vanek her attorney fees as allowed by 
§ 72-3-632, MCA. 
, 16 We have determined to decide this case pursu-
ant to Section I, Paragraph 3( d) of our 1996 Internal 
Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, which 
provides for memorandum opinions. It is manifest 
on the face of the briefs and the record that the ap-
peal is without merit because the issues are clearly 
controlled by settled Montana Jaw; the issues are 
factual and there clearly is sufficient evidence to 
support the findings of fact below; and the issues 
are ones of judicial discretion and there clearly was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
, I 7 Affirmed. 
We concur: JOHN WARNER, W. WILLIAM 
LEAPHART, JIM RICE, and JAMES C. NELSON. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Background: State filed complaint against de-
ceased father's son for recovery of medical assist-
ance paid to father during father's lifetime. Com-
plaint alleged that father had transferred real prop-
erty to son while reserving a life estate. The Circuit 
Court, Multnomah County, Michael C. Zusman, J. 
Pro Tern., granted summary judgment to son, and 
State appealed. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Edmonds, P.J., 
held that amendment to statute governing recovery 
of medical assistance paid by State during lifetime 
of holder of life estate interest was intended to 
reach life estates created before time of amend-
ment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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EDMONDS, P.J. 
*158 The state appeals from a grant of summary 
judgment under ORCP 47 to defendant on the 
state's claim to recover medical assistance paid to 
defendant's father during his lifetime. ORS 414. l 05 
. We reverse. 
The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. 
In 1993, Jack Willingham transferred certain real 
property to his son, defendant, reserving a life es-
tate. In 1997, he applied for medical assistance 
from the state, which he received until his death in 
2002. Thereafter, the state, on behalf of the Depart-
ment of Human Services (DRS), filed a complaint 
against defendant for recovery of the medical as-
sistance paid to the decedent under ORS 414.105 
and OAR 461-135-0845 and alleged that "[a]s re-
cipient of the Property, defendant is liable to 
plaintiff to the extent of Decedent's interest in the 
Property." In response, defendant filed an answer 
denying that the property that he received from his 
father was subject to the state's claim. Eventually, 
the trial court ruled that the property was not sub-
ject to ORS 414.105 because the legislature did not 
intend the statute to apply to life estates created be-
fore the effective date of the 1995 amendment to 
the statute and granted summary judgment to de-
fendant. 
[I] On appeal, the state argues that the amendment 
of ORS 414.105 in 1995 abrogated the common-
law rule that a life estate is extinguished at the mo-
ment of death for purposes of recovering medical 
assistance payments from the estate of a recipient. 
Because all of the assistance was paid to defend-
ant's father after the statute was amended, the state 
contends that it is entitled to apply the statute pro-
spectively to recover the amounts that it paid to de-
fendant's father from the value of his life estate as it 
existed at the moment before his death. It posits 
that the fact "that defendant may receive less upon 
[his father's] death than anticipated is a function of 
the value of the life estate, not a result of inclusion 
of the remainder interest in the estate." 
Page3 
Defendant disagrees that the state seeks to apply 
ORS 414.105 prospectively. He reasons that be-
cause he acquired his remainder interest in 1993, 
before the statute *159 was amended, any applica-
tion of the statute to the property is retroactive in 
nature, something that the legislature did not in-
tend. Alternatively, if the statute does reach the 
property, then, according to defendant, such an ap-
plication would constitute an unconstitutional retro-
active impairment of the contract that he had with 
his father to receive the remainder interest and an 
unconstitutional taking of it. Under all of those cir-
cumstances, he concludes that the legislature could 
not have intended that ORS 414.105 be applied to 
the property that he now owns. 
[2] In light of the parties' arguments, we turn to the 
language of the governing statute as it existed after 
1995 and between 1997 and 2002 when the state 
made payments to defendant's father.FNI ORS 
414.105 provides: 
FN I . The statute was also amended in 
200 I. Those amendments do not affect the 
outcome of this case. 
"(1) The Department of Human Services may re-
cover from any person the amounts of medical 
assistance incorrectly paid on behalf of such per-
son. 
"(2) Medical assistance pursuant to this chapter 
paid on behalf of an individual who **68 was 55 
years of age or older when the individual re-
ceived such assistance * * * may be recovered 
from the estate of the individual or from any re-
cipient of property or other assets held by the in-
dividual at the time of death including the estate 
of the surviving spouse. Claim for such medical 
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be 
established against the estate, but there shall be 
no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the 
death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at 
a time when the individual has no surviving child 
who is under 21 years of age or who is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled. Transfers of 
\10 
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real or personal property by recipients of such aid 
without adequate consideration are voidable and 
may be set aside under ORS 411.620(2). 
"(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recov-
ery of the amount of any aid from the estate or 
surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that 
the need for aid resulted from a crime committed 
against the recipient. 
"(4) In any action or proceeding under this sec-
tion to recover medical assistance paid, it shall be 
the legal burden *160 of the person who receives 
the property or other assets from a Medicaid re-
cipient to establish the extent and value of the 
Medicaid recipient's legal title or interest in the 
property or assets in accordance with rules estab-
lished by the department. 
"(5) As used in this section, 'estate' includes all 
real and personal property and other assets in 
which the deceased individual had any legal title 
or interest at the time of death including assets 
conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the de-
ceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy 
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust 
or other similar arrangement." 
The issue framed by the parties on appeal-whether 
the statute applies to a life estate created in 
1993-presents an issue of statutory interpretation. 
We ascertain the intention of the legislature under-
lying a statute by first considering the text and con-
text of the language used in the statute. Part of the 
context of a statute are prior versions of the statute. 
State ex rel Penn v. Norblad, 323 Or. 464, 467, 918 
P.2d 426 (1996). In amending ORS 414.505 in 
1995, the legislature added subsection (5) to the 
statute. Before that amendment, the state could 
charge the estate of the surviving spouse even 
though the decedent's interest had passed at the 
time of death by right of survivorship. ORS 
414.105(2) (1993). However, the 1993 version of 
the statute made no reference to life estates. Thus, it 
is apparent that the legislature intended by its 1995 
amendment to reach other kinds of property in-
Page4 
terests under the statute that had not been previ-
ously subject to it. Based on that change in the law 
in 1995, we agree with the state that the legal effect 
of the legislature's amendment was to modify the 
common law rule that a life estate interest is extin-
guished under the circumstances established by the 
statute. For purposes of the recovery of medical as-
sistance paid by the state during the lifetime of the 
holder of a life estate interest, the life estate contin-
ues to exist after the death of the person holding the 
interest. 
[3][4] The next question is whether the legislature, 
by amending the statute in 1995, intended to reach 
life estates that had been created before that time. 
Generally, legislation is to be applied prospectively 
unless it appears that the legislature intended to en-
act retroactive legislation. *161Fromme v. Fred 
Meyer, Inc., 306 Or. 558, 561, 761P.2d515 (1988). 
A retroactive legislative action is one that affects 
existing legal rights or obligations arising out of 
past transactions or occurrences. U.S. Bancorp v. 
Dept. of Rev., 337 Or. 625, 637, 103 P.3d 85 (2004) 
(application of 1995 tax regulation on taxpayer for 
actions taken in 1988-1992 constituted retroactive 
application of the regulation, since taxpayer was 
entitled to presume that its tax for those years 
would be based upon apportionment formula in 
1987 regulation); see also Whipple v. Howser, 291 
Or. 475, 488-89, 632 P.2d 782 (1981) (Linde, J., 
concurring) (" 'Retroactivity' itself is a deceptively 
simple word for a complex set of problems. In real 
time, all laws can operate only prospectively, pre-
scribing legal consequences after their enactment; 
they cannot change the past. On the other hand, all 
new laws operate upon a **69 state of affairs 
formed to some extent by past events."). 
As in many cases, it is not particularly helpful to 
the analysis in this case to label the 1995 amend-
ment as "retroactive" or "prospective" in applica-
tion. Indeed, the 1995 amendment becomes 
"retroactive" in application if the focus of the ana-
lysis is on when the life estate is created, but pro-
spective in its application if the focus is on when 
l1\ 
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the state made its payments to the recipient. Rather, 
we believe the more appropriate analysis is to dis-
regard labels and to discern the legislature's intent 
regarding whether it intended the statute to apply to 
life estates that were created before the amendment. 
[5][6] "Specifically, we look first to text and con-
text and, in the absence of an express retroactivity 
clause, we consider such textual cues as verb tense 
and other grammatical choices that might suggest 
what the legislature had in mind." State ex rel Juv. 
Dept. v. Nicholl>, 192 Or.App. 604, 609, 87 P.3d 
680 (2004). We also inquire whether the legislature 
included any express retroactive application provi-
sions elsewhere in the same bill, because the failure 
to include such a provision in one part of a bill but 
not another may be an indicator of what it intended. 
Here, there are no express provisions in the bill that 
amended ORS 414.105 in 1995 that inform the 
question of whether the amendment applied to 1993 
transactions. However, the 1995 amendment in-
cluded another change to the statute that does sug-
gest an answer to *162 whether the legislature in-
tended the statute to apply to life estates that were 
created before the amendment. 
Before the 1995 amendment, subsection (2) of the 
statute provided, in part, 
"Medical assistance pursuant to ORS 411.405 
and this chapter paid on behalf of an individual 
who was 65 years of age or older when the indi-
vidual received such assistance may be recovered 
from the estate, or if there be no estate the estate 
of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged 
for such aid paid to either or both." 
The 1995 amendment changed subsection (2) of the 
statute to provide, 
"Medical assistance pursuant to ORS 411.405 
and this chapter paid on behalf of an individual 
who was 55 years of age or older when the indi-
vidual received such assistance may be recovered 
from the estate of the individual or from any re-
cipient of property or other assets held by the in-
dividual at the time of death including the estate 
\1<Q 
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of the surviving spouse." 
In promulgating the 1995 amendment, the legis-
lature included within the scope of the statute addi-
tional property interests-life estates-that had not 
been included before, and it lowered the age of the 
recipients of payments of medical assistance af-
fected by the statute from age 65 to age 55. At the 
same time, the statute, as amended, continued to fo-
cus on when the assistance payments were received 
rather than when the property interests made sub-
ject to the statute were created. That focus, together 
with the changes made as a result of the 1995 
amendment, suggest that all life estates were inten-
ded to be subject to ORS 414.105 in the event that 
their owners received assistance payments, regard-
less of when they were created. 
If the text and context of a statute are inconclusive 
regarding a question of legislative intent, as they 
are here, we next consider the legislature history 
underlying the statute. Our review of legislative 
history of the 1995 amendment does not reveal that 
the legislature expressly discussed at that time 
whether life estates created before the adoption of 
the amendment would be subject to the statute. 
Rather, the legislature added the word "life estate" 
and changed the age *163 from 65 years to 55 years 
to make the statute consistent with federal law, as 
required by federal law in order to receive federal 
funding. See 42 USC§ 1396(a)(l8) and 42 USC§ 
l 396p(4)(B). Anita Leach, assistant administrator 
for the Senior and Disabled Services Division of 
what is now DHS offered the primary testimony re-
garding the proposed bill that eventually became 
the 1995 amendment to ORS 414.105. She testified, 
"House Bill 2067 changes the Estate Recovery Law 
by which persons who receive financial assist-
ance through federal Medicaid**70 funding re-
pay a part of that assistance from their estates. 
The change lowers the age at which the state can 
begin counting the amount to be collected from 
65 to 55 years. 
"The reason for the change is a modification in fed-
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eral law. In 1993 Congress made changes to the 
federal Medicaid Estate Recovery Law lowering 
the age to 55 years. Although this law took effect 
in October 1993, we have had permission from 
the federal Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices to delay implementation until our state law 
is changed. 
"The estate collection process works as follows: 
When a person dies after receiving financial as-
sistance for medical or long term care services-
those services Oregon finances with Medicaid 
funds-the State of Oregon files a claim against 
their estate. This claim must wait until the death 
of a surviving spouse or a disabled child. Cur-
rently we can collect for services provided to per-
sons 65 years of age or older. The law change-
consistent with the federal ruling-would allow re-
covery of costs of services provided for persons 
55 years of age or older. Collections will be small 
initially because persons who seek or who are re-
ceiving assistance must be notified of our intent 
to file a claim against their estates. Collections 
will not be made on the portion of services paid 
prior to the notice. " 
Testimony, House Committee on Human Resources 
and Education, Subcommittee on Human Re-
sources, HB 2067, Mar. 13, 1995, Ex. J (statement 
of Anita Leach, Assistant Administrator, Senior and 
Disabled Services Division) (emphasis supplied). 
*164 Although the above legislative history does 
not expressly address whether the 1995 amendment 
was intended to apply to the creation of life estates 
before its enactment, the implications from the 
above testimony inform that issue. The testimony 
demonstrates that, to the extent the legislature was 
concerned with the temporal scope of the provision, 
that concern related to when financial assistance 
was provided and not to when a life estate or other 
property interest governed by the statute was cre-
ated. In light of that testimony, the fact that the stat-
ute and the legislative history underlying it make no 
distinction as to when the property interests are cre-
ated is persuasive evidence that the legislature in-
Page 6 
tended ORS 414.105, as amended, to apply to all 
life estates. 
[7][8] In addition, defendant argues that, because 
DHS's rule, OAR 461-135-0845, valued the de-
cedent's life estate as zero until the 2000 amend-
ment, it is inapplicable to the benefits paid to his 
father before February 2000. Effective August 28, 
1996, OAR 461-135-0845 provided: 
"(I) Effective July 18, 1995, a Life Estate or oth-
er Interest in Real or Personal Property or an As-
set measured by or valued with respect to a life 
span (other than the life span of the relevant re-
cipient of state assistance) shall be presumptively 
established by reference to the tables as set forth 
at 26 CFR 20.2031-7 in the Code of Federal Reg-
ulations and in effect on June I, 1996, and shall 
be valued as of the Time of Death of the recipient 
of state assistance irrespective of actual life span 
of the measuring life. The value of a Life Estate 
owned by the relevant recipient of state assist-
ance and measured by such recipient's life span 
shall be zero at the Time of Death of the recipi-
ent." 
The current version of the rule, as amended effect-
ive February 1, 2000, and in effect at the time of 
decedent's death, provides: 
"(I) Effective July 18, 1995, the value of an ex-
pressly created life estate or other interest in real 
or personal property or other asset measured by 
or valued with respect to a life span, including 
that of the relevant recipient of public assistance, 
is established by reference to the life estate valu-
ation tables set forth in this rule and is valued as 
of the *165 time of death of the recipient of pub-
lic assistance irrespective of the actual life span 
of the measuring life." 
An agency is permitted to apply a rule retroactively 
if that is the agency's intent in enacting the rule. 
May Trucking Co. v. Dept. of Transportation, 203 
Or.App. 564, 573, 126 P.3d 695 (2006). In order to 
ascertain the agency's intent in promulgating the 
rule, we first examine the text and context of the 
\ 1-3 
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rule in question. **7lld. at 574, 126 P.3d 695. 
Here, the rule expressly states that it is "[ e ]ffective 
July 18, 1995." Based on the express language of 
the current version of rule, there is no question that 
plaintiff intends the current rule to be enforced in a 
retroactive manner. 
[9] Finally, defendant argues that our interpretation 
of the statute and the rule will result in an unconsti-
tutional impairment of defendant's contract rights in 
violation of Article I, section 21, of the Oregon 
Constitution and an unlawful taking by the state un-
der the Oregon and federal constitutions.FN2 We 
understand defendant to make an "as applied" con-
stitutional challenge to ORS 4 I 4.105 rather than a 
facial challenge. Defendant argues that when his 
father irrevocably deeded the remainder interest in 
the property to him in 1993, he acquired and held a 
vested interest in the property at that precise mo-
ment that the state cannot constitutionally impair. 
To the extent that defendant made those arguments 
in the trial court, the trial court did not rule on 
them. Rather, it held that defendant was entitled to 
judgment "as a matter of law for the relief sought in 
the First Affirmative Defense[.]" That allegation al-
leges, in part, "Because this legislature did not 
evince an intent that ORS 414. I 05 be retroactive, 
this change should not apply to life estates trans-
ferred before that date[.]" Indeed, one of defend-
ant's affirmative defenses that was not ruled on by 
the trial court challenges the state's evaluation of 
the value of the decedent's life estate based on his 
projected life span and the state of his physical 
health. *166 Under the circumstances, we decline 
to review an "as applied" challenge in this appeal 
from summary judgment when the trial court did 
not consider or rule on the factual predicates to 
such a challenge. Whether there is an unlawful 
"taking'; of defendant's property or an elimination 
of a contractual obligation between defendant and 
his father will have to await a factual determination 
in the trial court.FN3 For all of the above reasons, 
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
to defendant. 
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FN2. Article I, section 21, of the Oregon 
Constitution, provides in relevant part: 
"No * * * law impairing the obligation of 
contracts shall ever be passed * * * ." An 
impairment of contract occurs under Art-
icle I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitu-
tion, when, by operation of law, there is an 
elimination of an obligation under which 
performance is required. Eckles v. State of 
Oregon, 306 Or. 380, 399, 760 P.2d 846 
(1988), appeal dismissed, 490 U.S. 1032, 
109 S.Ct. 1928, I 04 L.Ed.2d 400 ( 1989). 
FN3. We hasten to point out that the stat-
ute does not purport to apply to defendant's 
remainder interest. Indeed, as defined in 
the statute, the "estate" of his father con-
sists only of the life estate that his father 
retained, not the remainder interest held by 
defendant. Moreover, the state on appeal 
appears to agree. In its brief, it states 
"defendant's remainder interest is not itself 
being subjected to reimbursement, but 
rather the reimbursement is based on the 
value of the life estate calculated immedi-
ately before the death of the decedent and 
included in the estate." 
Reversed and remanded. 
Or.App.,2006. 
State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. Willing-
ham 
206 Or.App. 156, 136 P.3d 66 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Background: Company acting on behalf of state 
Department of Human Services filed claim against 
estate to recover Medicaid benefits. The District 
Court, Monroe County, Daniel P. Wilson, J., 
ordered that estate pay claim up to value of de-
cedent's life estate. Administrator of estate ap-
pealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Ternus, J., held 
that: 
(I) recipient's estate was liable for benefits paid on 
recipient's behalf; 
(2) recipient's life estate in farm constituted an in-
terest in real property under prior version of estate 
recovery statute; 
(3) recipient's life estate constituted a "retained life 
estate" under revised estate recovery statute; 
(4) Iowa probate law does not control determination 
of assets includable in recipient's estate for pur-
poses of satisfying Medicaid debt; and 
(5) application of estate recovery statute did not un-
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Medicaid 
I 98Hk506 Judicial Review; Actions 
198Hk512 Scope of Judicial Review 
J98Hk512(2) k. De Novo Review. 
Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court would review de novo trial court's 
decision that application of estate recovery statute 
concerning state's claim in probate matter for re-
payment of Medicaid benefits was not unconstitu-
tional application that would impair administrator's 
contractual rights to property as remainder person. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; Const. Art. 1, § 
21; I.C.A. § 249A.5, subd. 2. 
J31 Health 198H €;::::>494 
198H Health 
l 98HIII Government Assistance 
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
J 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
l 98Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
Medicaid recipient's estate was liable for benefits 
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paid on recipient's behalf, where state Department 
of Human Services paid recipient's medical and 
nursing-home bills. I.C.A. § 249A.5, subd. 2. 
[4] Health 198H €;:;:=:>494 
198H Health 
198HIII Government Assistance 
I 98HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
I 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
l 98Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
For purposes of statute defining estate of medical 
assistance recipient to include any real property in 
which recipient had any interest at time of recipi-
ent's death, whether recipient, "at the time of her 
death," had an interest in farm would be determined 
as of point in time immediately before her death. 
T.C.A. § 249A.5, subd. 2, par. c. 
[SJ Health 198H €;:;:=:>494 
198H Health 
J 98HIII Government Assistance 
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
l 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
I 98Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
For purposes of statute defining estate of medical 
assistance recipient to include any real property in 
which recipient had any interest at time of recipi-
ent's death, recipient's life estate in farm constituted 
an interest in real property. I.C.A. § 249A.5, subd. 
2, par. c. 
[6) Life Estates 240 €=:>1 
240 Life Estates 
240kl k. Nature and Incidents in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Life estate is an interest distinct from and independ-
ent of the remainder. 
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[7) Health 198H €;:;:=:>494 
198H Health 
I 98HIII Government Assistance 
198HTII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
l 98Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
Under statute requiring retained life estate to be in-
cluded in Medicaid recipient's probate estate for 
purposes of repaying Medicaid benefits, recipient's 
life estate in farm constituted a "retained life es-
tate"; life estate was created by recipient, and recip-
ient held interest in farm at time she created life es-
tate. I.C.A. § 249A.5, subd. 2, par. c. 
18) Health 1988 €;:;:=:>494 
l 98H Health 
198HIII Government Assistance 
I 98HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
198Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
Iowa probate law does not control the determina-
tion of assets includable in a recipient's estate for 
purposes of satisfying a Medicaid debt; general pro-
bate laws do not apply since there is specific law 
that addresses matter. LC.A. §§ 4.7, 249A.5, subd. 
2, pars. c, d, 633.3, subd. 15. 
[9} Constitutional Law 92 €;:;:=:>2664 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXH Obligation of Contract 
92XXII(A) In General 
92k2664 k. Application to Federal Laws 
and Regulations. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k 154( I)) 
Constitutional Law 92 €;:;:=:>2671 
92 Constitutional Law 
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92XXII Obligation of Contract 
92XXII(A) In General 
92k267 l k. Existence and Extent of 
Impairment. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k 154(1)) 
Health 198H <£=>455 
198H Health 
J 98HIII Government Assistance 
I 98HIII(A) In General 
l 98Hk452 Constitutional and Statutory 
Provisions 
198Hk455 k. Validity. Most Cited 
Cases 
Application of estate recovery statute, which allows 
repayment of Medicaid benefits from recipient's es-
tate when recipient had retained life estate, did not 
unconstitutionally impair remainderman's vested re-
mainder interest in farm in probate proceeding con-
cerning recipient's estate; state did not seek to reach 
remainder interest, and court did not order that 
value of remainder interest be included in recipi-
ent's estate. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. l, § 10, cl. 1; 
Const. Art. l, § 21; LC.A. § 249A.5, subd. 2, par. c. 
*313 John A. Pabst of Pabst Law Firm, Albia, for 
appellant. 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Barbara 
E.B. Gailoway, Assistant Attorney General, for ap-
pellee. 
TERNUS, Justice. 
This appeal concerns the scope of reimbursement 
authorized by Iowa Code section 249A.5(2) for 
payments made under the State's medical assistance 
or Medicaid program. The appellee, Health Man-
agement Systems, Inc., acting on behalf of the Iowa 
Department of Human Services, filed a claim in the 
Estate of Ruby Laughead to recover Medicaid pay-
ments made on behalf of Laughead in the years pri-
or to her death. Over the objections of the appel-
lant, Charles Laughead, Administrator of the Estate 
of Ruby Laughead, the district court included in the 
111 
Page 3 
probate estate a life estate held by Ruby Laughead 
immediately*314 prior to her demise, and ordered 
the administrator to pay the appellee's claim to the 
extent of the value of that life estate. Upon the ad-
ministrator's appeal, we affirm. 
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 
Prior to February 27, 1990, Ruby Laughead owned 
a 338-acre farm in Monroe County. On that date, 
she transferred this property to her son, Charles 
Laughead, by quitclaim deed, reserving only a life 
estate. 
In 1995, the Iowa Department of Human Services 
(the department) began providing medical assist-
ance to Ruby, primarily in the form of nursing 
home care, through Iowa's Medicaid program. See 
generally In re Estate of Kirk, 591 N.W.2d 630, 
633 (Iowa 1999) ("Medicaid is a cooperative feder-
al-state program designed to provide federal finan-
cial assistance to states that choose to reimburse 
certain costs of medical treatment for needy per-
sons. It is the primary source of public assistance 
for the elderly who reside in nursing homes."). An-
nual income attributable to Ruby's life estate, less 
taxes and expenses, was also used to pay for Ruby's 
nursing home care. 
Ruby died on July 29, 2002, and Charles was ap-
pointed the administrator of her estate. By the time 
of Ruby's death, the department had provided med-
ical assistance to her in the amount of$137,596.88. 
Consequently, Health Management Systems, Inc. 
filed a claim in Ruby's estate on behalf of the de-
partment to recover these payments. The adminis-
trator disallowed the claim, and the matter was set 
for hearing. 
At the hearing held on the department's claim the 
parties stipulated that at the time of Ruby's death 
the farm in which Ruby held a life estate had a 
value of $405,000, and Ruby's life estate interest in 
FNl 
that property had a value of $41,451.75. This 
life estate was the only potential source of payment 
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for the department's claim. The administrator ar-
gued the department should not be able to reach 
Ruby's life estate because at the time the life estate 
was created Iowa law did not require Medicaid re-
imbursement. Alternatively, he contended that even 
if the estate recovery statute in effect when Ruby 
began receiving assistance applied, Iowa Code sec-
tion 249A.5(2) (1995), it did not require that a re-
cipient's life estate be included in the recipient's 
probate estate. Finally, the administrator asserted 
that to apply any version of the estate recovery stat-
ute would unconstitutionally impair his rights to the 
property as the remainder person. See U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 1 O; Iowa Const. art. I, § 21. 
FN l . In stipulating to the value of the life 
estate, the parties asked the court to rely on 
two "life estate tables" that calculate the 
relative values of a life estate and a re-
mainder interest in property based on the 
age of the life tenant. Cf. In re Estate of 
Kirk, 591 N.W.2d at 634-35 (valuing re-
cipient's interest in joint tenancy property 
for purposes of Medicaid reimbursement in 
the same manner as required under Iowa's 
inheritance tax statute). One table is from 
the Iowa Department of Revenue and Fin-
ance and is used for purposes of determin-
ing taxable value. The other table is from 
the Department of Human Services' manu-
al and is taken from the "unisex life estate 
or remainder table" found at 26 C.F.R. § 
20 .203 I -7 ( 1994 ). Given the parties' stipu-
lation, the proper valuation of Ruby's life 
estate is not an issue in this appeal. 
The district court ruled that the statute in effect at 
the time of Ruby's death governed, and that apply-
ing the statute under the circumstances of this case 
was not an unconstitutional retroactive application. 
Therefore, the court held, Ruby's life estate was an 
asset of her probate estate, and the department's 
claim would be allowed to the extent of the value of 
that *315 asset. The court directed the administrator 
to place in the estate the amount of $41,451. 75, 
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plus interest, as provided in Iowa Code section 
535.3 (2003). See Iowa Code § 249A.5(2)(e ) 
(stating interest accrues on debt owed by Medicaid 
recipient at the rate provided in section 535.3 com-
mencing six months after the recipient's death). 
[1][2] The administrator appealed. We review the 
district court's ruling on this contested claim for 
correction of errors of law. See Iowa Code§ 633.33 
(2003). Our review of the court's decision on the 
administrator's constitutional claim is de novo. See 
In re Estate of Beck, 557 N.W.2d 270, 271 (Iowa 
1996). 
II. Statutory Framework. 
At common law, the recipient of public assistance 
was not obligated to reimburse the State for pay-
ments made on the recipient's behalf. See State ex 
rel. Dep 't of Human Servs. v. Brooks, 412 N. W.2d 
613, 614 (Iowa 1987). The common law rule was 
modified with respect to Medicaid benefits in 1994 
when Iowa adopted an estate recovery statute. See 
1994 Iowa Acts ch. 1120, § 10 (codified at Iowa 
Code § 249A.5(2) (1995)). As originally enacted, 
section 249A.5(2) stated that the "provision of 
medical assistance ... creates a debt due the depart-
ment [of human services] from the individual's es-
tate for all medical assistance provided on the indi-
vidual's behalf, upon the individual's death." Iowa 
Code § 249A.5(2) (1995). This statute also 
provided that the estate of a medical assistance re-
cipient "includes any real property ... in which the 
recipient ... had any ... interest at the time of the re-
cipient's ... death, to the extent of such interests, in-
cluding but not limited to interests in jointly held 
property and interests in trusts." Iowa Code § 
249A.5(2)(c ). Moreover, these assets were made 
subject to probate. Iowa Code§ 249A.5(2)(d ). This 
statute was the law at the time Ruby began receiv-
ing Medicaid benefits in 1995. 
Effective April 2002, the final clause of section 
249A.5(2)(c ) was amended to reach interests in 
real property "including but not limited to interests 
\lK 
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in jointly held property, retained life estates, and 
interests in trusts." 2002 Iowa Acts ch. 1086, § 2 
(emphasis added). "Retained life estate" was 
defined to include any of the following: 
a. A life estate created by the recipient or recipi-
ent's spouse, in which either the recipient or the 
recipient's spouse held any interest in the prop-
erty at the time of the creation of the life estate. 
b. A life estate created for the benefit of the re-
cipient or the recipient's spouse in property in 
which either the recipient or the recipient's 
spouse held any interest in the property within 
five years prior to the creation of the life estate. 
Iowa Code § 249A.2(1 l) (2003). The amended ver-
sion of section 249A.5(2)(c ) was in effect at the 
time of Ruby's death. 
III. Is Ruby's Estate Liable for Medicaid Payments 
Made on Her Behalf? 
[3] As noted above, section 249A.5(2) provides that 
the "provision of medical assistance" to an indi-
vidual creates a debt due the department for such 
assistance "from the individual's estate." By the 
plain language of the statute, it is the receipt of be-
nefits that gives rise to the repayment obligation. 
This statute was in effect when the department star-
ted paying Ruby's medical and nursing home bills, 
and it continued in effect to her death. Clearly, 
then, her estate is liable for the Medicaid benefits 
paid on her behalf. See In re Estate of Thompson, 
586 N.W.2d 847, 852 (N.D.1998) (holding obliga-
tion to *316 repay medical assistance benefits 
arises when recipient receives benefits). The more 
troublesome question is what assets are includable 
in her estate for purposes of satisfying this debt. We 
turn to that question next. 
IV. Is Ruby's Life Estate Includable in Her Probate 
Estate For Purposes of Payment of the Debt Owed 
to the Department? 
Page 5 
The department contends that Ruby's life estate 
must be included in her probate estate under the 
original 1994 version of section 249A.5(2)(c ) and 
under the amended 2002 version. The administrator 
argues that neither version can be constitutionally 
applied, and if they do apply, the original statute 
did not encompass life estates. The administrator's 
constitutional defense is addressed below. As for 
the question of which version of the statute controls 
or whether both apply, we need not decide that is-
sue because we conclude that under either statute 
Ruby's life estate in the real estate transferred to 
Charles must be included in her probate estate. 
[4][5] Section 249A.5(2)(c ) as originally enacted 
defined the estate of a medical assistance recipient 
to include "any real property ... in which the recipi-
ent ... had any ... interest at the time of the recipi-
ent's ... death, to the extent of such interests, includ-
ing but not limited to interests in jointly held prop-
erty and interests in trusts." Iowa Code § 249A.5 
(2)(c ) (1995). Whether Ruby, "at the time of her 
death," had an interest in the real property at issue 
here is determined as of a point in time immediately 
before her death. See In re Barkema Trust, 690 
N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 2004) (holding "the phrase 'at 
the time of death' means the time immediately be-
fore the Medicaid recipient's death"). Immediately 
prior to her death, Ruby held a life estate in 338 
acres of land. For reasons that follow, we hold her 
life estate constituted an interest in real property 
within the meaning of section 249A.5(2)(c ). 
[ 6] When this court was called upon to interpret 
section 249A.5(2)(c ) in Barkema Trust, we con-
cluded "the legislature clearly intended to define 
'estate' broadly, and to include more than legal 
title, because it defined ['estate'] to include any 
'legal title or interest.' " Id. at 55 (quoting Iowa 
Code section 249A.5(2)(c ) (2003)). Iowa law has 
long recognized a life estate in real estate as an in-
terest in that property. See Beeman v. Stilwell, 194 
Iowa 231, 237, 189 N.W. 969, 971 (1922) (stating 
"[a]n estate for life is a freehold interest in land"). 
Moreover, it is an interest distinct from and inde-
l19 
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pendent of the remainder. See Holzhauser v. Iowa 
State Tax Comm'n, 245 Iowa 525, 535, 62 N.W.2d 
229, 235 (1953). Therefore, Ruby had an interest in 
the farm immediately prior to her death, and that in-
terest-her life estate-was includable in her probate 
estate under the original version of section 249A.5 
(2)(c ). 
[7) As for the 2002 version of section 249A.5(2)(c 
), it specifically includes "retained life estates" in 
the deceased recipient's estate. Moreover, Ruby's 
life estate falls within the statutory definition of 
"retained life estate" because it was created by 
Ruby, the recipient, and Ruby held an interest in 
the farm-fee title-at the time she created the life es-
tate. See Iowa Code § 249A.2(1 l) (2003) (defining 
"retained life estate" in part as "[a] life estate cre-
ated by the recipient ... in which ... the recipient ... 
held any interest in the property at the time of the 
creation of the life estate"). Thus, the district court 
correctly ruled that section 249A.5(2)(c ) required 
that Ruby's life estate be included in her probate es-
tate for purposes of satisfying her debt to the de-
partment. Cf In re Estate of Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d 
709, 713 (Minn.Ct.App.2002) (holding Minnesota's 
estate recovery *317 statute required that recipient's 
interest in real property owned by his wife must be 
included in his estate for purposes of Medicaid re-
imbursement). 
The administrator contends this conclusion contra-
venes federal law. He relies on a provision in the 
act that amended federal law governing eligibility 
for Medicaid benefits. See Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 
1361 l(e), 107 Stat. 312, 627 (1993). Section 
1361 l(e) provided that "[t]he amendments made by 
this section shall not apply ... with respect to assets 
disposed of on or before the date of the enactment 
of this Act." Id. § 1361 l(e)(2)(B), 107 Stat. at 627 
(emphasis added). That date was August 10, 1993. 
This restriction did not apply to the amendments re-
lating to Medicaid estate recovery, however, be-
cause those amendments were in a different section 
of the act. See id. § 13612, 107 Stat. at 627 
Page6 
(amending statutes pertaining to Medicaid estate re-
covery). 
[8] We also reject an argument by the administrator 
that this issue is controlled by Iowa's probate code. 
The administrator argues probate law does not in-
clude a decedent's life estate in the probate estate 
and does not permit the administrator to pay claims 
from other than estate assets. See Iowa Code §§ 
633.3(15) (defining "estate" as "the real and per-
sonal property of a decedent"), 633.410-.450 
(providing for payment of claims, debts, and 
charges against decedent's estate). In contrast, the 
estate recovery statute provides that "[f]or purposes 
of collection of a debt created by [section 249A.5 
(2) }, all assets included in the estate of a medical 
assistance recipient ... pursuant to [section 249A.5 
(2)(c ) ] are subject to probate. " Iowa Code § 
249A.5(2)(d) (emphasis added). Thus, the general 
probate laws do not apply because there is a specif-
ic law that addresses the particular matter at issue. 
See Iowa Code § 4. 7 (providing when irreconcilable 
conflict between general and special provisions ex-
ists, special provision "prevails as an exception to 
the general provision"). In addition, as this court 
noted in Barkema Trust, Iowa chose to define 
"estate" more broadly than required by federal law, 
including assets that would not otherwise be in-
cluded within a recipient's estate under state pro-
bate law. Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d at 55. There-
fore, Iowa probate law does not control the determ-
ination of assets includable in a recipient's estate 
for purposes of satisfying a Medicaid debt. We now 
consider the administrator's constitutional defense. 
V. Is the Application of Section 249A.5(2)(c) Un-
constitutional Under the Circumstances of This 
Case? 
[9] The administrator contends the district court im-
properly applied the estate recovery statute retroact-
ively to Ruby's 1990 transfer of a remainder interest 
to her son. More specifically, he argues allowance 
of the department's claim impairs his vested re-
mainder interest in the farm in violation of the state 
l~ 
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and federal constitutions. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 
10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law impair-
ing the Obligation of Contracts .... "); Iowa Const. 
art. I, § 21 ("No ... law impairing the obligation of 
contracts, shall ever be passed."). The impairment 
arises, he contends, from the fact that he will have 
to sell or mortgage the property in order to have 
sufficient funds to place the value of Ruby's life es-
tate in the probate estate. See generally Adair Bene-
volent Soc'y v. State, 489 N.W.2d I, 5 (Iowa 1992) 
(stating person challenging statute under contract 
clause must show the state law substantially impairs 
a contractual relationship). 
The flaw in this argument is that the department did 
not seek to reach Charles' *318 remainder interest, 
nor did the district court order that the value of the 
remainder interest be included in Ruby's estate. 
That Charles may receive less upon Ruby's death 
than he anticipated can be attributed to the value of 
Ruby's life estate, not to the court's inclusion of his 
remainder interest in the probate estate. We con-
clude, therefore, that Charles' remainder interest is 
not impaired by subjecting Ruby's life estate to the 
department's repayment claim. Consequently, sec-
tion 249A.5(2)(c) is not unconstitutional as applied 
in this case. 
VI. Summary. 
The district court properly ruled the estate was li-
able for the department's claim for reimbursement 
of medical assistance payments made to the de-
cedent. In addition, the court did not err in includ-
ing Ruby's life estate in her probate estate for pur-
poses of satisfying the estate's debt to the depart-
ment. Finally, the district court correctly held sec-
tion 249A.5(2) did not have an unconstitutional ret-
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DIANA M. BONTA', as Director, etc., Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
DEBORAH S. BURKE et al., Defendants and Re-
spondents. 
No. C037609. 
Court of Appeal, Third District, California. 
May 23, 2002. 
SUMMARY 
The state Director of Health Services brought an 
action for reimbursement of Medi-Cal expenses 
against the beneficiaries of real property conveyed 
to defendants by a recipient of health services who 
had retained a life estate in the property and the 
right to revoke defendants' interest. The trial court 
granted summary judgment for defendants on the 
ground that the property was not part of the recipi-
ent's estate at the time of her death in that it had 
passed to defendants earlier. (Superior Court of 
Sacramento County, No. OOASOOO I I, John R. 
Lewis, Judge.) 
The Court of Appeal reversed. It held that, under 
real property and probate principles, defendants' in-
terest vested at the time the property was trans-
ferred, even though their mother retained the life 
estate and right to revoke. However, the court held 
that, for purposes of Medi-Cal reimbursement, 
"estate" must be construed broadly. As a life tenant, 
the recipient retained not only the enjoyment of the 
property but also the unbridled power to divest her 
daughters of any interest whatsoever. The property 
had no value to them until the recipient died. Thus, 
the recipient's interest in the property must be 
deemed to have passed to the daughters at the time 
of her death. (Opinion by Raye, J., with Scotland, 
P. J., and Davis, J., concurring.) 
HEAD NOTES 
(1) Public Aid and Welfare § 
35.2--Medi-Cal--Reimbursement for Benefits Paid-
-From Decedent's Estate--What Is Included in Es-
tate. 
In an action by the state Director of Health Services 
for reimbursement of Medi-Cal expenses against 
the beneficiaries of real property conveyed to de-
fendants by a recipient of health services who had 
retained a life estate in the property and the right to 
revoke defendants' interest, the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment for defendants on the 
ground that the property, having passed to them 
earlier, was not part of the recipient's estate at the 
time of her death. Under real property and probate 
principles, defendants' interest vested at the time 
the property was transferred, even though the their 
mother retained the life estate and right to revoke. 
However, for purposes of Medi-Cal reimbursement, 
"estate" must be construed broadly. As a life tenant, 
the recipient retained not only the enjoyment of the 
property but also the unbridled power to divest her 
daughters of any interest whatsoever. The property 
had no value to them until the recipient died. Con-
sistent with the legislative policy of reaching assets 
not irrevocably transferred to beneficiaries, the re-
cipient's interest in the property must be deemed to 
have passed to the daughters at the time of her 
death. 
[See 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 
1990) Wills and Probate, § 583; West's Key Num-
ber Digest, Social Security and Public Welfare 
~ 241.70.] 
COUNSEL 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Charlton G. Hol-
land III, Assistant Attorney General, and Frank S. 
Furtek, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
Catherine L. Hughes; Law Offices of John L. Boze 
and John L. Boze for Defendants and Respondents. 
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The difficult question posed by this case is whether 
the State of California (State) has a claim for reim-
bursement of Medi-Cal expenses against the benefi-
ciaries of real property conveyed to them by a re-
cipient of health services who had retained a life es-
tate in the property and the right to revoke their in-
terest. The trial court granted the beneficiaries a 
summary judgment against the State, concluding 
that the property was not part of the decedent's es-
tate at the time of her death. We reverse. 
Facts 
In 1994 Lennie J. Smith executed a grant deed 
granting a fee simple interest in her house to her 
daughters, Deborah S. Burke and Linda Osborn, but 
retained a life estate in the property and the right to 
revoke the remainder. Four months before Smith 
died in 1996, the deed was recorded. *790 
From September 1994 through December 23, 1996, 
the Department of Health Services (Department) 
paid for health care services and health care premi-
ums for Smith. After Smith died, Diana M. Bonta', 
the Director of Health Services, filed a complaint to 
enforce and collect money due on a Medi-Cal cred-
itor's claim for $45,357.58. The trial court denied 
the Department's motion for summary judgment 
and granted Burke and Osborn's motion for sum-
mary judgment. 
Discussion 
In 1965 the United States Congress established 
Medicaid, a cooperative federal/state program to 
provide health care services to the poor. (Tit. XIX 
of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
1396 et seq.) The federal government partially re-
imburses a state for medical assistance provided to 
eligible low-income persons as long as the state 
abides by the requirement of the Social Security 
Act to qualify for Medicaid funds. California parti-
cipates in the Medicaid program through the Cali-
fornia Medical Assistance Program (Medi-Cal). 
(Welf & Inst. Code, § 14000 et seq.) 
Congress enabled states to recover the costs for 
medical services from the estate of the former re-
cipient. (42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B).) According to 
federal law, the term "estate," with respect to a de-
ceased individual, "(A) shall include all real and 
personal property and other assets included within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of 
State probate law; and [~] (B) may include, at the 
option of the State ... any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual 
had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to 
the extent of such interest), including such assets 
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the de-
ceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or 
other arrangement." (42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4).) 
Pursuant to the federal enabling statute, California 
enacted a mandatory estate recovery program. Sec-
tion 14009.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code 
states in relevant part: "[T]he department [of Health 
Services] shall claim against the estate of the de-
cedent, or against any recipient of the property of 
that decedent by distribution or survival an amount 
equal to the payments for the health care services 
received or the value of the property received by 
any recipient from the decedent by distribution or 
survival, whichever is less." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 
14009.5, subd. (a).) 
California utilizes the federal definition of "estate." 
The regulations for the Medi-Cal estate recovery 
program define "estate" as "all real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual 
had any legal title *791 or interest at the time of 
death (to the extent of such interest), including as-
sets conveyed to a dependent, survivor, heir or as-
signee of the deceased individual through joint ten-
ancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, 
living trust, or other arrangement[.]" (Cal. Code 
Regs., tit. 22, § 50960, subd. (b)(l).) 
In Be/she v. Hope (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 161 [38 
Cal.Rptr.2d 917] (Hope), the Court of Appeal con-
sidered whether property passing by way of a re-
vocable inter vivos trust was part of the estate of 
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the decedent for purposes of recovery of Medi-Cal 
benefits. The beneficiaries of Myrtle Hope's trust 
contended that section 14009.5 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code impermissibly enlarged the scope 
of recovery allowed under federal law by allowing 
recovery from outside the estate. ( Hope, supra, 33 
Cal.App.4th at p. 170.) The court analyzed whether 
the federal statute, which before 1993 did not 
define "estate," included nonprobate transfers on 
death. 
There had been a vociferous debate on the scope of 
an "estate" prior to 1993. The court in Hope was 
part of that debate. In its attempt to decipher con-
gressional intent, the court examined the purpose of 
the Medicaid Act. "One of the express purposes of 
the Medicaid Act 'is to enable "each state, as far as 
practicable under the conditions in such state, to 
furnish ... medical assistance on behalf of families 
with dependent children and of aged, blind, or dis-
abled individuals, whose income and resources are 
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical 
services .... " (42 U.S.C. § 1396.)' [Citation.] [1(] Al-
lowing states to recover from the estates of persons 
who previously received assistance furthers the 
broad purpose of providing for the medical care of 
the needy; the greater amount recovered by the 
state allows the state to have more funds to provide 
future services. Furthermore, if a person has assets 
available to pay for the benefits, then the state 
should be allowed to recover from those assets be-
cause that person was not fully entitled to all bene-
fits." (Hope, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 173.) 
The court found the term "estate" ambiguous be-
cause it could mean probate estate or taxable estate. 
Turning to the Internal Revenue Code, wherein 
Congress included revocable transfers in the value 
of the gross estate for federal taxes, the court con-
cluded that Congress intended the term "estate" to 
be broader than the probate estate. According to the 
court in Hope, if Congress had intended such a nar-
row definition, it would have said so. (Hope, supra 
, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 173-174.) 
The court rejected the beneficiaries' argument that 
the 1993 amendment defining "estate" was compel-
ling evidence that Congress had intended to 
broaden the definition, and therefore, a pre-1993 
"estate" must be limited to *792 the common law 
definition. Because the amendment did not merely 
define "estate" but contained major substantive 
changes and additions, the court concluded "that 
Congress was merely clarifying the original intent 
by expressly declaring the meaning of the words 
used in the act. [11] We find Congress intended the 
term 'estate' to have a broad meaning. By including 
probate and nonprobate transfers on death in the es-
tate, the purposes of the act will be better achieved 
and the broad definition will ensure that assets of a 
recipient are used for the cost of care rather than 
given away." ( Hope, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 
175.) 
Two federal cases concluded otherwise. In Citizens 
Action League v. Kizer (9th Cir. 1989) 887 F.2d 
I 003 (Kizer) and Bucholtz v. Be/she (9th Cir. 1997) 
114 F.3d 923 (Be/she), the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the term "estate" as used in 42 
United States Code section I 396p prior to the Octo-
ber I, 1993, amendment was limited to the common 
law definition. Consequently, neither property 
passing to a joint tenant by right of survivorship ( 
Kizer) nor property passing to a beneficiary of a re-
vocable inter vivos trust (Be/she) was part of a de-
cedent's estate under the Medicaid Act. In Kizer, 
Judge Canby registered a dissent later embraced by 
the court in Hope. ( Kizer, supra, 887 F.2d at pp. 
1008-1009.) We need not weigh in on this debate. 
Hope, Kizer, and Be/she turned on an assessment of 
congressional intent in the absence of an express 
definition of estate. Congress has now provided a 
definition and California has incorporated it into its 
recovery program. We tum then to the words of the 
relevant statutes and regulation. 
The California Medi-Cal estate recovery program 
mandates the Department to "claim against the es-
tate of the decedent, or against any recipient of the 
property of that decedent by distribution or survival 
.... " (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 14009.5, subd. (a).) 
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Moreover, the definition of "estate" under the fed-
eral statute and the state regulation includes, in rel-
evant part, real property "in which the individual 
had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to 
the extent of such interest), including such assets 
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the de-
ceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or 
other arrangement." (42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 22, § 50960, subd. (b )(I).) 
( 1) In granting Burke and Osborn's motion for sum-
mary judgment, the trial court stated: "The law is 
clear that the fact that the grant of the fee simple in-
terest was revocable does not change the fact that 
defendants received a vested interest by the trans-
fer. [Citation.] The property interest held by de-
cedent's heirs was granted to them in 1994. The 
subject property did not pass to them by distribu-
tion or survival." The court recognized that *793 
Hope expanded the definition of estate but con-
cluded it "still requires that the transfer to the recip-
ient occur upon the death of decedent." FNI 
FNl The trial court considered Smith's 
right to transfer property without jeopard-
izing her eligibility for benefits. The Attor-
ney General asks us to take judicial notice 
of eligibility requirements. We deny the re-
quest. Eligibility is not at issue in this ap-
peal. 
The simple question is what passed when? The an-
swer for purposes of recovering Medi-Cal expenses 
is difficult. Burke and Osborn insist that their moth-
er's life estate terminated at the moment of her 
death, their interest had vested in 1994, and con-
sequently nothing passed to them "by distribution 
or survival." The Attorney General, on the other 
hand, argues that as long as the recipient of services 
reserves an interest in the property and the power to 
revoke the remainder until she dies, the property is 
in her estate. Burke and Osborn took fee simple 
possession, under the language of Welfare and In-
stitutions Code section 14009 .5, by survival. Ac-
cording to the Attorney General, "In form, there 
was transfer of a defeasible remainder interest when 
the deed was executed. In substance, Lennie 
Smith's property interest was only received by 
[Burke and Osborn] when they survived Lennie 
Smith." 
Burke and Osborn's argument is plausible because a 
remainderman's interest did vest at the time the 
property was transferred even though their mother 
retained both a life estate and the right to revoke 
their interest. ( Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial 
Home (1914) 167 Cal. 570 [140 P. 242).) But we 
must ascertain the meaning of an "estate" not as the 
term is used in either real property or probate law 
but as a term of art for the purposes of the Medicaid 
and Medi-Cal programs. In that context, we con-
clude that the State has a claim against the real 
property for several reasons. 
First, the definition of "estate" in federal and state 
law is very broad. Whatever Congress may have in-
tended before 1993, it included an expansive defini-
tion in the 1993 amendment, evidencing an intent to 
provide states with the authority to obtain reim-
bursement for medical services from beneficiaries 
who obtained their interest through a vast array of 
types of transfers. Those types of transfers include 
''.joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, 
life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." (42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), italics added.) The inclusion 
of the catchall "or other arrangement" suggests that 
Congress intended the definition to be as all-
inclusive as possible. 
Second, allowing the State to recover as much as 
possible of the costs of medical services provided 
to low-income persons furthers the purpose of the 
Medicaid and Medi-Cal programs. The recovered 
costs replenish the program and allow "the state to 
... provide future services." ( *194Hope, supra, 33 
Cal.App.4th at p. 173.) Hence, recovery does not 
turn on "technical differences in the character of 
how property is owned by a recipient of Medicaid 
Act benefits in order to permit recovery." (Id. at p. 
174.) 
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Third, Welfare and Institutions Code section 
l 4009.5, subdivision (a) compels the Department to 
file a claim against "any recipient of the property of 
that decedent by distribution or survival .... " The 
Legislature chose the term "survival" rather than 
the more familiar term "survivorship." Again, we 
must presume the choice was both intentional and 
significant. While a joint tenant takes title by the 
right of survivorship, a rather narrow class of own-
ers, the Legislature declared that the Department 
must file against those who received the property 
by surviving the decedent. Here, Burke and Os-
born's interest was realized when the power to re-
voke terminated, that is, when Smith died and they 
survived her death. 
We conclude that Smith retained a significant 
"interest in the property" until her death. As a life 
tenant she retained not only the enjoyment of the 
property but also, as the holder of the right to re-
voke the remainder, the unbridled power to divest 
her daughters of any interest whatsoever. As a con-
sequence, the property had no value to them until 
Smith died. Consistent with the legislative policy of 
reaching assets not irrevocably transferred to bene-
ficiaries, Smith's interest in the real property passed 
to her daughters at the time of her death, who took 
it by survival. The Department, therefore, is entitled 
to recover from the recipients of her property the 
cost of the medical services rendered to Smith. She 
received the services she needed during her lifetime 
and the State is entitled to reimbursement after her 
death. 
The judgment is reversed. The parties shall bear 
their own costs of appeal. 
Scotland, P. J., and Davis, J., concurred. *795 
Cal.App.3.Dist. 
Bonta v. Burke 
98 Cal.App.4th 788, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 02 Cal. 
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COMES NOW the Appellant, CATHIE PETERSON, PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MELVIN PETERSON, by and through 
counsel, JOHN A. FINNEY, of FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A., and 
submits this Appellant's Reply Brief pursuant to the Notice Of 
Settling Transcript On Appeal, filed October 9, 2009, and 
following the Respondent's Brief dated December 10, 2009, as 
follows: 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. The June 12, 2008 Order Was Interlocutory And Not Final 
Or Appealable 
The Personal Representative takes issue with the State of 
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Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare's ("Department") 
characterization of the Order On Petition To Require Payment Of 
Claim, entered June 12, 2008. The Department asserts that the 
June 12, 2008 Order did two things, first that it required 
payment of a claim and second that it "set aside the life estate 
interest as an asset of the estate for purposes of estate 
recovery ... [which] effectively ordered the real property to be 
partitioned for purposes of the payment of the Department's 
Claim." Respondent's Brief p. 5-6. The Department then argues 
that Idaho Code 17-201 made the June 12, 2008 Order appealable 
and final if not appealed within 42 days. 
Idaho Code§ 17-201, specifically subsections 4, 5, and 7, 
as urged by the Department, does not make the June 12, 2008 Order 
appealable. The order did not (4) set apart property, (5) direct 
partition of real property, nor (7) partition any part of the 
estate. The Magistrate did not set a specific value being placed 
upon the Medicaid Life Estate Inclusion. The Magistrate ordered 
that an ".Amended Inventory list - listing the fact that there is 
a life estate for which purposes of Medicaid recovery, is an 
asset to be included in the estate and also valuating [sic 
valuing] the asset." Transcript 06/03/2008, Page 20. The 
Magistrate did not set aside nor partition any specific interest 
or specific value in the property. The Magistrate did nothing 
more than determine that the Medicaid statute provides for a 
"Medicaid Life Estate Inclusion" to be included and valued. The 
Magistrate did not determine any value nor distribute nor set 
aside, nor partition the "Life Estate Medicaid Inclusion." Such 
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an order by the Magistrate is not appealable, and is not final. 
The June 12, 2008 Order was interlocutory. The Personal 
Representative objected to the relief granted in the 
interlocutory June 12, 2008 Order. The Magistrate, pursuant to a 
subsequent motion, allowed a preliminary, limited appraisal. 
The appropriate appealable order is the August 11, 2009 
Order Granting Petition To Compel. See In re Skinner's Estate, 
48 Idaho 288, 282 P. 90 (Idaho 1929) and Matter of Freeburn's 
Estate, 97 Idaho 845, 848, 555 P.2d 385, 388 (Idaho 1976). The 
August 11, 2009 Order set values and awarded certain amounts to 
the Department, and is the appealable order. The review of the 
objected to interlocutory order (June 12, 2008 Order) is subject 
to appeal and review with the final appealable order (August 11, 
2009 Order). See Matter of Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 316, 678 
P.2d 108, (Idaho App. 1984). 
The cases cited by the Department in support of its position 
each involved an actual award of a specific interest in real 
estate or a specific sum regarding an interest in real estate, 
specifically Wilson v. Fackrell (Idaho 1934) and Estate of Burton 
(Montana 2009 - unpublished and not citable as precedent). That 
is not the situation with the June 12, 2008 Order. 
The Department's assertions that the June 12, 2008 Order 
prohibits this appeal, is in error. The June 12, 2008 Order did 
not grant the Department any interest in the "Medicaid Life 
Estate Inclusion." The June 12, 2008 Order requires the Personal 
Representative to amend the inventory to show the "Medicaid Life 
Estate Inclusion" and to assign it a value. The quote cited by 
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the Department from the hearing which is set forth on Page 8 of 
the Respondent's Brief is wholly consistent therewith. The issue 
of the valuation of this fictitious "Medicaid Life Estate 
Inclusion" real estate remained to be determined. The 
Department's claim was allowed against available assets of the 
Estate, which is not an award of the Department an interest in 
any real estate or even in the "Medicaid Life Estate Inclusion." 
B. The Appraisal Was Only A Preliminary, Tentative, Short 
Form Appraisal Of The Fee Simple Value 
The Department on Page 9 of the Respondent's Brief asserts 
that the appraisal of the date of death market value of the fee 
simple value of certain real estate obtained by the Personal 
Representative is somehow controlling. Initially, the Department 
cites Idaho Code § 15-1-310 for the proposition that the 
Department's filing of the Notice Of Filing Appraisal Report And 
Addendum is admissible, because it was filed with the Court by a 
Deputy Attorney General for the Department. Idaho Code § 15-1-
310 provides that a every document filed "shall be deemed to 
include an oath, affirmation, or statement to the effect that its 
representations are true as far as the person executing or filing 
it knows or is informed, and penalties for perjury may follow 
deliberate falsification therein." That provision does not make 
the appraisal value admissible. Further, the appraisal value is 
not relevant to the issues on this appeal. 
The transcript of the hearing regarding the motion for an 
appraisal on September 15, 2008 was not requested by the 
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Department for inclusion in this appeal, and the transcript is 
not included. The Order Approving Hiring Of Appraiser was 
entered September 23, 2008 and specifically provided for "a 
preliminary, tentative, short form appraisal of the fee simple 
value" of certain real property. Also, by the Order, the 
Magistrate Court specifically reserved ruling "on the issue of 
whether a more detailed, long form appraisal is necessary" and "on 
the issue as to opinion testimony as to life estate valuation or 
expectancy, until presented with said issue by affidavit and/or 
testimony pursuant to I.R.E. 702." 
Neither the June 12, 2008 Order, nor the receipt of the 
appraisal, expressly or impliedly trigger the sale of the fee 
simple real property in order to pay the Department's claim. As 
stated on Page 9 of the Respondent's Brief, it is not until the 
Order Granting Petition To Compel entered August 11, 2009 that the 
Magistrate set a value to the fictitious "Medicaid Life Estate 
Inclusion" to be included in the assets of the estate and entered 
an order to sell not only that fictitious interest, but indeed the 
fee simple interest in the real estate. 
C. The Purported Purposes Of Idaho Code § 58-218 Do Not 
Control Over The Actual Statutory And/Or Rule 
Provisions 
In the argument contained in the Appendix starting on Page 
18 of the Respondent's Brief, the Department argues that the 
language of Idaho Code§ 58-218(4), which is reportedly taken 
"word for word from 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (4) (B)," is an "expanded" 
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definition. The language of the statute does include the term 
"life estate" but the Department ignores every other word in that 
section. The Department ignores the limiting language "to the 
extent of such interest." The Department ignores the language 
which it emphasized by underling of "including such assets 
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased 
individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement." 
The instant matter has nothing to do with the value of a life 
estate conveyed by the Deceased Melvin Peterson at the time of 
his death of to anyone. No such conveyance occurred (in fact 
there was at no time a conveyance of a life estate) . The 
Department is claiming that a life estate held until the moment 
of death, is the subject of the statute. That is an error and an 
incorrect interpretation of the express and implied language of 
the statute. 
By way of example, if a decedent, prior to death, held an 
undivided 50% joint tenancy with right of survivorship interest, 
at death, that interest would be conveyed to the other joint 
tenant by operation of the deed. That is a non-probate transfer, 
but the 50% interest of the decedent is included the estate of 
the decedent for Medicaid recovery. 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon Case of State v. Willingham 
cited by the Department is neither binding, nor on point. 
Although the language is similar in some respects (likely due to 
the federal statutes), there is no evidence that Idaho's law was 
copied from Oregon as proffered by the Department. Further, sub-
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section (5) of the Oregon statutory provisions does not have the 
limiting language as the Idaho statutory provisions. Further, 
the case cites other statutory historical amendments for their 
basis, which have nothing to do with the Idaho provisions. The 
Oregon statutory development and rule provisions are 
substantially and materially different than the Idaho provisions. 
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, following 
the 1993 Congressional amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, rejected 
the argument of the State of California's argument that comm.on 
law terms were abrogated in Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923 
(1997) , a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto (7 
pages). The 2002 California case of Bonta v. Burke cited by the 
Department attempts to distinguish the issue on appeal, but fails 
to do so, and fails to follow the Ninth Circuit's decision. 
The Department asserts in page 18 of the Respondent's Brief, 
that the comm.on law of Idaho is that when a life estate 
terminated that the interest passes to the remainderman. That is 
not the common law of Idaho. As cited in the Appellant's Brief 
on pages 10 and 11, a remainderman does not take their property 
by descent or as successors of the deceased's interest. The 
remainderman's interest was vested at the time of conveyance. 
The only thing death does, is provide for the moment of enjoying 
possession. No interest "passes" by the death of the life estate 
holder. 
Contrary to the Oregon, California, and Iowa cases cited by 
the Department, Idaho's statutory provisions must be based upon 
the actual language and the intent of the Idaho Legislature. The 
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Idaho legislature, by the language of the provision, did not 
change or abrogate Idaho common law. The legislature clearly 
made the inclusion of a non-probate transfer subject to common 
law principals by the limiting language of "to the extent of such 
interest" and by the limiting language of the necessity of a 
"convey[ance] ." Further, the State of Idaho has not adopted any 
"rules" comparable to the rules of other States for defining or 
making a "life estate" subject to the Department's claim in an 
estate. Such a result does not make the statutory provision a 
nullity, as the statutory provision only applies "to the extent 
of such interest" and nothing more. The language is contrary to 
a conclusion that the common law was somehow abrogated or 
modified, or otherwise impacted. 
D. Jurisdiction Over The Personal Representative Is Not 
Jurisdiction Over Non-Probate Assets 
The Department misconstrues the issue of jurisdiction over 
Cathie Peterson and her individual assets and liabilities. Of 
course the Court has jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson as 
Personal Representative of the Estate. The real property, 
regardless on the outcome of the proceedings, is vested not in 
the Estate nor vested in Cathie Peterson as the Personal 
Representative. If the property was vested in John Smith as the 
remainderman, it would (just like here) not be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Probate Court, just as John Smith would not. 
The Probate Court would have no jurisdiction to order John Smith 
to sell his property. 
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Similarly, if John Smith was serving as Personal 
Representative, that would not make his remainderman interest (or 
any other property he owned) subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Probate Court. Serving as Personal Representative does not, in 
and of itself, submit a person's individual assets to the 
jurisdiction of the Probate Court. 
Idaho Code § 15-3-602 provides in pertinent part, emphasis 
added, that "[b]y accepting appointment, a personal 
representative submits personally to the jurisdiction of the 
court in any proceeding relating to the estate that may be 
instituted by any interested person." As further set forth in 
the comments, the submission to jurisdiction is only as to 
proceedings relating to the estate, and nothing further. 
The Department cites the relevant Uniform Probate Code 
provisions regarding the capacity, duty, and authority of the 
Personal Representative, but fails to recognize the distinction 
between that capacity, duty, and authority compared to a person's 
individual status, duty, and authority. The status of a Personal 
Representative does not consume the individual's status. 
E. All Evidence Requires An Oath Or Affirmation, But That 
Is Not The Standard For Admissibility 
The Department appears to assert that every document or 
statement made in an estate proceeding is "admissible" or is 
"evidence" because they "shall be deemed to include an oath, 
affirmation, or statement to the effect that its representations 
are true as far as the person executing or filing it knows or is 
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informed." Idaho Code 15-1-310. An attorney is not a witness 
and is not able to give testimony in a proceeding. Issues of 
foundation and admissibility are not resolved because of an oath, 
affirmation, or statement. The Department fails to recognize 
that no actual evidence or presentation of evidence has been 
made, and therefore no factual record exists, upon which the 
Magistrate could make any decision, factual or otherwise. The 
transcripts of the hearings show that the Personal Representative 
repeatedly objection to decisions, findings, and conclusion being 
made by the Magistrate without any witness or other evidence 
being admitted. 
F. Assignment Of Value 
The Department asserts that the Personal Representative has 
somehow failed to comply with the June 12, 2008 Order and that 
such failure limits an appeal of the August 11, 2009 Order. As 
set forth on Page 3 of the July 28, 2009 Transcript, the Personal 
Representative, barring this appeal and the August 11, 2009 
Order, is ready and prepared to file an Amended Inventory 
assigning a value, and in the event of objection, to proceed with 
evidence as to the value. 
On Page 13 of the Respondent's Brief, the Department finally 
acknowledges that the rules upon which it relies do not apply to 
this circumstance. The Department even acknowledges the 
circumstance (a gift of either a life estate or a remainder 
interest prior to death, even moments prior) to which the rules 
apply. That is different than a determination of the value of a 
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life estate at the moment of death. The Department argues that 
the rules should be used "to determine the value passing at death 
to the remainderman." This logic fails to understand that 
nothing passes at death. The remainderman's interest already 
exists and is not based upon succession or inheritance. The 
Department is mixing apples and oranges in arguing that the 
valuation tables should be applied. When a person gifts either a 
life estate or a remainder interest, there is a value and the 
rules are a method for determining value based upon the person's 
life expectancy. The rules are not the only method for 
determining value in that circumstance. Upon death or at the 
moment of death, there is no value to a life estate. 
Now if a person had gifted (rather than retained) a life 
estate, and held the remainder interest at death, that remainder 
interest would have a value. That value would not be based upon 
the life expectancy of the deceased and the rule cited by the 
Department would still not apply. The Department's argument 
fails. 
G. Medicaid Life Estate Inclusion Does Not Result In Sale 
Of Property 
Notwithstanding that neither the Department nor the Estate 
have an interest or ownership in the property, if by some stretch 
of fiction, the Department (or the Estate) was validly awarded a 
38% interest in the fee simple property right, only that 38% 
interest would be subject to sale by the Estate. The Department 
argues that by operation of the statute and rules, that the real 
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property is owned jointly by Cathie Peterson in her individual 
capacity and by the Estate (through the capacity of the Personal 
Representative) . The Department then argues that all the 
property is subject to sale. Only the undivided interest would 
be subject to sale, under the broadest relief possible. 
H. The Department Is NOT Entitled To Recover Attorney Fees 
For the reasons set forth above, and in the Appellant's 
Brief, the Department is not entitled to the relief it requested 
and was granted, and is not entitled to an award of attorney fees 
and costs. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The Order On Petition To Require Payment Of Claim, entered 
June 12, 2008 was interlocutory and was not appealable. The 
Order Granting Petition To Compel, entered August 11, 2009, was 
entered upon reversible error, and is not supported by fact or 
law, and should be reversed. The Estate is entitled to an award 
of reasonable attor:~ fees and an award of costs. 
DATED this :z;t;_ day of December, 2009. 
OHN A. FINNEY 
ttorney for Appellant Estate 
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United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Charlotte BUCHOLTZ; California Advocates For 
Nursing Home Reform, a non-profit corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
Kimberly BELSHE, Director, Gerald Rohlfes, 
Chief of the Third Party Liability Branch of the 
California Department of Health Services; John 
Rodriguez, Chief Deputy Director of Programs of 
the California Department of Health Services, De-
fendants-Appellants. 
No. 96-16438. 
Argued and Submitted April 14, 1997. 
Decided June 6, 1997. 
Successors of deceased Medi-Cal recipients 
brought action seeking to enjoin state from attempt-
ing to recover costs of Medi-Cal services provided 
to recipients. The United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California, Vaughn R. 
Walker, J., granted injunction. State appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Fernandez, Circuit Judge, held 
that: (I) state could not pursue beneficiaries of inter 
vivos trusts to recover costs of Medi-Cal services 
provided to settlors, but (2) state could pursue 
transferees of deceased recipients' tenancy in com-
mon and community property for Medi-Cal reim-
bursement purposes. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Executors and Administrators 162 ~45 
162 Executors and Administrators 
I 62III Assets of Estate 
162III(A) In General 
162k45 k. Trust Estates and Other Equit-
able Estates and Interests. Most Cited Cases 
Under California common law, when person ere-
ates, and transfers property to, inter vivos trust and 
trust estate does not revert to settlor's estate on his 
death, trust property is not subject to probate ad-
ministration in settlor's estate. 
[2] Executors and Administrators 162 ~45 
I 62 Executors and Administrators 
162IIJ Assets of Estate 
162III(A) In General 
162k45 k. Trust Estates and Other Equit-
able Estates and Interests. Most Cited Cases 
Under California law, property held in inter vivos 
trust is not part of decedent's estate, even if de-
cedent-settlor retained power to revoke. 
(3] Health 198H ~494 
198H Health 
l 98HIII Government Assistance 
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
198Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak24 l.70) 
Property held in inter vivos trust is not part of de-
cedent's "estate", for purposes of recovering Medi-
caid costs. Social Security Act, § l 9 l 7(b )(I), as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b)(l). 
[4) Health 198H ~494 
198H Health 
l 98HIII Government Assistance 
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
l 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
198Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak241.70) 
State of California could not pursue beneficiaries of 
inter vivos trusts to recover costs of Medi-Cal ser-
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vices provided to settlors, as property held in inter 
vivos trust was not part of a settlor's "estate". So-
cial Security Act, § l 9 l 7(b )(1 ), as amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b)(l); West's Ann.Cal.Welf. & 
Inst.Code§ 14009.5. 
(5) Health 198H €;;:::>494 
198H Health 
l 98HIII Government Assistance 
l 98HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
l 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
198Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak24 l. 70) 
Since property held by a decedent in form of ten-
ancy in common or community property was part of 
decedent's "estate", even if excused from rigors of 
probate administration, state of California could 
pursue transferees of such property for Medi-Cal 
reimbursement purposes. Social Security Act, § 
1917(b)(l), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b)(l) 
; West's Ann.Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code§ 14009.5. 
*923 Beverley R. Meyers, Deputy Attorney Gener-
al, San Francisco, California, for defendants-appel-
lants. 
Amitai Schwartz and Antonio Ponvert, III, Law Of-
fices of Amitai Schwartz, San Francisco, Califor-
nia, for plaintiffs-appellees. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California, Vaughn R. Walker, 
District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-95-01342. 
*924 Before: D.W. NELSON and FERNANDEZ, 
Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY, District Judge.FN' 
FN* The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, 
United States District Judge for the District 
of Montana, sitting by designation. 
OPINION 
FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge: 
S. Kimberly Belshe, Director of the California De-
partment of Health Services, and other officials of 
that Department (collectively Belshe) appeal from 
the district court's injunction in favor of Charlotte 
Bucholtz, Ernest Gentile, and Janet Cottrell, who 
brought this action on their own behalves and on 
behalf of all others similarly situated, FNI 
(collectively Bucholtz). The district court determ-
ined that the State of California was not entitled to 
recover certain Medi-Cal payments from the suc-
cessors of deceased Medi-Cal recipients, when the 
successors received the property through revocable 
inter vivos trusts, or by passage without probate ad-
ministration of property held in the form of tenancy 
in common or community property. The district 
court then enjoined Belshe from taking steps to re-
cover from Bucholtz and further required steps dir-
ected toward the refund of money already re-
covered. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and re-
mand. 
FNl. Another plaintiff was California Ad-
vocates for Nursing Home Reform, but it 
did not purport to be a class representative. 
Our holdings as to Bucholtz apply to it also. 
BACKGROUND 
Although it might make for somewhat less interest-
ing reading, we will not set forth the facts involved 
in the individual cases before us. That is because all 
of the cases follow the same essential pattern, and 
nothing turns on their individual differences as far 
as this litigation is concerned. 
Basically, Medi-Cal recipients, who have since 
died, had placed property into revocable inter vivos 
trusts. When they died, the property went to the be-
neficiaries of the inter vivos trusts. 
Belshe, however, asserted that the state had a Medi-
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Cal claim against the property and the beneficiaries 
because of California Welfare and Institutions Code 
§ 14009.5, which allows for a claim "against the es-
tate of the decedent, or against any recipient of the 
property of that decedent by distribution or surviv-
al." Bucholtz asserted that federal law precluded 
application of§ 14009.5 to the beneficiaries of inter 
vivos trusts created by Medi-Cal recipients who 
died before October l, 1993. See 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b)(l) (1989).FNZ The district court agreed 
with Bucholtz. 
FN2. The law has been amended as to indi-
viduals who died after September 30, 
1993. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 13612, 
107 Stat. 312, 627-28. 
A similar, but far from the same, set of problems 
was presented by property which passed from 
Medi-Cal recipients without the necessity of pro-
bate administration because it was held in the form 
of tenancy in common or in the form of community 
property. The district court also resolved those is-
sues against Belshe. This appeal followed. 
ruRISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF RE-
VIEW 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
"A district court's grant of permanent injunctive re-
lief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion or applic-
ation of erroneous legal principles." United States 
v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 3 (9th Cir.1994) (citation 
omitted). We review questions of law de novo. See 
Twenty-Three Nineteen Creekside, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 59 F.3d 130, 131 (9th Cir.1995), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 1154, 116 S.Ct. 1034, 134 
L.Ed.2d 111 (1996). 
DISCUSSION 
Medicaid is a federal program which provides med-
ical assistance to eligible low-income persons and 
which is administered through the states under a co-
operative federal-state funding scheme. A state's 
participation in Medicaid is voluntary, but particip-
ating states must comply with the federal Medicaid 
Act. California participates through its Medi-Cal 
program. 
*925 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l),FN3 states 
which participate in the program may not recover 
medical assistance amounts "correctly paid on be-
half of an individual" except, as relevant here, 
"from his estate." It was pursuant to this enabling 
statute that California enacted the provision that al-
lows amounts to be recovered from people who re-
ceived property from a decedent "by distribution or 
survival." Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code§ 14009.S(a). 
FN3. All references are to the section as it 
existed before October 1, 1993, unless oth-
erwise stated. 
It is undisputed that Belshe believes that § 
14009.5(a) reaches property in which the decedent 
had an interest at his death, whether that property 
was held in joint tenancy, in an inter vivos trust, in 
tenancy in common, or in community property. 
Neither the parties, nor we, dispute her interpreta-
tion of that statutory provision. However, we have 
made it clear that to the extent that the California 
provision seeks to reach further than § 1396p(b)(l), 
it cannot stand. 
We thoroughly explained that in Citizens Action 
League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir.1989). In 
Kizer, California was attempting to recover Medi-
Cal payments from "persons who by right of sur-
vivorship have succeeded to property they formerly 
held in joint tenancy with a benefits recipient." Id 
at 1005. The survivors sued to tum aside the state's 
claims, and we said: 
In construing the statute, we look first to its plain I 
meaning. If the statutory language is unambiguous, 
its plain meaning controls unless Congress has 
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"clearly expressed" a contrary legislative intention. 
In addition, unless Congress has made manifest an 
intent to the contrary, a presumption obtains that 
when Congress uses a common law term, it intends 
to use it in its common law sense. 
Federal Medicaid law limits a participating state's 
ability to recoup benefits as follows: "No adjust-
ment or recovery of any medical assistance cor-
rectly paid on behalf of an individual under the 
State plan may be made, except ... from his estate. " 
Because Congress did not defme "estate" in the 
Act, we look to its common law meaning in con-
struing this statutory section. 
At common law, "estate" excluded interests in a de-
cedent's property that were formerly held in joint 
tenancy. Because the California statute is not so 
limited, appellants' argument is compelling. 
Id at 1006 (citations and footnote omitted). We, 
therefore, agreed that "use of the word 'estate' in 
the recoupment provision limits a state's recovery 
to property which descends to the recipient's heir or 
the beneficiaries of the recipient's will upon death." 
Id at 1005. In so doing, we also noted that even the 
California statute distinguished between the 
"estate" of the decedent and property which passed 
by "distribution or survival." Id at 1006 n. 3. But, 
again, the federal statute was limited to the estate 
itself Thus, the state's claims failed. 
Belshe cannot avoid the holding or implications of 
Kizer, but bridles under it and seeks some solace 
from the fact that Congress has now amended § 
13 96p(b )(1) to provide that a decedent's estate for 
purposes of recovery includes assets within his 
"estate, as defined for purposes of State probate 
law," and may, at the state's option, include assets 
which pass through "joint tenancy, tenancy in com-
mon, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other 
arrangement." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A)-(B) 
(1993). That, however, does not help Belshe's 
cause. In the first place, it draws the salient distinc-
tion between the estate for probate law purposes 
and other forms of receiving title at death. More 
importantly, as we have already said, it does not ap-
ply to decedents who died before October 1, 1993, 
the class with which we are now dealing. That un-
derscores the fact that the amendment was not 
simply a clarification of prior Congressional intent; 
it was a directive for the future. Therefore, it is 
from Kizer that we must take our lead as we tum to 
the questions raised in this case. 
A. Inter Vivos Trusts. 
For these purposes, we see no principled distinction 
between property held in an inter vivos trust and 
property held in joint tenancy. It is a commonplace 
that property held in a revocable inter vivos trust is 
entirely apart from the trustor's own estate. The 
trust is an entity all its own; one which has *926 
been used for centuries to create different results 
from those which flow from personal ownership of 
property. The result of creating an inter vivos trust 
has been no different in California. 
[1][2][3] At common law, "[w]hen a person creates, 
and transfers property to, an inter vivos trust and 
the trust estate does not revert to the settlor's estate 
on his death, the trust property is not subject to pro-
bate administration in the settlor's estate." Parrette 
v. Hutchison (Jn re Estate of Parrette), 165 
Cal.App.3d 157, 164, 211 Cal.Rptr. 313, 318 
(1985) (citation omitted); see Valentine v. Read, 50 
Cal.App.4th 787, 792, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 840 
(1996); Parson v. Parson, 49 Cal.App.4th 537, 
541-42, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 686, 688 (1996); Bier-
schbach v. Heigho (Estate of Heigho), 186 
Cal.App.2d 360, 364-65, 9 Cal.Rptr. 196, 201 
(1960); see also Be/she v. Hope, 33 Cal.App.4th 
161, 168-169, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 922 (1995) (trust 
transferred a present interest at its creation, was not 
a testamentary instrument, and property did not 
pass through estate). The property held in an inter 
vivos trust is not part of the decedent's estate, even 
if the decedent-settlor retained the power to revoke. 
See Parson, 49 Cal.App.4th at 541-42, 56 
Cal.Rptr.2d at 688; Parrette, 165 Cal.App.3d at 
164, 211 Cal.Rptr. at 318. Thus, by using accepted 
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common law defmitions-definitions used in Califor-
nia itself-property held in an inter vivos trust, like 
property held in joint tenancy, is not part of the de-
cedent's "estate" for purposes of recovering Medi-
caid costs. See Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006. 
[4] In short, a decedent's property interests in re-
vocable inter vivos trusts end at his death, and the 
property vests in accordance with the trust terms 
alone, just as a decedent's property interests held in 
joint tenancy end at his death, and the property 
vests in accordance with the terms of the joint ten-
ancy provisions alone. Belshe, therefore, cannot 
pursue inter vivos trust beneficiaries any more than 
she can pursue joint tenants. 
This is all underscored by Hope. There, Belshe 
sought to pursue revocable inter vivos trust benefi-
ciaries and argued, as she does here, that the prop-
erty should be treated as part of the decedent's es-
tate because the trust was essentially testamentary 
in character. See Hope, 33 Cal.App.4th at 164, 38 
Cal.Rptr.2d at 919. The court pointed out that 
Belshe was misinterpreting California law as it had 
been outlined by the California Supreme Court in 
Tennant v. John Tennant Mem'l Home, 167 Cal. 
570, 140 P. 242 (1914). As the California Court of 
Appeal wrote: 
Tennant holds exactly the opposite of what Depart-
ment asserts it holds. Tennant holds that a trust 
such as the one here transfers a present interest at 
its creation. It further holds that the grantor can re-
serve powers of revocation without invalidating the 
trust. 
The above authorities demonstrate that the trust 
created by Myrtle Hope is a valid trust and is not a 
testamentary document. 
The Department also argues that because the heirs 
were not vested with a present interest prior to 
Myrtle's death, then the heirs took their property 
through Myrtle's estate. The Department again mis-
characterizes language in Tennant and ignores its 
express finding rejecting the same argument made 
by the Department here and holding that the deed 
transferred a present interest in the remainder. 
Hope, 33 Cal.App. 4th at 168-69, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d at 
922 (citations omitted). The Court of Appeal was 
under no illusion that property in an inter vivos 
trust should be treated like property held as part of 
the decedent's estate. Rather, the court made it clear 
that inter vivos trust property is treated differently. 
It is true that Hope disagreed with our position in 
Kizer and opined that the word "estate," as used in 
1396p(b)(l), should have a broader meaning than 
the one we gave it. Id at 171, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d at 924 
. So be it, but we are bound by and will follow 
Kizer. Belshe cannot prevail. 
B. Tenancy in Common and Community Property. 
Property held in the form of tenancy in common or 
community property is only superficially similar to 
property held in joint tenancy or in a revocable 
inter vivos trust. While the decedent's interest in 
property held in the latter forms is not subject to his 
disposition at his death, property held in the former 
forms is. He may do what he likes with his share; 
he may devise and bequeath *927 it where he will, 
or allow it to pass under the laws of intestate suc-
cession, if that is his will. In other words, his share 
is generally subject to his disposition and to admin-
istration as part of his estate; it does not simply vest 
in others. This, surely, is the common understand-
ing of those forms of ownership. 
California has said as much regarding tenancy in 
common. See England v. Young (In re Estate oj 
England), 233 Cal.App.3d l, 4 n. 2, 284 Cal.Rptr. 
361, 362 n. 2 (1991) ("In a tenancy in common, 
each tenant has a separate but undivided interest in 
the property which can be conveyed by deed or 
will."); Rupp v. Kahn, 246 Cal.App.2d 188, 196, 55 
Cal.Rptr. 108, 113 (1966) ("[T]he decedent's in-
terest as a tenant in common is likewise part of the 
probate estate."); Yeoman v. Sawyer, 99 Cal.App.2d 
43, 46, 221 P.2d 225, 227 (1950) (Because the 
parties held the property as tenants in common, 
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upon decedent's death the undivided one half in-
terest standing in decedent's name became a 
"separate, descendible interest." (citation omitted)). 
California has been no less clear about interests in 
community property. See Allen v. Graham (In re 
Marriage of Allen), 8 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1228, JO 
Cal.Rptr.2d 916, 917 (1992) ("If the property was 
community property ... her mother's community 
half passed to her by virtue of the will."); Komara 
v. Blair (Estate of Blair), 199 Cal.App.3d 161, 166, 
244 Cal.Rptr. 627, 630 (1988) ("[I]f property is 
held as community property, one half belongs to the 
surviving spouse on the death of the other and the 
remaining half is subject to the testamentary dis-
position of the decedent."); Rupp, 246 Cal.App.2d 
at 196, 55 Cal.Rptr. at 113 ("[C]ommunity property 
is subject to administration in the [decedent's] es-
tate .... "); Thompson v. Boyd, 217 Cal.App.2d 365, 
385, 32 Cal.Rptr. 513, 525 (1963) ("[C]ommunity 
property passing from the control of the [decedent] 
by reason of his death is subject to his debts and ad-
ministration in his estate."). 
All of this militates in favor of Belshe's position, 
and Bucholtz takes too simplistic a view of our de-
cision in Kizer when she argues that simply because 
property can sometimes be received by a surviving 
spouse without actual "probate administration" it 
cannot be part of the estate. It is true that in Kizer 
we mentioned the plaintiff's argument that because 
the joint tenancy bypassed probate, it was not part 
of the estate. See 887 F.2d at 1005. But we put no 
particular weight on that argument; rather, we held 
that the property was not part of the decedent's es-
tate. 
[5] At one time, if property were part of the 
"estate," probate administration would almost cer-
tainly be called for. But legislatures in more mod-
em times have sought to avoid the necessity and ex-
penses of probate administration when there does 
not appear to be any particular reason to administer 
the estate. Thus, it has long been the law of Califor-
nia that if an estate is small enough, it can be trans-
ferred without actual probate administration. See 
Cal.Prob.Code §§ 13100-13116. The property is no 
less a part of the decedent's estate, but the expense 
of transferring it to the heirs or devisees is reduced. 
The property still passes in accordance with the dir-
ections in the decedent's will or by intestate succes-
sion. See Cal.Prob.Code §§ 13110, 13006. 
Moreover, the property remains liable for the de-
cedent's debts. See Cal.Prob.Code § 13109. Clearly, 
it is part of the decedent's estate, even though it is 
not actually subjected to administration. 
By the same token, the law of California now 
provides that assets held in the form of community 
(or separate) property can be transferred to the sur-
viving spouse without probate administration, if the 
decedent wills it to her or if she would receive it 
through intestate succession. See Cal.Prob.Code §§ 
13500-13506. The property remains subject to the 
decedent's debts. See Cal.Prob.Code § 13550. 
Again, it is perspicuous that the property has re-
mained part of the decedent's estate, even though it 
has avoided actual administration. 
Therefore, the mere fact that property which is part 
of the decedent's estate in every salient sense may 
not be put through the rigors of classical probate 
administration will not suffice to preclude Califor-
nia from proceeding against the recipients of the 
property for Medi-Cal reimbursement purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
Once again we have been asked to traverse the ter-
ritory which we covered in Kizer. We *928 have 
done so and hold that California may not pursue the 
beneficiaries of inter vivos trusts to recover the 
costs of Medi-Cal services provided to people who 
died before October 1, 1993. It may, however, pur-
sue people who received property held by the de-
cedent in the form of tenancy in common or com-
munity property. A proper reading of Kizer sub-
tends both of these results. 
We are not unmindful of the suggestion that the 
rights of recipients of property in which the de-
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cedent had an interest will vary depending on how 
that interest was held. However, people who engage 
in proper estate planning often achieve results dif-
ferent from, and better than, those obtained by 
people who are unwilling or unable to do so. Those 
results often flow from the fonn of holding title to 
property. We see nothing sinister about the fact that 
before October 1, 1993, people utilized the options 
that our sophisticated system of property law made 
available to them at the time. 
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and RE-
MANDED. The parties shall bear their own costs 
on appeal. 
C.A.9 (Cal.),1997. 
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